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ABSTPACT
This thesis is a theoretical investigation of the basic 
relationships between pollution and economic activity. The study 
considers both the positive and normative economic aspects of the 
pollution problem, although more attention is paid to the latter.
Or major interest is the relationship between pollution and economic 
growth.
The main body of the thesis commences with an analysis of an 
uncontrolled economy. Here we are interested in the stability 
characteristics of the growth process.
From the stability of uncontrolled systems we turn to the 
optimality of controlled systems. Employing Pontryagin's Maximum 
Principle we analyse the optimal control of economic activity over 
time. Initially we consider the control of pollution in the absence 
of economic growth. The joint problems of optimal investment and 
pollution control are then considered.
In order to better examine the general equilibrium nature of
the pollution problem we consider a two sector model.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
... it seems to me that given the urgency of 
the situation, both economist and environmentalist 
are obliged to take the risk of reaching across 
the boundaries of their disciplines and to accept 
the consequent criticism as something to be borne, 
cheerfully if possible, as a social duty.
Barry Commoner [1971, p 251]
This thesis is a theoretical investigation, in a deterministic 
framework, of the basic relationships between pollution and economic 
activity. The thesis examines both positive and normative aspects 
of the pollution problem. Of particular interest is the 
relationship between pollution and economic growth.
Pollution and the more general problem of environmental 
management have become popular topics for discussion in recent years. 
The environmental problem has three basic facets: population,
natural resources, and pollution. The scientific community is not 
united on the relative importance of these problems nor on the 
degree of the problem in general.
The Ehrlichs [1970] stress the population problem while 
Commoner [1971] stresses the pollution problem. This indeed has 
been the source of debate between the environmentalists. Ehrlich 
in an interview in The Ecologist [1973, p 21] said that he wished 
Commoner would "not say silly things that denigrate the role 
played by population growth or increased affluence in generating 
our problems".
1
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Maddox [1971] disagrees with the degree to which the 
"Doomsday" people think the problem has gone. He sets out to 
show that these prophecies while "founded in science, they are at 
best pseudo-science". Ehrlich in return dismisses Maddox’s work 
as "hopelessly incompetent".'*’
Economic growth is often used as a target by the 
environmentalists. The Ehrlichs [1970, p 280] claim that 
"Economic growth has become the standard for progress, the benefit 
for which almost any social cost is to be paid". In support of the 
theory that economic growth is the root of all evil are two 
computer studies, one by Forrester [1971] and subsequently 
Meadows et al [1972]. These studies set out to examine the limits 
to growth. Using the methods of "systems dynamics" these authors 
model the world system. The authors emphasize that they are only 
interested in the general behaviour of the world system and not in 
making exact predictions. The general conclusion of these studies 
is that if we continue as we are at present the system is bound to 
collapse.
These computer simulations lend weight to the Doomsday 
predictions. Indeed, many people have taken the results very 
seriously. Others have been dismayed by the reports and more so 
by their acceptance. Beckerman [1972, p 327] termed the Meadows 
report "a brazen, impudent piece of nonsense", that nobody could 
take seriously. He further complains [p 339] that
the various equations that constitute the model are
not estimated from data that are revealed to us, let
1 The Ecologist [1973, p 21].
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alone a description of the statistical methods used 
to test for significance or to deal with the special 
problems thrown up by time-series data.
We shall have more to say about the computer reports and the 
stability of the growth process in Chapter III below.
Whether one accepts the ’’crisis" proportions of the problem 
or not it is clear that the economic process produces undesirable 
by-products. A major problem in discussions is that pollution is 
an emotion-charged word. It is a bad thing and we do not want bad 
things. The concept of an optimal amount of pollution different 
from zero is difficult for people to accept.
It is true that other things being equal, zero pollution is 
preferable. It is when we realize that it is not possible to keep 
other things equal that it is clear that zero pollution may not be 
optimal. The society may not be prepared to give up what is 
required in order to clean up pollution. The role of the economist 
is to aid in devising optimal policies for pollution and other 
economic activities.
In the course of the work which follows in Chapters III to VII
we shall not consider the problems of natural resource exhaustion
or population growth. These problems are left to independent
investigations being carried out at the Australian National 
2University. This is not to deny that the problems are interrelated 
but much knowledge can be gained through investigating the parts 
separately. In fact, to begin with too elaborate a model may only
2 See Pitchford [1973] and Vousden [1973].
serve to confuse, with no hope of understanding the basic issues 
involved. To quote Maddox [p 142]
the cleverness of modern science consists largely 
in the ease with which complicated systems can be 
described in simple terms or by simple models.
The basic system to be examined in this thesis can be 
described by the following simple flow chart* Figure 1.
The input-production-investment loop is familiar and is 
the basis of traditional studies of economic growth. It is 
worth discussing the pollution loop further. It is not the 
intention to survey the literature on technical aspects of 
pollution here, but rather to discuss the aspects which the 
models of the thesis try to incorporate. To aid the discussion, 
we set out this loop as Figure 2.
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In Figure 2, it is seen that there are three major facets 
of the pollution flow: (i) Sources, (ii) Decay and (iii) Effects.
We turn to a brief discussion of these aspects.
(i) Sources. Generally speaking the sources of pollution 
(apart from natural sources) can be classified as being in the 
production sector or the consumption sector. The following table 
gives the amount of air pollution generated in the United States.
Table 1
Total Air Pollution in the United States
3by Source in the Year 1966
Source Tons of Pollutant (millions)
Proportion
(%)
Motor Vehicles 86 60-6
Industry 23 16-2
Power Plants 20 14-1
Space Heating 8 5-6
Refuse Disposal 5 3-5
All Sources 142 100
3 Senate Report [1969, p 16].
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The largest contributor by far is the motor vehicle, accounting 
for over 60% of all air pollution. The largest emission from 
the motor vehicle is carbon monoxide. 92*9% of carbon monoxide 
emissions are from this source/
For water the commonest form of pollution is the discharge 
of crude or partially treated sewage. Next in importance is the 
discharge of trade wastes.^
(ii) Decay. Pollution may be a stock or a flow concept.
Noise pollution is a flow which depends only on current activities. 
Under certain conditions smoke may be considered a flow. If 
there is a temperature inversion so that the atmosphere is stable 
then smoke and particles can build up.
Those pollutants which can build up are, in general, not 
infinitely durable. For pollution as a stock we see a decay 
process. For the cases where pollution is infinitely durable the 
rate of decay is zero. With organic chemical pollution of water, 
the stream bacteria decompose the compounds. If there is sufficient 
dissolved oxygen, this process proceeds aerobically. For large 
waste loads the dissolved oxygen supplies may become depleted and 
the decomposition proceeds anaerobically.
The rate of self-purification may depend upon the amount and 
nature of the waste load. Certain toxic substances inhibit the 
self-purification powers of water by killing the bacteria required
4 Senate Report [1969, p 19].
5 Klein [1962, pp 111-37].
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to degrade the organic wastes. If the pollution is great enough 
it may render a waterway biologically dead and unable to cleanse 
itself.
Inorganic compounds are non-biodegradable. That is, inorganic 
compounds are not broken down by the natural biological processes 
in the water. Other forms of pollution may be very long lived.
DDT, for example, may remain in the environment for a very long time.
(iii) Effects. Generally speaking the effects of pollution 
can be on the production process or on the utility or welfare of 
consumers.
Examples of how utility is affected by pollution are easy to 
find. A recreation area may be spoiled by pollution of the rivers 
in the area. The pollution may not only affect the aesthetic value 
but may also constitute a health hazard. Dirty air also is 
aesthetically unpleasant. During temperature inversions, the dust 
particles etc. are trapped and the air can become foul and a danger 
to health.
It is also possible that pollution reduces the amount of 
output that can be produced with a given supply of productive 
inputs. One reason for this may be that the health of the 
labourers has been reduced and hence they work less efficiently. 
Crops can be destroyed by air pollution. Citrus growers in New 
South Wales estimated that losses due to air pollution could 
reach $5 million - about 10% of industry income in 1967-68.^
6 Senate Report [1969, p 30]
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Pollution need not affect both the production function and the 
utility function. Water may be too polluted for swimming but be 
of sufficient quality for industrial cooling purposes. On the 
other hand, the main concern may be that the existence of pollution 
reduces the amount of output available for consumption.
No one model can represent adequately all forms of pollution. 
The models in the following chapters aim to incorporate various 
features of the system shown schematically in Figure 1.
Chapter II surveys the static and dynamic economic models 
that have been developed by economists to analyse pollution control. 
The main body of the thesis begins in Chapter III with an analysis 
of the behaviour of an uncontrolled process of economic growth.
The design of optimal policies for the control of pollution is 
the subject of Chapters IV to VII. Initially it is assumed 
(Chapter IV) that there is no net investment in capital and no 
feedback of pollution to production. The attention is focused on 
the consumption/pollution trade-off.
Optimal investment planning is the topic in Chapters V arui VI. 
In Chapter V pollution is a flow while in Chapter VI it is a stock. 
In Chapter VI the question of controllability of optimal policies 
in decentralized societies is considered.
The model is disaggregated in Chapter VII to consider the 
pollution question when there is more than one commodity produced 
in the economy. Chapter VIII presents the central conclusions of
the analysis.
10.
CHAPTER II
ECONOMIC THEORY AND POLLUTION CONTROL:
A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE
Until a few years ago, pollution was regarded as a minor 
aberration of the economic system. Smoke pollution was used by 
Pigou and his followers as an example of market failure. Now 
economists are turning to the pollution problem as an area for 
study in itself. In his introductory text Samuelson [1970] 
includes a section on the "Polluted Environment" confessing that 
the United States’ "trillion dollar GNP may be, in part an 
illusion". [p 793]
The purpose of this chapter is to survey the attempts of 
economic theorists to come to grips with the various aspects of 
pollution control. We thus ignore the literature on empirical 
work which has been done in this field. In order to make the 
survey easier to handle we shall divide it into two sections.
The first section considers static analysis while the second 
section deals with the dynamic analysis.
2 * 1 Static Analysis
Much of the early work in pollution economics was done by 
economists who were interested generally in the theory of 
externalities. Smoke pollution was used as a convenient example 
of an external diseconomy while the bees and orchards story 
served as an example of an external economy. Since these papers 
are documented elsewhere (Nath [1969], Mishan [1971]) we will 
consider the contributions of these works to pollution control
problems specifically.
Pigou, in his Economics of Welfare3 was the first economist 
(that I am aware of) to discuss the problem of pollution -
... smoke in large towns inflicts a heavy uncharged 
loss on the community, in injury to buildings and 
vegetables, expenses for washing clothes and 
cleaning rooms, expenses for the provision of extra 
artificial light, and in many other ways. [p 184]
Since there was no compensation for the disservices rendered by 
the smoke generators, Pigou concluded that the industry was 
overproducing - current output exceeds ideal output. To rectify 
the situation,
there will be certain rates of tax the imposition 
of which by the state would increase economic welfare; 
and, one rate of tax which would have the optimum 
effect in this respect. (Pigou [1932, p 224])
In this argument Pigou is discussing competitive industries.
If the smoke generating industry is a monopoly, it is no longer 
necessarily true that the industry is overproducing since it is 
producing at a point where the price of output exceeds marginal 
(private) cost which other things being equal, indicates that 
output should be expanded.
Starting with Coase [1960] a number of economists began 
investigating the use of a bargaining solution as a means of 
solving the externality problem rather than the tax approach of 
Pigou. These authors argue that the Pigovian solution fails to 
take account of the two-way relationship of an externality 
situation. ■*" Davis and Whinston [1965] give a more rigorous 
demonstration of the Coase bargaining scheme.
1 See also Buchanan and Stubblebine [1962].
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The externally influenced party offers a bribe to the generating 
party to reduce the level of his activity. If the externally 
affected party is not satisfied he can increase or decrease the 
bribe until a situation is reached where neither party can be 
made better off without making the other party worse off. The 
authors also consider other legal arrangements but these will not 
be considered here.
Certainly the bargaining approach has appeal; however, it
does have a number of shortcomings for the pollution problem.
The bargaining which takes place occurs in a two person world
with emittors and receptors clearly defined. Bargaining becomes
difficult when the number of individuals is increased unless the
individuals in the groups have identical preference (or production)
functions. In a number of pollution problems the emittors and
receptors cannot be defined as distinct groups. In the case of
air pollution by automotive exhaust the receptors are themselves
the emittors. The same is true for lake pollution by cottagers.
In these cases no one individual will find it worthwhile to cut
back his waste generation since by himself he contributes a
2negligible amount of the pollution. In attempting to abate 
pollution (alone) any individual can only incur additional cost 
while enduring the same air (water, etc) quality as before.
2 See Arrow and Hahn [1971, pp 132-136] and Chapter VII below.
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Dolbear [1967] has offered theoretical evidence that the 
emittor in pollution problems should receive a lump-sum subsidy 
accompanied by a per unit tax since
a per unit tax on X (the emittor) which has the 
twin objectives of keeping Y (the receptor) on his 
starting point indifference curve and attaining a 
Pareto optimum is not, in the general case 
possible. [p 98]
Consider the following diagram from Dolbear [p 98].
Bread
G Heat-Smoke
Figure 2‘1
There are three basic commodities in the model - bread, heat, 
and smoke. In producing heat, smoke is generated. Mr.X derives 
utility from bread and heat, while Mr.Y derives utility from bread 
only, and disutility from smoke.
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In order to produce heat, bread must be given up at a rate 
given by the slope of FF. If there is no heat, then OF bread 
can be produced. The income distribution is such that GF bread 
goes to Mr.Y - no matter what amount of heat is produced. In the 
absence of government intervention then GG is the budget line for 
Mr.X. In maximizing his utility he will locate at the point where 
his indifference curve is tangent to GG (or a boundary point of GG). 
In Figure 1 he settles at E^. Mr.Y is also at consuming an 
amount of bread equal to GF.
The starting point indifference curve for Mr.Y referred to 
Yabove is labelled as I^ . This is the locus of bread and smoke for
which Mr.Y (the receptor) is just as well off as he would be in a
clean environment with the given income distribution. If the
value judgement that the emittor should pay for damages is invoked
Ythen the solution is on the curve I p p  is drawn as the price 
consumption curve for Mr.X. If a per unit tax is used to alter 
the relative price of bread to Mr.X, then his optimizing decision
will place him somewhere on pp. Thus the price line required to
Y Yachieve a solution on I  ^must pass through the intersection of I^
and pp. It is clear from the diagram that this is not a point of
tangency of indifference curves. The point of tangency is at
point E^. Dolbear's conclusion then is that in general it is not
possible to achieve E^ using a per unit tax. A subsidy must also
be used.
This result should not be surprising. From general 
equilibrium theory (without externalities) we know that if a 
social welfare function picks a certain point on the contract
15.
curve (E^  in this case) as the "best" solution, then in general 
a shuffling of initial endowments may be required in order to 
achieve that point using a price system. Dolbear’s result is 
then not peculiar to the externality problem.
If Mr.Y's indifference curves are linear, then a per unit tax 
will work without altering the initial income distribution.
For the two-person case the problem with nonlinear indifference 
curves can be eliminated by the choice of a different tax function. 
The "starting point indifference curve" of the receptor is his 
damage function in this case. Since Dolbear assumed that the 
government has knowledge of all preference functions, the obvious 
tax function is one which is coincident with the "starting point 
indifference curve". The same equilibrium is reached (without a 
subsidy) that the Dolbear solution obtains. This is the point 
that Pauly [1968] was trying to get at when he noted that what 
was needed for Dolbear’s problem was "an increasing rather than a 
constant per unit tax" [p 528] although the language is not clear.
Another failing of the ’Pigovian Tradition’ has been pointed 
out by Plott [1966]. This author has shown that if the externality 
is generated by an input which varies inversely with the level of 
output, then a tax designed to curtail the level of output will 
in fact worsen the situation. Plott argues that corrective policy 
should be aimed at curtailing the use of the offensive input.
While this phenomenon of an inferior input may be deemed 
unrealistic or at least unlikely (Mishan [1971]), it is important 
for completeness that it be recognized and accounted for.
16.
Baumol and Oates [1971] feel that the major defect of the 
Pigovian approach is that the controller does not have the 
information which is required to specify the tax rates which are 
necessary to attain the optimal solution. The planner is hard 
pressed to calculate the initial net damage let alone the damage 
at the optimal point. Of course, trial levels could be selected and 
as activities were modified, the taxes could be re-adjusted if 
necessary. In this manner an optimal solution might be reached.
Baumöl and Oates suggest a further possibility. The planners 
select a set of standards for an acceptable environment. These 
would come from ecologists, biologists, physicians, etc. Taxes 
are then devised to bring about the desired standards. While this 
in general does not represent an optimal allocation of resources 
per se, the authors demonstrate that it is the least cost method of 
achieving the desired standards.
The authors feel that this approach should be used only in 
areas where the function relating social welfare to the level of 
externality generation is negatively sloped and reasonably steep. 
This method does not eliminate the information problem. Deciding 
upon "acceptable" standards may not be easy. Determining whether 
the social welfare function is steep enough seems to pose further 
problems.
There is a further idea developed in Coase [1960] worth 
considering. He suggests that
If factors of production are thought of as rights, 
it becomes easier to understand that the right to do 
something which has a harmful effect (such as the 
creation of smoke, noise, smells, etc) is also a 
factor of production. [p 456]
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and
The cost of exercising a right (of using a factor of 
production) is always the loss which is suffered 
elsewhere in consequence of the exercise of that 
right - the inability to cross land, to park a 
car, to build a house, to enjoy a view, to have 
peace and quiet, or to breathe clean air. [p 456]
In the past individuals have had the right to use the atmosphere 
and waterways as disposal units for the wastes of production and 
consumption. Since the marginal cost of using these factors in 
the past has tended to be zero or close to zero (except perhaps 
locally) the price for their use has been zero. However, 
society has it in its power to change the distribution of these 
property rights if it is deemed in the social interest.
In this connection, Dales [1968] has a proposal for water
pollution control. He suggests establishing a market in "Rights
to Pollute", i.e., rights to use waterways as disposal units.
The Water Control Board (WCB), on behalf of the government
determines the desirable level of discharge of various wastes.
It then creates an equivalent number of 'Rights’. Each Right
allows firms to discharge one ton of wastes. These Rights will
bring a non-negative price, the level of which will be determined
by the interaction of firms demand for disposal services and the
supply of Rights as regulated by the WCB. The prices so determined
3will be the equivalent of the taxes used by Baumöl and Oates.
If part way through the year a firm finds it has more Rights 
than it requires, it can offer them for sale in the market. With 
positive prices for the Rights to Pollute some firms will find it 
more profitable to install treatment facilities. If a higher
3 See above.
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quality of water is desired, the WCB can reduce the number of 
Rights to Pollute offered in the market.
Admittedly, the system will require a certain amount of 
monitoring to keep firms from cheating. This could be paid for 
out of revenues raised in the market and from fines-levied for 
dumping without right. For some forms of pollution such as run-off, 
automotive exhaust, house-heating etc, the monitoring costs render 
this solution impractical.
Theoretically, the number of Rights available should differ 
geographically to account for the different assimilative capacities 
of the regions. However, Dales discourages this differentiation 
since he fears that regions will become equally bad as firms 
relocate to take advantage of lower Right prices. Surely if 
such an attempt is made, the prices will not remain ’low’.
Toward the end of the 1960's a number of elaborate general 
equilibrium models began to appear. One such model is that of 
Ayres and Kneese [1969] who consider environmental pollution and 
its control as a materials balance problem for the economy as a 
whole. They feel that air and water pollution cannot be treated in 
isolation. In trying to solve one problem authorities may only 
create or aggravate another. For example, they state that
a region which went in heavily for electric space 
heating and wet scrubbing of stack gases (from steam 
plants and industries), which ground up its garbage 
and delivered it to the sewers and then discharged 
the raw sewage to watercourses, would protect its 
air resources to an exceptional degree. But this would 
come at the sacrifice of placing a heavy residuals 
load upon the water resources. [p 287]
Ayres and Kneese proceed to set up a model which will allow
the residuals to be traced through the economy. For this purpose
the authors use a version of the Walras-Cassel general equilibrium 
4model extended to allow for intermediate products. It is 
instructive to discuss their model in detail. First we note 
that physical quantities are measured in mass units. This is 
necessary for certain calculations the authors make.
There are M resources and services
r1 » * ,rM
and N commodities or products
xi.. V
Each requires a ^  of resource j to produce one unit of X^.
To produce an amount X_^  then requires a^ of resource r^ . This 
gives rise to the following allocation
rj aj1^1+ ***+ajN^N *  ^ 1,...,M.
Commodity production X and final demand Y are related by 
*k - • k = 1,... ,N,
where the matrix A of A ^  coefficients is defined as 
A = [I-C]"1
where the elements of C are the Leontief input coefficients.
Combining (1) and (2) resources can be related to 
final demands,
4 See Dorfman, Samuelson and Solow [1958].
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J k=l J £=1
iv. • j = 1,...,M. (3)
In equilibrium the price, p^, per unit of is equal to 
the unit costs of production, hence 
M
Pk = f / j V  ’ k = 1 >--->N >
where is the price per unit of resource j .
The demand for final products is given as a function of 
product prices
\  = V P1»"'»PN) ’ k = 1... N,
while the factors are supplied according to their prices
rk = g (v l,...,vm) , k = 1,...,M,
with the p.'s functions of the v.’s.
J J
The M resources are partitioned into raw materials and 
services, so that
(4)
(5)
becomes (7)
21.
Factor prices and technical coefficients are partitioned in 
similar fashion. (4) is then rewritten as
„ , m m _ ,s s Pl. = E bjfcv + Z b v  • (8)
unit cost unit cost 
of raw of services 
materials
Two additional sectors are added to the basic model - an 
"environmental" sector whose output is Xq and a "final consumption" 
sector whose output is . Before proceeding to the materials flow 
condition note the following definitions:
C ^ X  - (physical) quantity transferred 
from sector k to j.
C ^X^ - quantity transferred from j to k.
Flows into and out of the environmental sector must be equal.
N
.Z1Cokxk k=l
' ' w w — y
Z C. X +C. X . , . ko o fo ok=l
(9)
sum of all sum of all
raw materials return flows
flow
Similarly, for the consumption sector
E C. ,X- 
k-1 kf f
V
Z C.. X. + X . , , fk k fo ok=l v
sum of all sum of all waste residuals 
final goods materials (plus accumulation) 
recycled
(10)
2 2 .
Using the definition
Xf
N
E Y
j=l
(ID
Ayres and Kneese obtain the following expression for the residuals 
flow:
Cf X f o o
N N 
E E 
j-1 k-1 fj
(12)
Converse [1971] has suggested that (12) be disaggregated to 
allow for the fact that there are many residuals with different 
properties. Noll and Trijonis [1971] also suggest making a 
distinction between the vector of residuals and the vector of 
pollutants. If the vector approach is used, Noll and Trijonis 
state that mass is not the most useful measure of the vector 
components. A number of pollution problems may not be directly 
related to mass. [p 731]
In order to incorporate the externalities, the authors 
further partition the resources to allow for disservices. These 
disservices are denoted
u u
rl ’* * *,rs
where now L+P+S = M. These disservices have a negative value 
although they are not bought and sold in the market. These 
negative virtual prices are denoted
u ,. . . ,u 1 * s
The supply of disservices depends not upon the level of prices 
but rather upon the level of final demands
rk ■ 1,...,s . (13)
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(3) becomes
raw m 7 hm y
materials rk . . kj j ’ 3=1
k =
labour
and
technical
services
s _ s T7 ■ = Z b Y.
j=i k3 3
k = 1.... P
unwanted u „ . u „r, = Z b. .Y. , inputs k x kj j k = 1,. . . ,S
The price equation is
v m , s s _ , u
pk = * V vj + * bjkvj - ,E bjkuj •\
cost of cost of
raw labour
materials and
cost for 
providing 
environmental 
technical disservices 
services
Equation (16) requires further comment. It is not clear what 
effects the 'unwanted inputs' have upon the system. Pollution 
entering the production process should result in the requirement 
that more "productive" resources be used to produce a given level 
of output. This is not the case in the present model. (16) in 
fact is a linear form of (13). For these reasons Noll and Trijonis 
state that the model will not yield negative prices for the 
disservices.
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
Ruff [1972] presents a general equilibrium model which 
incorporates pollution. We consider the model briefly. Let
24 .
k k kx = (x^,...,xN) = Net output of ordinary goods for firm k; 
lc lc lcZ = (Z^,...,Z^) = Net output of pollutants for firm k. 
lc lc lcg (x , Z ) >_ 0 , Production constraint for firm k.
K kZ^ = E Z^ = Total pollution of type £,. 
k=l
= (q^,...,q^) = Net consumption of goods by individual j.
tP(q^,Z) = Ordinal utility indicator for individual j.
i ic,E q. <_ E x. , Accounting constraint for good i. 
j 1 k 1
Now the amount of pollution produced by each firm is taxed 
at a per unit rate. Let t denote the vector of tax rates. A 
competitive equilibrium with externalities is defined as follows:
Definition. (Ruff [1972, p 187])
An allocation q, x, Z is said to be a competitive general 
equilibrium allocation and p is said to be a competitive general 
equilibrium price vector, relative to the tax vector t and the 
income distribution b, if:
(a) p ’ q~* = b^ , q^  >_ 0
and for all q^ _> 0 such that p' q^ <_ b^
Uj (qj ,Z) £ U j (qj,Z) , j = 1,...,M.
(b) gk (x‘,2^) >_ 0
and for all xk , Zk such that gk (xk ,Zk) ■> 0
p ’ xk - “Zk £  p ' ^  Zk , k = 1,. . . ,K.
2 5.
(c) I ?  > I qj. , p^  ^ >_ 0
k 1 j 1
and
Pt [E - E qj] = 0 , i = 1.....N.
k j
(d) Z£ = E z\ , £ = 1.....L.
k
This is the standard definition of a competitive equilibrium^ 
with externalities added to the model. The pollution affects only 
the utility of households; it does not affect the production sets 
directly. Production decisions, of course, are affected by the 
pollution emissions at the firm level because of the taxes. A 
profit maximizing firm must view pollutants as inputs to production 
(via g ) with non-negative prices given by the tax vector. There 
is nothing in the model which determines the "optimum" level of 
the tax vector t. This is given exogenously. The competitive 
equilibrium is defined relative to a given vector t. This 
allocation is efficient (as shown by Theorem I p 187) in the 
sense that there is no other allocation which has the same 
aggregate pollution levels and is Pareto preferred.
The pollution taxes are shown by Ruff [p 188] to have an 
interesting interpretation. This interpretation is given by the 
following theorem which we state without proof.
5 See, for example, Arrow and Hahn [1971].
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Theorem.
In the general equilibrium of the above Definition, the tax 
price of pollutant £, is the marginal cost, in terms of 
"national income" as ordinarily defined and at current prices, 
of reducing pollutant £. That is, defining national income at 
current prices Y, by
Y E E p ’' xk E E p ’1 qj
k j
it is true that
E E p'
j
(18)
Leontief [1970] showed that input-output analysis could be 
applied to the pollution problem. A pollution sector is added to 
the other sectors of the model. Each of the sectors generates a 
certain amount of pollution - the level of which depends upon the 
output in that sector. Leontief’s arithmetic examples are used in 
what follows.
Let , X£ and X^ represent the manufacturing, agriculture, 
and pollution sectors respectively. Y^, i = 1,2,3, are the 
respective final demands. Consider the following set of equations:
0-75 X1 - 0-40 X2 = Yx
-0-14 + 0-88 X2 = Y2 (19)
0-50 X± + 0-20 X2-X3 = 0.
The meaning of the first two equations is well known. The last
equation gives the amount of pollution generated by the manufacturing 
industry and the agricultural industry depending upon their level
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of output. This amount is X^. The model as it stands has no 
active agent for pollution control, but a control sector can be 
added. Assume that the input requirements of the process are two 
man years of labour and 0*20 yards of cloth per gram of pollutant 
prevented from being discharged into the air by agriculture or 
manufacturing.
We now have the following equations:
0-75 X± - 0-40 X2 = Y]L
-0*14 X1 + 0*88 X2 - 0*20 X3 = Y2
(20)
0-50 X± + 0*20 X2 - X3 Y3
-0*80 X, - 3-60 X0 - 2-0 X»+L = Y.1 2 3 4
where L is the level of employment and Y^ is the amount of labour 
employed by households (assumed to be zero). Y3 is the level of 
uneliminated pollution which is not demanded by the community in 
the usual fashion but, rather, tolerated.
The general solution to (20) is
Agriculture X^ 
Manufacture X„
1-573 Y_l + 0-749 Y2
0-449 Y± + 1-404 Y2
Pollutant X, 0-876 Y± + 9-655 Y2
Labour 4-628 Y1 + 6-965 Y2
- 0-149 Y0 + 0-000 Y,3 4
- 0-280 Y„ + 0-000 Y.3 4
- 1-131 Y0 + 0-000 Y,3 4
- 3-393 Yq + 0-000 Y..3 4
(21)
Notice that in order to reduce pollution by 1 gram say, the 
pollutant sector must eliminate 1-131 grams of pollutant. The 
reason for this result is that the economic activities required 
to eliminate pollution generate more pollution.
As in the previous models, pollution does not enter the 
production sector directly. The presence of pollution does not 
result in an increase in the resources required to produce a given 
basket of final demands. The computational effort would increase 
tremendously if this and alternative techniques were allowed for.
2•2 Dynamic Analysis
To this point we have been discussing static economic models.
We now turn our attention to the models which have been formulated 
to discuss the dynamic aspects of pollution and pollution control.
First we consider a growth model with pollution. This model 
is due to d'Arge [1971], The basic growth model is a 
Harrod-Domar model. The following relationships are postulated:
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W = gc (F-S)+gfF (22)
D = (1/v)W-hIr-5. (23)
(22) expresses the waste as a linear function of consumption (F-S) 
and production F. gc and g^ are respective coefficients of 
consumption and production. (23) gives the time derivative of 
average waste density D, as a function of the level of waste 
generation (weighted by a volume measure V of the environment) 
the amount of pollution control 1^ and the constant decay rate of 
waste density. This decay function may not be valid for D = 0, 
since if D = 0 and V y  W-hl^ = 0 then D < 0, and waste density 
becomes negative.
Combining (22) and (23) we obtain
D = (1/v)(gc+gf)F-(1/v)gcS-hIr-6 (24)
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which relates the waste accumulation to the output level, the 
level of saving, investment in pollution control, and natural decay. 
If S = I = 0, then D = 0 for F > 0 if and only if (Vy) (g^gf)? = <5 
This F is such that the environment can assimilate the waste 
currently produced. This says nothing about the amount of waste 
already in existence.
Using the following equations
S = sF 
F = ol,
I.+I f r
where = 1^ is the investment in productive capital, F the growth 
rate of output, o the output-capital ratio, we obtain
f = os-a(f).
In the absence of pollution control, output increases at the rate 
as - the warranted rate.
From (24), (25) and (27)
[(gc/V)(l-s)+(gf/V)-hs]F + £ F-6 = D.
In order to maintain D = 0 then 
F+aF-n = 0
where
a = a [(gc/hV)(l-s)+(gf/hV)-s]
and
(25)
(26)
(27)
(28)
(29)
(30)
n = a6/h. (31)
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The solution to (29) is
F(t) = H e"at+n/a. (32)
Given H > 0, then for output to increase over time, while maintaining 
D = 0, it is necessary that
a < 0 that is sh > g (1-s)/V+g--/V (33)c i
i.e. the savings rate and the efficiency of pollution control are 
sufficient to outweigh the waste production rates of consumption 
and production.
It is not possible to predict the long-run behaviour of the 
economy from the model as it stands. (25) does not specify the 
allocation of investment between pollution control and productive 
capital. If (33) is violated we know that it will not be possible 
to hold D constant as output expands. Suppose however that there 
is no^  pollution control. Since there are no resource limitations 
and no feedback effect of waste on production, then output grows 
at the warranted rate. Hence D can increase without bound.
Keeler, Spence and Zeckhauser [1972, Model II], Plourde [1972],
and Smith [1972] discuss various aspects of the pollution problem
using one state variable optimal control models. These papers
£
treat pollution as the state variable. We confine our attention 
to the economic assumptions underlying these mathematical models.
6 See also Chapter IV.
The Model II presented by Keeler, Spence and Zeckhauser 
treats the pollutant as an intermediate good in production. D.D.T.
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is the type of pollutant the authors have in mind. Utility is 
separable in consumption and pollution
U(C,P) = g(C)-h(P) (34)
with
g' 1 0 , gM < 0 , g' (o) = 00
(35)
h ’ _> 0 , hM > 0 , h’ (0) = 0.
Labour is the only scarce factor in the model and is fixed in 
supply. Labour L^ is devoted to producing the pollutant while the 
remainder L-L^ is devoted to producing consumption directly. The 
pollutant is produced according to j(L^) where
j ’ > 0 , jM < 0 , 0 <_ L1 <_ L. (36)
The output of the consumption good is dependent upon the amount of 
labour devoted to its production and the amount of pollutant used,
Fa-L^jo^)) (37)
f (L. ) since L is fixed. (38)
j (L^ ) is not essential to production so that f(0) > 0.
Pollution in the system accumulates according to
p = jap - b P  (39)
where b is the decay rate of pollution and there is no 
anti-pollution activity.
From their analysis the authors concluded that
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The model points out that just as it is not 
optimal to ignore the pollution problem, neither 
is it optimal to ban the flow of pollutant forever.
It may not even be optimal to ban its use now; 
whether it is depends upon the current level of 
the stock of pollution. [p 29]
In Forster [1972b] I showed that this conclusion followed from 
the assumption that h ’(0) = 0 in (35). If h' (0) is non-zero, 
then it may be optimal to ban the use of the pollutant forever.
The stock of pollution is left to decay away. It will not do so 
in finite time since the decay is exponential.
Plourde assumed that a constant proportion of output ends up 
as waste. Labour is diverted from producing output to cleaning 
up the existing waste. We shall have further comments on Plourde’s 
conclusions in Chapter IV.
Smith investigated the problem of waste accumulation and 
recycling. We shall consider this model closely. It is assumed 
that consumers possess a strictly concave utility function
U = U(qi,q2 ,Q). (40)
q^ is the instantaneous quantity of a "good" commodity consumed, 
q^ has a positive marginal utility
au
8q. > 0 . (41)
The quantity of recycled waste is q  ^ q^. assumed by Smith
that households find it troublesome to return waste. Hence,
< 0 .
8q2 “
Q is the stock of accumulated waste material. This stock yields
(42)
disutility.
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q3 = ^1-^2 t*ie quantity of container units that are disposed 
of and must be replaced. The waste stock Q accumulates at a gross 
rate n(q^-q2), where n is the number of households, but decays 
exponentially at rate y. Therefore,
= n(q1-q2)-yQ. (43)
In addition to n consumers it is assumed that there are n firms 
capable of performing any or all of the productive activities.
Each q_^  is then associated with a function f^(L^) where
qi = ^ 0 ^ )
f [  > 0 , f” < 0 (44)
3
E L .  = L . 
i=i 1
The constraints of the problem can be stated as
f3(L3) f2^ L2^
L ^ + L2+ L3 = L .
The programming problem is to
(45)
max
f 00
U(fia i),f2 (L2),Q)e_Stdt
" O
subject to (43) and (45).
(46)
A few comments about the structure of the model are in order. 
First, why should consumers derive disutility directly from 
recycling? There is no need for them to transport the refuse to 
collection points, say. It may be thrown out as litter and labour 
be devoted to collecting it. Hence, the cost of recycling is the 
loss in output resulting from taking labour away from producing new q^.
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There is also a problem concerning the benefits of recycling. 
One benefit is that the stock of pollution increases at a slower 
rate for given q^ . But the recycled material does not seem to 
get into the productive process except by requiring that fewer 
resources be devoted to producing new containers. These new 
containers do not appear in the productive process either. The 
only tie is constraint (45).
The recycled material should be available for consumption.
If in a given time period we produce q^ of consumption good and 
reclaim q^  of the consumption good, should not total consumption be
q] +q2 ?
In order to better capture the essence of the recycling 
problem, I think it would be preferable to consider a model in 
which the product of recycling entered production as an input in 
the next period. Labour is then devoted to recycling to reduce the 
waste and to make more consumption goods for future periods.
Keeler, Spence, and Zeckhauser [1972, Model I] also discuss 
pollution control with capital growth. This is a two state 
variable problem in optimal control.^ As in Plourde's model, a 
constant fraction of output ends up as pollution. A fraction of 
output is devoted to pollution control while another fraction is 
devoted to investment in capital. We return to this model in 
connection with the results of Chapter VI.
7 See Chapter VI.
Brock in an unpublished manuscript discusses pollution and 
capital in a discrete time model. It is assumed initially that
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social welfare depends upon consumption and pollution
U = u ( c t ,Pt ). (47)
The stock of pollution P increases as a result of waste generation 
W in production, but decays away at a rate m, 0 < m < 1, hence
Output in period t depends upon the capital stock from t-1 and 
waste generation in t-1,
Brock assumes that the "techniques of production are less costly in 
terms of capital input if more pollution is allowed". In other 
words, by raising the amount of waste generated, more output is 
produced. This output can be consumed or used to form the capital 
stock to produce output for period t+1:
(48)
with initial stocks given by
P. = m P +W .o o (49)
(50)
(51)
(52)
where is the initial capital stock.
The planning problem is to
00
max Z 6tU(C ,P ) t * tt=o
(53)
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subject to (48), (49), (51) and (52) where 6 is the discount 
factor (assumed to be equal to 1).
Assuming an intolerable level of pollution P exists, define 
a new variable E which may be interpreted as an ’environment good'
E = P-P. (54)
E then is the difference between the intolerable level and the 
current level of pollution. Using (54), (53) becomes
00
max E 6tU(Ct,Et) (55)
t=o
subject to C +K = F(K n ,W,_ ..)J t t t-1* t-1
Et = m Et_1-Wt_1+(l-m)P.
The models discussed so far have assumed that population is 
stationary and that there are no problems of resource depletion. 
Pitchford [1973, Chapter 6] has discussed the problem of resource 
pollution in connection with a study of optimal population growth.
This model differs from the foregoing ones in that pollution as a 
stock does not enter the model explicitly. Instead, pollution which 
results from production depletes the resources in the economy - 
either quantitatively or qualitatively - unless offset by pollution 
control.
Total physical output is given by
<j> = <f>(N2,K2,L2) , 4> e C(2) (56)
where (N2,K2,L2) is the vector of labour, capital and resources
respectively devoted to production. Each factor is assumed
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indispensible to production; however, it is not assumed that <j> 
is subject to constant returns to scale. <J> is strictly concave 
throughout the relevant domain. This output may be devoted to 
consumption, investment in productive capital, or population 
control.
It is assumed that factors used in production result in the 
resource base being run down (or growing more slowly) while factors 
used in anti-pollution activities result in offsetting this to a 
degree
gCN-L, K1 ,L1 ;N2 ,K2 ,L2) g e (2) (57)
g is strictly concave for relevant N^,K^,L^, i = 1,2, and each 
factor is indispensible to pollution control so that
g(0,K1 ,L1 ,N2 ,K2 ,L2) = g(0,0,0,N2 ,K2 ,L2) < 0
n 2 ,k 2 ,l 2 > 0.
Capital behaviour is given by
K = I (58)
where I is investment and depreciation is ignored.
Labour grows at an exponential rate 6, in the absence of control, 
but appropriate expenditure on population control (J >_ 0) can check 
its growth. Hence
N = 6N-J/8 (59)
where 3 is the expenditure required to prevent the population from 
growing by one extra person.
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Social welfare is a function of consumption per head and 
conserved resources per head,
U e c (2) C CN
U 1 > ° , u 2 > 0 , U2(c,0) > 0 ,
(60)
The subscript i, i = 1,2, denotes a partial derivative with 
respect to the ith argument. £  is a lower consumption bound - 
below which the society would not wish to fall.
The planning problem is to
max (61)
subject to
K = I , I > 0 , K(0) = K—  o
N = 6N - 4  > J > 0 ,  N (0) = Np —  o
L = g(N1,K1,L1;N2,K2,L2) , L(0) = Lq
cfi-cN-I-J >_ 0
N _> Nx+N2 , K _> Kx+K2 , L >_ L±+L2+L3 , L >_ L 
Lv K±,KifL± > 0 , i = 1,2.
A possible endpoint to which the system could tend is given 
by
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(62)
gT > P L1
(6 U2 L3-P)3+c
c 6
L2
(63)
(64)
(65)
(66)
(67)
L1+L2+L3 _< L (68)
with equality if g > p
L1
g(N1,K1,L1;N2,K2,L2) = 0 (69)
L = L1+L2+L3 , N = Nx+N2 , K = Kx+K2 . (70)
From (62) the marginal product of capital in production no 
longer equals the social discount rate. However, the marginal product 
adjusted for resource renewal does equal the discount rate. Since 
the adjustment factor is less than one, less capital is devoted to 
production than would be if there were no pollution problem.
(63) states that the marginal product of resources in
renewal must not be lower than the rate of discount. If it
happens that g is bounded above by some value r, then a 
L1
solution will not exist for p > r. Since g is strictly concave and
gT ^  0, g attains a maximum for Ln =0. If L. =0, then 
± 1 1 1
g < 0 from the indispensibility assumption.
The marginal rate of substitution between any pair of factors 
in producing output is equated to the marginal rate of substitution 
in maintaining a given level of resources (66).
Consider (67) with > 0. Now
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implies > p and hence L^+L^+L^ = L. As p -* 0 this condition
1 U2tends to U„ > 0, and as p -> 00, it tends to —  > <J> . Hence az U1 L2
sufficient condition for resources to be maintained at their upper 
limit is that the demand price of conserved resources exceed the 
marginal product of productive resources.
It is not possible to say whether the model yields a higher 
or a lower optimum population than the conventional models.
This seems to be because the labour can now be employed in 
pollution control as well as in production.
Loehman and Whinston [1970] (hereafter L-W) have employed 
optimal control techniques to investigate a problem in pollution 
control on a waterway in which an upstream firm pollutes a
downstream firm.
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It is assumed that there is a downstream firm B with a net 
return function V (q ) where q is the level of output of firm B.
-D JJ  D
Vß possesses the following properties:
VB 1  0 » vg < 0 , VJ" < 0. (71)
The upstream firm A has a net revenue function (q ) where
VA -  ° ’ VA < °* (72)
A's production is proportional to his waste production
klWA kl > 0. (73)
This waste causes damage to firm B. The damage depends upon the 
level of w and the flow F(t) of the stream. Denote the per unit 
damage by D(w^,F). The extra cost to B is then
D(wA ,F(t))qß (74)
if B produces q_. D has the following properties:Jl5
D-L > 0  ,
3D
9F D2 < °
D11 > 0 , D21 D12 < 0 , D22 > 0.
(75)
The output of firm B, q changes over time according toD
qB = k2{V^-D(wA ,F)} , k2 > 0. (76)
This is a behavioural equation which states that q^ will rise if 
the net marginal revenue exceeds the per unit damage, and fall if
the reverse is true.
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The objective is to maximize joint returns. Formally, the 
problem is to
max
r T
{VA(qA)+V qB>-D(wA’F)qB}dtJ o
subject to
qB ■ k2{V^(qB)-D(wA ,F)}
° - WA - WA ’ 0 i qB - qB >
where qA = k ^ .
The values w° and q° are not initial values of the variables but A B
the values for which
V! = 0 and Vi = 0 A B
respectively.
There is a problem in deciding what the economic objective 
is in this model. If we assume that the firms are jointly owned, 
then it is difficult to justify treating q^ as a control variable 
while q^ is a state variable. If q^ is also subject to control then 
the equation (76) is meaningless and the optimization problem 
ceases to be intertemporal in nature. Suppose, however, we assume 
that the firm A is publicly regulated but B is not. B instead 
reacts according to (76). The government now in regulating A must 
consider the external effect on B and hence seeks controls which
will maximize the joint revenues of the firms.
Forster and Logan [1973] have pointed out that the L-W paper 
contains several mathematical errors which vitiate the results of 
the analysis. Pointing out the errors and the source of the 
errors as they proceed, the authors reanalyse the problem 
attempting to retain as much of the original model as possible.
The objective of this chapter has been to introduce the 
reader to the various approaches used by economic theorists in 
analysing the economic aspects of pollution control. We now 
turn to the main body of the present study.
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CHAPTER III
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN A POLLUTED ENVIRONMENT"'
One of the questions posed by the report for the Club of Rome's 
project on the predicament of mankind, Meadows et al [1972, p 127] 
is:
Is the future of the world system bound to be growth 
and then collapse into a dismal, depleted existence?
Many of the computer simulations in the report and its precursor,
Forrester [1971], suggest that the answer to this question is -
yes, if we continue as we are at present. In particular, we can
expect collapse if pollution is not curbed.^ According to
Forrester [1971, p 75] - "A pollution crisis lurks within the
system".
The purpose of this chapter is to consider the same question
2posed by the Meadows group although in a theoretical rather than 
a statistical framework. We investigate an economy in which 
pollution is generated by the production of physical output. This 
output is consumed or devoted to increasing the capital stock.
There is no active attempt to control pollution at all. Mathematically, 
our interest will centre on the stability properties of the system of 
differential equations which describe the motion of the economy.
* This chapter has grown out of material originally published
in the Swedish Journal of Economics (Forster [1972a]). Forster 
[1973b] is based upon the results of this chapter.
1 Meadows et al [1972, p 133].
2 d ’Arge [1971] and d'Arge and Kogiku [1973] also consider 
pollution in models of economic growth.
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In  s e c t i o n  3*1 i t  i s  assumed t h a t  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  f o r  
p h y s i c a l  o u t p u t  i s  i n d e p e n d e n t  of  t h e  amount o f  p o l l u t i o n  i n  t h e  
s y s te m .  That  i s ,  t h e r e  i s  no f e e d b a c k  e f f e c t  o f  p o l l u t i o n  on 
p r o d u c t i o n .  S e c t i o n  3*2 assumes t h a t  f o r  a g i v e n  c a p i t a l  s t o c k ,  
i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e  l e v e l  o f  p o l l u t i o n  r e d u c e  t h e  amount o f  o u t p u t  
p r o d u c e d .  In  s e c t i o n  3*3,  we assume t h a t  t h e  n a t u r a l  decay  r a t e  
depends  upon t h e  l e v e l  of  p o l l u t i o n  i n  e x i s t e n c e  a t  any t im e ,  
w h i l e  i n  s e c t i o n  3*4 t h e  p o l l u t i o n  does  n o t  d e c a y .  In  s e c t i o n  3*5 
we assume t h a t  c a p i t a l  does  n o t  d e p r e c i a t e .  I n  s e c t i o n  3*6 we 
r e t u r n  t o  t h e  Club o f  Rome's Report  f o r  a c o m pa r i son  o f  r e s u l t s .
3 * 1 Model 1
In  o r d e r  t o  f o c u s  on t h e  p rob lem  of  growth  and p o l l u t i o n ,  
we make a number of  s i m p l i f y i n g  a s s u m p t i o n s .  I t  i s  assumed t h a t  t h e  
p o p u l a t i o n  i s  s t a t i o n a r y  and f u l l y  employed a t  a l l  t i m e s .  There 
a r e  no p rob lem s  o f  r e s o u r c e  e x h a u s t i o n  and t h e r e  i s  no t e c h n i c a l  
p r o g r e s s .
P h y s i c a l  o u t p u t  i s  t a k e n  t o  be a s t r i c t l y  concave  f u n c t i o n  
o f  t h e  c a p i t a l  s t o c k  K.
<p = <|>(K) , 4> (K) e C ( 2 ) . (1)
The m a r g i n a l  p r o d u c t  o f  c a p i t a l  i s  p o s i t i v e  b u t  d i m i n i s h i n g
<J>! > 0 , <j>" < 0 , K > 0.  (2)
S o c i e t y  d e v o t e s  a c o n s t a n t  p r o p o r t i o n  ( 1 - s )  o f  t o t a l  o u t p u t  
t o  c o n s u m p t io n ,  and t h e  r e m a in d e r  t o  augm en t in g  t h e  c a p i t a l  s t o c k  
so t h a t
dK
d t K = s4> (K)-6K (3)
4 6 .
where 6 is the constant rate of capital depreciation. 3
For purposes of this chapter we also assume
0 = lim <j>' (K) < < lim 4>T (K). (4)
K-*» 3 *S K+o
Assumption (4) ensures the existence and uniqueness of K > 0 such 
that K = 0.
Pollution P is generated by the production process. Since all 
factors are constant except for capital, the amount of pollution 
generated depends upon the amount of capital input used in production.
In the absence of natural decay then
P = g(K) , g(0) = 0. (5)
The flow of pollution increases with productive activity at an 
increasing rate. Thus
g' > 0 , g" > 0 , K > 0 (6a)
and
lim g’ (K) = 0 , g’ finite for K < °°. (6b)
K->o
It is assumed that the stock of pollution is subject to decay at a 
constant exponential rate a. We assume that a is independent of 
pollution as well as time. Thus
P = g(K)-aP. (5’)
The study of this model then reduces to the investigation of 
the mathematical properties of a system of two differential equations 
in two variables. The system is
3 So far the model is independent of pollution. For a discussion
of this growth model without pollution see Burmeister and
Dobell [1970, chapter 2].
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K = scf) (K)-6K , K(0) = Ko O ’)
P = g(K)-aP , P (0) = Pq . (5")
(3') and (5") are autonomous since the right-hand sides are independent 
of time. The assumptions made above are sufficient to guarantee the 
existence and uniqueness of solutions to (3'), (5M) once the initial 
conditions have been specified.
Existence and uniqueness of solutions are important properties 
for any descriptive economic process. Our mathematical model would 
not describe much if a solution did not exist. Further, if a 
solution existed but was not unique, we would be in the situation 
of having an economic system which under the same conditions could 
behave in different ways. The predictive power of the model 
would be smashed.
We turn now to a phase analysis of this polluted growth 
process. Consider first the locus of points for which P = 0.
This locus is defined by
P = g (K) / a .
Thus
dP
dK •P=0
(7)
The P = 0 curve is upward sloping to the right and
lim P . = 0.
K>o P=0
(8)
Now consider the curve K = 0 for K > 0. This is defined by
K = I  <(> (K) . (9)
48.
Assumption (4) guarantees the existence and uniqueness of the 
solution which we denote by K. The K = 0 locus then is the vertical 
line K = K.
As long as g' is finite for K < 00 an equilibrium will exist 
as portrayed in Figure 1. If g'(K*) = 00 for some K* < K, then there 
exists no equilibrium with K > 0.
For fixed levels of P, P = g(K)-aP is an increasing function 
of K. Thus P > 0 to the right of P = 0, while P < 0 to the left.
K < 0 to the right of K since depreciation offsets gross investment.
To the left of K, we have K > 0. These results are shown in Figure 1.
Figure 3*1
4 9.
Linearizing the system (3), (5’) about the equilibrium we
have
4>'-6 o K-K
g' -a P-P
(10)
A /Vwhere derivatives are evaluated at (K,P).
The characteristic roots of the Jacobian matrix are
yl,y2 = y{“(a“(<^),“5)) ± ^ [a-(<j> ’-6) ]2 + 4a (<f> ’ -6) } (11)
or
= -a , h2 = ^'(K)“5- (11*)
It is seen that the roots are real and negative. Hence, the 
equilibrium (K,P) is locally a stable node. Examining Figure 1 
it is seen that trajectories which cross the boundary of the region 
bounded by P = 0, K = K and the K-axis, all point inward. Thus 
a limit cycle cannot exist about (K,P).
The point (K,0) is the equilibrium of the simple neoclassical 
4growth model. Pollution has not therefore affected the endpoint 
capital stock. The only modification introduced here is the 
existence of a finite but non-zero level of pollution in equilibrium.
This is to be expected since pollution does not affect production 
in any way and hence the capital accumulation equation is 
independent of the level of pollution.
4 See Burmeister and Dobell [1970, chapter 2].
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If social welfare depends upon the level of pollution, then 
in equilibrium social welfare is constant but at a lower level than 
if no pollution existed.
Before moving on to Model 2, we shall do some comparative 
statics analysis.“* First we examine the effects of different 
savings rates upon the long-run values of capital and pollution.
Mathematically, we wish to solve the following system:
scf> ’ - 6
g’
evaluated at equilibrium. 
Define
A =
s<j>’-6 0
g ’ -a
-a(s<j>’-6) > 0.
Then using Cramer's Rule we find that
8P
8s i  {g'4>} > 0
and
8K
8s {a<t>} > 0.
(12)
(13)
(14)
5 See Samuelson [1947, chapter 2].
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It is seen that the levels of pollution and capital move in the 
same direction as the savings rate. Thus thriftier communities 
have larger capital stocks and more pollution in the long-run.
We now examine the effects of different rates of pollution 
decay upon equilibrium values of K and P. The system to be solved 
is
s<J>'-6 0 9K9a =
0
t _9Pg -a 9a P
which has as its solution
fi =  f <0
and
I£  = o.da
For low rates of decay, the equilibrium level of pollution is 
higher than for high rates of decay. The capital stock is not 
affected.
(15)
(16)
(17)
3*2 Model 2
Model 1 presented a growth process in which production was 
independent of the level of pollution in the system. This meant 
that the process of capital accumulation was independent of the 
level of pollution as well. In this section it is assumed that the 
pollution affects production adversely.
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The production function is assumed to be a strictly concave 
function of capital and pollution
= <f <K,P) , *(K,P) e C(2). (18)
To simplify the analysis we assume that <f> is additively separable 
in K and P and hence^
♦kP = 0. (19)
The marginal product of capital is positive but diminishing. That is
4>k > 0 , ♦KK < 0 , K > 0. (20)
We assume that satisfies the limit conditions expressed in (4).K
The marginal product of pollution is negative and decreasing
<f>p < 0 , 4>pp < 0 , P > 0 (21)
and
lim <J) •= 0. (22)
P+o F
The capital accumulation equation now becomes
K = s<J> (K,P)-6K (23)
while pollution accumulates according to
P = g(K)-aP. (5’)
Strictly speaking our equations (23) and (5’) make sense only 
for values of (K,P) such that <J>(K,P) >_ 0. The locus of points for 
which cf)(K,P) = 0 is upward sloping to the right in the first quadrant.
6 A subscript denotes a partial derivative with respect to 
the subscript.
5 3 .
P o i n t s  (K,P) which  l i e  above t h i s  l o c u s  a r e  such t h a t  (K, P) < 0.  
The model  i s  n o t  d e f i n e d  i n  t h i s  r e g i o n .  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  we d e f i n e  
t h e  f e a s i b l e  s e t  ft where
ft = { (K,P) |<j>(K,P) _> 0 , K _> 0 , P > 0} .
I t  i s  assumed i n  what  f o l l o w s  t h a t  (K,P) e ft. F i g u r e  2 i l l u s t r a t e s  
t h e  f e a s i b l e  s e t .
F i g u r e  3*2
We now a n a l y s e  t h e  p h a s e  p o r t r a i t  o f  t h e  sy s te m  ( 2 3 ) ,  ( 5 ' ) .  
The l o c u s  o f  p o i n t s  f o r  wh ich  P = 0 i s  t h e  same as  i n  Model 1; 
how ever ,  t h e  K = 0 c u r v e  i s  more c o m p l i c a t e d .
D e f in e
N(K,P)  = s4> (K,P ) -6K = 0
nk = s 4>k" 6 7 0 as K 7 1
(24)
i-
d
 >
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Np = scDp < 0 , P > 0 .
S(J)K"6 > < _
= — r —  - O a s K - K ,  P > 0 , (25)
K=0 ' S4>P *
w here sc^C K ,?) = 6.
K.
For c o n s t a n t  K, K i s  a d e c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  o f  p o l l u t i o n .  Hence K < 0
above th e  K = 0 c u rv e  and K > 0 be low . These r e s u l t s  a r e  shown i n
F ig u re  3.
dP
dK
F ig u re  3*3
C o n s id e r  t h e  sy s te m  o f  d i f f e r e n t i a l  e q u a t i o n s  l i n e a r i z e d
a b o u t  ( K ,P ) :
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SV 6
8 ’
scj). K-K
P-P
(26)
where derivatives are evaluated at (K,P). The roots of the Jacobian 
of this system are
w1>m2 i{-[a-(s4>..-<5) ] ± /[a-(s<(> —6) ]2 + 4[ 6)a+s<Js_g' ]} (27)
The structure of the model is such that
dP
dK P=0
(K,P)
K=0
(K,P)
(28)
i.e. the P = 0 locus cuts the K = 0 locus from below at (K,P) 
This means that
(s<t>K-6)a+s4>pg' < 0. (29)
Thus the stability of (K,P) depends upon the sign of 
a-(s(f>K-6). If
a-(s<J)v-6) > 0 (30)is.
then the characteristic roots (27) have negative real parts and the 
equilibrium is locally stable. If the inequality is reversed then 
the equilibrium (K,P) is unstable.
There remains the case where
a-(s<t>K-6) = 0. (30’)
In this case the roots (27) are pure imaginary. For linear systems 
this means that the equilibrium is a center. However, we are
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considering a nonlinear system and this result is no longer 
assured since the equilibrium is degenerate. It is possible that 
while for linear systems, the equilibrium is a center, for the 
nonlinear system it is a stable focus or perhaps an unstable focus. 
Or, it may remain a center.'7 If the equilibrium is locally a center 
we may say that it is neutrally stable in the sense that along a 
closed trajectory, the distance from the trajectory to the 
equilibrium is bounded.
To recapitulate, for local stability of the equilibrium it is 
necessary that
« < - ( » )3K - V3P'
and sufficient that
(31)
evaluated at (K,P). In words, the equilibrium is locally stable if 
at that point the effect of a change in the capital stock on the rate 
of investment is less than the absolute value of the effect on the 
pollution flow of a change in the level of pollution.
We continue the analysis in this section for the case where the 
equilibrium (K,P) ^ (0,0) is locally stable. In Figure 3 the 
equilibrium is locally stable since s<f>^ -6 < 0 which is sufficient 
to ensure (31') is satisfied.
7 See, for example, Coddington and Levinson [1955, Theorem 4*1, 
p 382].
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The origin is also an equilibrium in this model. Consider the 
Jacobian matrix of the system (23), (5’) linearized about the origin
scj) -6 0
J = K
0 -a
The roots of this matrix are
Ml,y2 = ± ^  [s4>K-6—ot]2 + 4ot(s4>K—6) } (33)
which are real and opposite in sign. Thus the origin is a 
saddlepoint. In Figure 3 trajectory A is drawn as the stable 
branch of the saddle. This trajectory divides the phase plane into 
two regions I and II. This serves to emphasize the "local" property 
of stability in nonlinear systems.
The system of differential equations (23), (5') has an
infinite number of solutions until the initial conditions (K ,P )o o
have been assigned. Any trajectory which originates in II must 
remain there since by the uniqueness property of integral curves, 
it cannot cross A at any point. These paths instead are 
characterized by increasing capital and pollution for a certain 
time interval until pollution chokes output to the point where gross 
investment cannot offset depreciation and the capital stock declines. 
Later the capital stock is low enough that pollution generation is 
offset by natural decay, and the pollution level falls as well.
Output eventually falls to zero as the trajectory approaches the 
boundary of the feasible region ft.
(32)
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Trajectories which originate in I cannot escape to II. These 
trajectories may move to the equilibrium (K,P) which we have shown 
to be locally stable. However, we cannot rule out the existence of 
limit cycles in I.
We have seen that when the equilibrium is locally stable, it is
possible for the system to equilibrate or to collapse. Which of
these results is attained depends crucially upon the historically
given initial conditions (K ,P ).■“-------  o ’ o
Returning to the equilibrium we note that K < K as shown in 
Figure 3. K is the solution of s<£(K,0)-6K = 0, i.e. the long-run 
capital stock of the neoclassical model. Hence, if this polluted 
growth process equilibrates it moves to an equilibrium which has a 
non-zero level of pollution and a lower capital stock than the standard 
theory of growth would predict.
We now turn to the effects on equilibrium values of capital 
and pollution of changes in the savings rate and the decay rate. 
The relevant partial derivatives are found by solving
SV5 S<Pp 3K3s , 
l 
__
__
1
s ' -a 3P3s 0
and
s*K-« S<t>p
3K
3a 0
s' -a
3P_
3a P
(34)
( 35)
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Define
A1 = -a(s4>K-S)-g’s4>p > 0 from (28), (29). 
From (34) we have
8K
8s
and
8P
8s
(36)
(37)
As in section 3*1 thriftier communities have more capital and more 
pollution in equilibrium. To see the reason for this result consider 
a lower savings rate. With a lower savings rate, a lower pollution 
level is required to maintain a given capital stock. In order to 
maintain a lower pollution level, it is necessary that the 
equilibrium capital stock be smaller.
Solving (35) we obtain 
- P s ^8K
8a > 0
and
8P_
8a
(s<|>k-6)P >
— r —  < 0
(38)
(39)
(38)shows that for high decay rates, the capital stock is greater 
in equilibrium. In order to determine the effect upon the stock 
of pollution we need to know whether the equilibrium occurs above 
or below K. If the equilibrium occurs for K < K, then for infinitesimally 
small increases in a, the pollution level rises; however, for large 
increases in a, the pollution level may fall.
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3-3 Model 3
Models 1 and 2 differ in the assumptions regarding the feedback 
effect of pollution on production. The assumption regarding pollution 
accumulation and decay was the same for both models. It was 
assumed that pollution would decay at a constant exponential rate 
a > 0. This rate was independent of the level of pollution as well 
as independent of time. This implies that the more pollution there 
is the faster it is decaying away at any time. The natural clean-up 
processes cannot be destroyed.
In this model we assume that a depends upon the level of 
pollution. On the interval (0,P) a is strictly concave and
decreasing. For P >_ P a is identically zero. Formally,
a e C , P > o , a(0) = a > 0  o (40)
a E C(2) , a* < 0,  a” < 0 ,  0 < P < P (41)
a = 0 , P 1 P. (42)
Figure 3*4
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Define the pollution decay function f as
f(P) = a(P)P (43)
which is certainly continuous everywhere. On the interval (0,P), 
f is twice differentiable. Further
f(0) = f(P) = 0.
From Rolle's Theorem there exists a P* such that f’(P*) = 0.
Since f" = 2a'+a"P < 0 on (0,P), there exists a unique P* such 
that f’(P*) = 0. Thus the following conditions characterize f:
f' = a’P+a > 0 , f" = a"P+2a’ < 0 , 0 < P < P* (44a)
f'(P*) = 0 (44b)
f  = a’P+a < 0 , f" = a"P+2af < 0 , P* < P < P (44c)
f = 0 P > P. (44d)
Over the interval (0,P*), it is seen that the more pollution 
there is, the faster it is dissipated. For P >__ P* the level of 
pollution starts to depress the natural decay process. At P the 
pollution has destroyed the natural clean-up processes in the 
environment. These results are illustrated in Figure 5.
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f(P)
Figure 3*5
The pollution equation may now be written as 
P = g(K)-f(P).
Capital accumulates according to
K = s<J)(K,P)-6K 
as in Model 2.
It is noticed from (44) that the first derivative of f is 
not everywhere continuous, but has a discontinuity at P. Any 
trajectory which passes beyond P will not equilibrate since P > 0 
for K > 0 along such a trajectory. We restrict our attention to 
P < P in what follows.
(45)
(23)
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The locus (K,P) for which K = 0 is the same here as in Model 2. 
Consider the locus for P = 0. Define
M(K,P) = g(K)-f(P) = 0 
MK = g ’ > 0  K > 0
Mp = -f1 j  0 as P j  P*
dP
dK
>
< 0 as P  ^P*. (46)
The slope -ttz . is not defined at P = P* since f’ vanishes at 
dK P=0
that point. The locus for P = 0 is upward sloping to the right 
until P = P*. As P increases beyond P*, the capital stock must fall 
in order to maintain P = 0 and the curve P = 0 bends backwards 
until it hits the boundary of the feasible region.
Figure 3*6
t-
d>
For fixed levels of P, P is an increasing function of K. 
Therefore P > 0 to the right of P = 0, and P < 0 to the left as 
shown in Figure 6,
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The qualitative behaviour of possible time paths is 
illustrated in Figure 7.
•>P = 0
K = 0
Figure 3*7
The stationary curves have been drawn so as to intersect for
0 < K < K
P* < p < "p.
The characteristic roots of the Jacobian matrix of the system 
(23), (45) evaluated at equilibrium are
yl ’y2 = -|{-[f'-(scf^-6) ] ± /  [f ’ - (s<^ K-ö) ] 2-»-4 [ g T s4>p-h(sc^ K—6) f ' ]}
(47a)
(47b)
(48)
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Since
f ’ < 0 and s<j>v--6 > 0 (49)
then
-[fT- (s4>K—6) ] > 0. (50)
Also since
dP
dK K=0 P=0
(51)
we have using (49)
(s<J>K-6)f ’+s4>pg ’ < 0. (52)
From (52) and (50) the roots (48) have positive real parts and hence 
the equilibrium is unstable. For any (Kq ,P ) (0,0) the system
moves away from the equilibrium as shown in Figure 7. Ultimately, 
trajectories leave the feasible region (or approach a limit cycle).
There is no a priori reason to suspect that the equilibrium 
will occur in the region defined by (47). Figure 8 illustrates 
a case where the equilibrium occurs in the region
0 < P < P* (53a)
K < K < K. (53b)
^d
>
6 6.
Figure 3*8
The reader will notice the similarity of Figure 8 and 
Figure 3. It is easily verified that the equilibrium (K,P) is 
locally stable and the origin is a saddlepoint as in Model 2.
If a trajectory originates in I it remains there while 
trajectories in II remain there and eventually pass out of the 
feasible set. As in Model 2, here the initial conditions play 
a crucial role.
If the equilibrium is locally stable then small increases 
in the savings rate increase the long-run values of capital and 
pollution. Sufficiently large increases however may alter the 
stability characteristics of the equilibrium.
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We have considered only two cases for the present model.
One case was where the equilibrium was unstable; the other case 
had a locally stable equilibrium. This is not the end of the 
possibilities. For example, by shifting curves around one may 
generate multiple equilibria. Foci, centers, and saddlepoints are 
all possible in this model. The following conditions are sufficient 
for local stability of an equilibrium:
fT — (s<f>6) > 0 (54)
and
g1 s<j)p+(s<j>K“6) f ’ < 0. (55)
3 * 4 Model 4
In sections 3*1 and 3#2 it was assumed that pollution was 
subject to exponential decay at a rate a. a was assumed to be 
independent of the level of pollution in the system. In section 3*3, 
it was assumed that a was a decreasing function of pollution. The 
case where a is zero for all levels of pollution will now be 
considered.
In this case the P = 0 locus coincides with the P-axis. Only 
if K = 0 can the pollution stock be kept constant. Figure 9 
is the phase portrait for the case where production is independent 
of the level of pollution.
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Figure 3*9
The capital stock approaches K while pollution increases without 
bound. Output is not reduced, but social welfare is if it depends 
upon the state of the environment.
Figure 10 is the phase diagram for the system of Model 2
with a = 0.
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In region I both capital and pollution rise until pollution chokes 
output to the point where gross investment no longer offsets 
depreciation and the capital stock declines. The level of pollution 
continues to rise while capital falls in II. Eventually output 
falls to zero and the trajectory passes out of the feasible region £2.
3 * 5 Model 5
The previous sections have all assumed that capital depreciates 
at a constant exponential rate 6 > 0. We now consider the case 
where capital once installed does not depreciate. We assume that 
production depends upon the level of pollution as in sections 3*2 
and 3*3 so that capital accumulates according to
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K = s<J>(K,P) , s > 0. (56)
Assume that pollution accumulates according to
P = g(K)-aP (5»)
where a > 0 is constant.
As long as s > 0 there is no equilibrium of the system (56),
(5') which has <KK,P) > 0. Figure 11 is the phase portrait.
Figure 3*11
Trajectories in region I are characterized by rising capital 
and pollution. Over some time interval it is possible for output 
to be increasing but ultimately the output declines to zero as 
the trajectory approaches the boundary of the feasible set ft.
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If s = 0 in this model then there is no capital accumulation 
and the trajectory follows a path parallel to the P-axis and 
approaches the P = 0 locus which is seen to be stable from above 
and from below. If the P = 0 locus is approached from below then 
output fend hence consumption) is decreasing over time. For 
pollution decay functions of the type used in section 3*3, it 
is possible for sufficiently high values of K, that if s = 0 then 
output will decrease to zero. Here the absence of capital 
accumulation does not stop the collapse.
If s > 0, a > 0, 6 = 0, but = 0 then it is possible for
capital, output and pollution to increase without bound. This 
result is similar to those found by d'Arge [1971] and d'Arge and 
Kogiku [1973].
3 * 6 Summary and Conclusion
We have examined pollution and economic growth under various 
assumptions. The stability properties of Model 1 were greatly 
disturbed when we considered the possibility that pollution may 
reduce the amount of output produced from a given capital stock.
In sections 3*2 and 3*3 we found that it was possible to obtain 
a locally stable equilibrium or an unstable equilibrium. The 
result depends upon the relative shapes of the curves concerned.
This depends not only upon the technical functions such as <{>, g, 
or f but also upon the social parameter s. Without precise knowledge 
of these functions and parameters, it is not possible to predict the 
stability characteristics of an equilibrium. If the equilibrium 
is locally stable, the ultimate outcome depends crucially upon the 
historically given initial endowments (K ,P ).
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In section 3*4 the decay rate of pollution was zero while in 
section 3*5 the depreciation rate was zero. In these models the 
system eventually collapsed, if production depended upon the 
pollution level and if s > 0. If the production function is 
independent of pollution then the level of pollution increases 
indefinitely.
In their study of the limits to growth, Meadows et al [1972] 
make the following statement:
Since we intend to use the world model only to 
answer questions about behaviour modes not to make 
exact predictions, we are primarily concerned with 
the correctness of the feedback loop structure and 
only secondarily with the accuracy of the data. [p 122]
Without denying that the feedback loop structure is important, we 
observe in view of the results of this chapter that not even the 
general behaviour of the system can be determined independently 
of the data used. A similar result has been shown by changing
g
the data in the Forrester [1971] model.
9We conclude that (in the absence of population growth and 
resource scarcity) the future of the world system is not necessarily 
collapse as predicted by the computer simulations of Forrester and 
Meadows et al. More detailed information is required before the 
ultimate fate of the world system is known.
8 See Mahbub ul Haq [1972], By changing the pollution-capital 
ratio by 5/8 the prediction of catastrophe was completely erased.
9 For a discussion of population and economic growth see 
Pitchford [1973].
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When there is a locally stable equilibrium we saw that the 
long-run values of capital and pollution can be affected by the 
assumed value of the savings ratio. In fact, thriftier 
communities have more capital and more pollution in equilibrium. 
This may partially explain why the pollution levels in the more 
industrialized countries are higher than in less industrialized 
countries even if the same technology exists in both. In the case 
of Model 3 we note that if the equilibrium is unstable then a large 
decrease in the savings ratio may result in a locally stable 
equilibrium being established.
The assumptions of the above analysis were very severe.
There was no attempt to control pollution and no technical change. 
The savings behaviour of the community was simple and fixed over 
time. In assuming no pollution control and a constant savings 
rate s we "lock" the system into a given trajectory. If there is 
pollution control and/or if s is permitted to vary then the 
trajectories are altered and we wish to find those trajectories 
which are ’’optimal" in accordance with some measure of social 
economic welfare. We now turn to a consideration of this problem
of optimal control.
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CHAPTER IV
OPTIMAL CONSUMPTION PLANNING IN A POLLUTED ENVIRONMENT *
The economic models examined in Chapter III were descriptive 
rather than prescriptive. We observed the evolution of an economy 
whose motion was described by a system of differential equations.
The centre of attention was the stability of the growth process.
Most economic processes can be controlled. For example, in the 
previous chapter investment could have been controlled by varying 
the savings ratio. In a controlled model we focus upon the 
optimality of the control. Faced with many values for controls, the 
economic planner desires that control which gives the "best" result 
in accordance with some given performance criterion.
This chapter starts an investigation into how an economy with 
a pollution problem should be controlled. The purpose of the 
following models is to illuminate the central issues in pollution 
control and economic activity. The central issue is the pure 
consumption/pollution trade-off. In order to focus on this basic 
problem we assume away problems of natural resource exhaustion, 
population growth, technical progress, and capital accumulation.
We thus assume that there is a fixed supply of factor inputs which 
produce a fixed amount of output in each period. We may think of 
this as the natural state of the economy, or we may think that a 
policy of "zero" growth in output has been decided upon by the 
central decision makers.
* A version of this chapter has been accepted for publication in 
the Economic Record.
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The society derives utility from consumption but in consuming 
output, pollution is generated which yields disutility. By foregoing 
present consumption the amount of pollution in the future may be 
reduced. This is the dilemma. Maximizing the utility of consumption 
is not consistent with maximizing social economic welfare. The 
problem for the central planner is to determine the optimal 
consumption plan.
Keeler, Spence and Zeckhauser [1972, Model II], Plourde [1972] 
and Smith [1972] investigate various aspects of the pollution problem 
in similar models. The work of this chapter is closest in spirit to 
that of Plourde. Smith investigates recycling while Keeler, Spence 
and Zeckhauser examine the choice of a production technique.
The basic model is formulated more rigorously in section 4*1. 
Pontryagin's Maximum Principle is used in section 4*2 to discover 
the nature of the optimal solution. In section 4*3 we consider the 
effects on equilibrium values of changes in the parameters of the 
model. Section 4*4 re-examines the problem of 4*2 but with a change 
in the assumption regarding the disutility of pollution. Section 4*5 
presents the central conclusions of the analysis. Appendix 4A states 
without proof the necessary conditions for the control problem
considered here.
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4•1 The Mathematical Model
It is assumed that social economic welfare is measured by a 
strictly concave utility function of current consumption and the 
current stock of pollution. The marginal utility of consumption is 
positive but diminishing. The marginal utility of pollution is 
negative and decreasing. This disutility may be due to aesthetic 
considerations, health, or discomfort. As the pollution level 
rises these effects are aggravated. Formally the conditions on the 
utility function U are
U = U(C,P) U(C,P) e C v
uc > 0 ’ u cc 0 , C > 0
Up < 0 * upp 0 , P > 0
uccupp ucp - °*
(la)
(lb)
(2)
For purposes of the basic model we assume that an increase in the 
stock of pollution reduces the marginal utility of consumption. That is,
UCP < °- (3)
This is economically reasonable: a rise in the dust particle level
in a picnic area will drive down the enjoyment derived from an 
additional sandwich.
The following limit conditions are imposed on the partial 
derivatives of U:
lim Ur (C,P) = 00 for all P > 0, (4)
O o  L
and
lim U (C,P) = 0 
P+o ^
for all C > 0. (5)
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Condition (4) ensures that no optimal policy will entail a zero level 
of consumption. This assumption is standard in the optimal growth 
literature. Condition (5) states that a small deviation from a clean 
environment does not reduce welfare. A few wisps of smoke from a 
single automobile are unlikely to result in a public outcry. This 
condition is sufficient to ensure that no optimal trajectory moves 
the economy to a clean environment as will be seen below. For many 
forms of pollution, however, (5) is not reasonable. This assumption 
is relaxed in section 4*4 below.
A fixed output <j>° is produced in each time period. This may 
be interpreted as output net of replacement investment. This output 
is allocated to consumption C or to pollution control E so that
Posing the problem in this way allows us to focus solely on the 
consumption - pollution trade-off.
The stock of pollution increases as a result of the consumption 
process. The flow increases at an increasing rate with respect to 
consumption. The stock of pollution is subject to decay at a 
constant exponential rate a. In the absence of anti-pollution activity 
the stock of pollution evolves over time according to
4>° = C + E (6)
P = g(C) - aP
where
g(0) = 0
g f > 0 , gM > 0 C > 0 (7)
and
lim g ’ (C) = 0 
C->o
It is possible for the community to slow the accumulation 
(or hasten the decline) of pollution by devoting some expenditure to 
anti-pollution activities. The amount of pollution cleaned up will 
be a function h of the amount of pollution control expenditure E. 
This function satisfies the following conditions
h(E) e C (2) , h(0) = 0
h' > 0 , hM < 0 , E > 0,
and
lim h’ (E) = °°.
E-nd
Either the activity annihilates the pollution or it transforms 
it to some form which can be disposed of at no cost to society 
(other than through E). Thus the communities net contribution to 
the flow of pollution is measured by 
g(C) - h(E).
From (6) the level of anti-pollution activity can be determined 
solely by the choice of the consumption level
E = <f>° - C.
The net contribution then is a function of the consumption level. 
Define
Z(C) = g(C) - h(t(>0-C).
Z has the following properties:
Z' (C) = g' + h’ > 0,
and
ZM(C) = gM - h" > 0.
The flow of pollution increases at an increasing rate with respect 
to consumption. Note also that from (8)
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l im  Z ' ( C )  = l im  g ’ (C) + l im  h '  (4>°—C)
C-*cj)0 C-*<J>° C-*<j>°
=  00 #
Le t  C be t h e  s o l u t i o n  o f  Z(C) = 0 .  Then o
Z(C) < 0  f o r  C < Co
and
Z(C) > 0  f o r  C > C .o
For  C < Cq t h e  community i s  n e t  p o l l u t i o n  a b a t i n g ;  f o r  C > Cq , i t  
i s  n e t  p o l l u t i n g .  Cq i s  t h e  l e v e l  o f  consum pt ion  which  w i l l  j u s t  
s u s t a i n  a c l e a n  e n v i r o n m e n t .  These r e s u l t s  a r e  shown i n  F i g u r e  1.
F i g u r e  4^1
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Z(C) may be thought of as the pollution control function. By 
selecting the consumption level the community uniquely determines 
the amount of pollution it generates in net terms. The control 
function has two components. One is an active control represented 
by h(E), where existing pollution is cleaned up. The other 
component is a passive control given by g(C). Consider transferring 
a unit of output from the consumption sector to the anti-pollution 
sector. In terms of pollution control, society gains in a two-fold 
manner. First, with more anti-pollution control expenditure more 
pollution can be cleaned up. Secondly, since the consumption level 
is lower, less pollution is being generated.
With expenditure on pollution control, the accumulation of 
waste is governed by
4•2 The Optimal Solution
We assume the existence of a Central Planning Authority who 
seeks to maximize the discounted flow of utility. In order to give 
consideration to generations not yet born, the time horizon is left 
infinite. Future utility is discounted at a constant exponential 
rate p > 0. The formal planning problem is to
P = Z(C) - aP. (10)
max e ptU(C,P)dt p > 0 (ID
C J o
subject to
P = Z(C) - aP , P(0) = Pq , P(oo) free
o C > 0 P > 0.
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This is a fixed (infinite) time free right-hand endpoint 
optimal control problem. There is one state variable P and one 
control variable C. Pq is the historically given initial pollution 
level.
The performance functional (11) is an improper integral. 
However,
,00
e'ptU(C,P)dt <_ 
J o
c°°
e""ptU (tj)° ,0)dt 
■' o
U(4>°,0)
P
which is finite
and hence a maximum of the integral exists.
Using the Arrow and Kurz [1970] formulation of Pontryagin’s 
Maximum Principle (see Appendix 4A) the necessary conditions for a 
solution to the above problem (11) are:
there exist a function \p(t) such that
H = U(C,P) + \p(Z(C) - aP) 
and functions r(t) and q(t) such that
L = H + r(Z(C) - aP) + q(<t>° - C)
3, -u-cc.p)
9C - 0 , or ty+r - Z T ( C )  + Z'(C)
• p) T
ip = pip - —  , or ip = (p+aH-Up (C,P) + ra
r _> 0 , rP = rP = 0
, q(<t>°“C) = 0.
(12)
(13)
(14)
q >_ 0 (15)
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A policy of all-out consumption is non-optimal since from (9) 
and (12)
q-U (C,P)
llm c_z^Tc)— > = 0
0(f)0
=> lim (^+r) = 0.
But for C = <|)0 , P > 0  or P > 0
= > r = 0
and hence ip = 0, which can only exist for an instant since 
ip = -Up(C,P) > o.
For an interior solution (P > 0, 0 < C < 4>°) the necessary 
conditions are
It is well known in control theory that the costate variable ip 
has the interpretation of a shadow price of the corresponding state 
variable if the objective function has the dimension of an economic 
value.^ From (12’) it is seen that the shadow price of pollution is 
negative. (12’) also gives the derived demand for consumption as a 
function of the shadow price and the level of pollution. We can
1 See Arrow and Kurz [1970, Chapter 2] or Intriligator [1971 
Chapter 14].
-uc (c ,p)
(12’)
and
 ^= (p-fa)^ -Up(C ,P) . (13’)
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visualize the system solved as C = C(ip,P) with
9C
dip
Z'
-(Ucc+^zn) 0 (16a)
and
9C
9P -(ucc+*z”> < 0 . (16b)
The level of consumption is an increasing function of ip and a decreasing 
function of the level of pollution.
We turn now to an analysis of the (P,^) phase plane. First 
consider the behaviour of the stock of pollution. Define
N(ib ,P) = Z (C (ip , P)) - aP = 0
Z' !•£■ > 0
n p ■ z ’ f - a < 0
di >^
dP P=0
-z' f + °
z- IS > 0. (17)
The locus N(4>,P) = 0 is upward sloping to the right in the phase 
diagram with
lim ip 
P-*o P=0
lim
P+o
C-H3
-UC (C,P) 
Z' (C)
-UC (Co>0)
Z'(C0) •
For fixed levels of ip, P is a decreasing function of the level of 
pollution. Therefore P < 0 to the right of P = 0 and P > 0 to the
(18)
lef t .
8 4 .
Now c o n s i d e r  t h e  b e h a v i o u r  o f  t h e  s h a d o w  p r i c e  i p .  D e f i n e
M ( ^ ,P )  E (p + a) i | ; -U p ( C ( ^ , P ) , P )  = 0 .
M
P
( p + a ) ' UCP If * 
~UPP~UCP 3P
0
d\Jj
dP
ip=0
- ^ C C ^ P ^ C P ^ ^ P P 2 " 
- (U cc+* Z " )(P+a-Ucp | £ )
( 1 9 )
The ip = 0 c u r v e  i s  d o w nw ard  s l o p i n g  t o  t h e  r i g h t  w i t h
l i m  \p 
P->o \p=0
= l i m
P->o
Up(C,P)
p+ a
( 2 0 )
a n  i n c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  o f
0 .
T h e s e  r e s u l t s  a r e  show n i n  F i g u r e  2 .
= 0 f r o m  ( 5 ) .
F o r  c o n s t a n t  P ,  ip = (p + a ) i | j -U p (C (ip ,P )  ,P )  i s  
H en ce  ip > 0 a b o v e  \p =  0  a n d  < 0 b e l o w  =
8 5 .
*
-UC(Co’0)z'(co)
00
Figure 4‘2
To determine the stability properties of the equilibrium 
consider the Jacobian matrix of the system
Z(C) - aP
 ^= (p+a)ip-Up (C ,P)
00 00evaluated at the equilibrium (ip ,P )
z 3Cdip
j
3C
9P
3£ 
CP 3P (p+a)-U
12
CP dip
(21)
det J
" — ----  ----
dC 3C
- a + z  Tt P+a UCP dip
—  - ____ ___
+ Z' 3Cdip
(UCCUPP UCP) UPP
■<uc c ^ z,,) (22)
Since the determinant of J is negative, it follows that the 
equilibrium is a saddlepoint. From Gale and Nikaido [1965] it 
also follows that the equilibrium is unique which is clear from 
Figure 2.
Regions I and IV are traps in the sense that if any path 
enters either of these regions, it remains there forever. We now 
show that the trajectory which lies along the stable branch of the 
saddlepoint is the optimal solution to the intertemporal 
maximization problem (11).
Paths in I (or which enter I) can be dismissed immediately 
as non-optimal since P > 0 and ip > 0. Eventually ^ = 0 while 
ip = -Up > 0 and ip becomes positive violating (12’).
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Now compare the path to the equilibrium denoted by
2with any other feasible path (ij),C,P).
Let
X(t) = e-ptij (t) (23)
= > X = ijje pt - pe p%. (24)
From the concavity of U(C,P) we have
f 00
e~pt{U(C*,P*)-U(C,P)}dt _> 
J o
f00
e"P (C*-C)+U*(P*-P)}dt 
J o
r00
e"pt{ [-^*Z’ (C*)] (C*-C) + [i|;*(a+p)-^ *] (P*-P) }dt 
J o
[~4>*e pt]{Z’ (C*) (C*-C)-a(P*-P)}dt + (pe pthp*-e p%*) (P*-P)dt
' o
r00
[-i|)*e-pt ] (Z ’ (C*) (C*-C)-a(P*-P)}dt 
•' o
, ° o
(P*-P)A*dt 
J o
[-^*e pt]{Z’(C*)(C*-C)-a(P*-P)}dt - (P*-P)e pt>*
' o o
c00 . •
A*(p*_p)dt 
* o
c°°
[ — P t ] (Z ' (C*) (C*-C)-aP*+aP+Z (C)-aP-Z (C*)+aP* }dt 
*' o
2 This proof is a special case of a theorem proved by Mangasarian [1966]. 
See also Appendix 6A of this thesis.
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r ° °
[-^*e”pt]{[Z*(C*)C*-Z(C*)]-[Z’(C*)C-Z(C)]}dt 
J o
0 since Z'(C*)C-Z(C) attains a maximum at C = C*.
The expression is met with strict inequality if
for some t, C(t) =f C*(t). Since C(0) =j= C*(0), the
3equilibrium path is the optimal path.
In the above proof we used the fact that P is bounded. To see 
that this is so note that if C = cf)0 then
P = Z(<j>°) - aP 
which has as its solution
p = Z (({> ) rp _ Z (<j) ) i at
a L o a J
Since a > 0, as t -> “ => P + z(<fr°)
Thus P < max(P . — ^ — —) . —  o’ a
(25)
It has just been shown that the trajectory leading to the 
equilibrium is the optimal path for the maximization problem (11). 
Thus given Pq , the Central Planning Authority selects that value of 
ip (0) (and hence C(0) by (12’)) which corresponds to the stable branch
of the saddlepoint. ip is then changed over time according to (13')
0° 00
which ensures convergence to the equilibrium (P ,\p ).
3 The sufficiency theorem of Arrow and Kurz [1970 , p 51] requires 
that the Hamiltonian be concave and the costate be non-negative. 
The above proof suggests that the theorem be weakened to allow 
non-positivity of the costate with concavity of the Hamiltonian. 
This proof is provided in Appendix 6A.
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The equilibrium, as has been demonstrated, is formally a
saddlepoint in the (P,^) phase space. This means that if if; is
set at any value other than the one corresponding to the stable
branch of the saddle, and then is changed over time according to
(13') then the chosen trajectory diverges from the optimal
trajectory. Plourde [1972, p 125] concluded that
Controlled systems suffer from the basic 
flaw that once an economy gets off an optimal 
trajectory it tends to move away from that 
trajectory.
However, the models discussed in this chapter and by Plourde are
non-stochastic. There is no reason for the economy to get off the
optimal trajectory in such a controlled system. The system is
strictly stable subject to the choice of the optimal control. The
multiplicity of trajectories in the phase diagram Figure 2 merely
reflects the fact that in general the optimal path will differ for
4different time horizons and initial values of the state variable. 
Samuelson [1967] has the following analogy to the problem of 
stability and planning:
A bicycle is highly unstable: unless set just
right (and reset just right if perturbed), it 
will fall cumulatively away from equilibrium.
But a bicycle manned by a trained rider is stable.
The biological link provides its governor. The 
governor or his muscles, knows how to reaim it 
at every instant to retain stability. [pp 222-223].
4 Other authors have been concerned about the "instability" of 
optimal systems. See Fox, Sengupta and Thorbecke [1966] 
and Loehman and Whinston [1970]. For discussions of these 
see Preston [1972] and Forster and Logan [1973].
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The models discussed here do not cast doubt upon the efficiency 
of controlled systems. The conjecture by Plourde [1972, p 125] 
that
... it generally seems advisable to incorporate 
as much of the conventional pricing adjustment 
mechanisms into controlled systems as possible.
does not follow from his model. The problem of designing controls
for decentralized systems is one which requires investigation. This
comes under the general heading of what Arrow and Kurz [1970] term
controllability. We return to this question in Chapter VI.
For initial levels of pollution lying above the equilibrium 
solution, the pollution level must fall and as it falls over time 
resources are released from pollution control and devoted to 
consumption. For initial levels of pollution lying below the 
endpoint, the pollution stock rises over time. As it rises, more 
resources are devoted to pollution control and hence the level of 
consumption falls over time.
We now turn to a discussion of the stationary solution, 
conditions on C and P in equilibrium are:
The
Z(C )
oo . -u (c“,p”)Z’(c")V c >p > ■--?£---
(26)
(27)
(26) is the condition that in equilibrium the stock of
pollution is constant. The amount of new pollution generated
00 00Z(C ) is just equal to the amount which decays away aP .
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(27) is a little more complicated. The left-hand side is 
the marginal utility of consumption - the instantaneous gain in 
utility from additional consumption. The numerator of the right 
is the loss in utility caused by an increment in consumption.
This utility is lost because additional pollution has been 
generated as a result of the momentary increase in consumption.
If the pollution does not decay then this loss in utility must 
be endured forever. The present value of this loss is
-Up(C,P)Z'(C)
P
If however, the pollution does decay at some positive rate, the 
loss in utility in any period will be less. The present value will 
be lower and the foregoing measure must be adjusted to account for 
decay. The new measure is
-Up(C,P)Z'(C)
p+a
This present value may be interpreted as the marginal psychic^ 
cost of consumption. (27) then states that the marginal utility 
of consumption equals the marginal psychic cost of consumption.
-upz’
Alternatively, we could interpret ■ as the utility
gained by devoting an additional unit of output to pollution control. 
This must equal the marginal cost of pollution control in terms of 
foregone consumption.
5 The term "psychic" is used here so as not to confuse this 
concept with the cost of producing consumption.
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The interpretation of as a present value was justified
on intuitive grounds above. We now show this more formally.
The change in utility at any point in time due to a change
00 00
in the pollution level (with reference to (C ,P )) is
Up (c“ ,p”)dP(t).
The amount of pollution (dP) however decays over time according to 
(dP) = -u(dP)
= > dP(t) = e at(dP)(0)
(dP)(0) is the amount of pollution generated by a momentary
00
increase in consumption i.e. Z ’(C ). Thus 
dP(t) = e“atZ' (C°°) .
The present value of the change in utility is
P. V.
f 00 . oo oo oo —  ry f . — nt
(Up (C ,P )Z' (C )e }e p dt 
o
00 00 0 0,
= Up(C ,P )Z'(c ) e- (p+a)tdt 
 ^o
00 00 . oo v
Up(C ,P )Z ’ (C )
p+a
Q.E.D.
This completes our discussion of the stationary values of 
C and P for given values of the parameters p, a and <j>°. We now 
turn to a consideration of the effects on equilibrium values of C 
and P of different values of these parameters.
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4•3 Variations in the Parameters
Differentiating the system (26), (27) totally we obtain
Z'dC -a dP = Pda + Odp + h'dcj)0
{(p+a)Ucc+UpZ"+UcpZ'}dC {(p+a)Ucp+UppZ'}dP = -Uc(da+dp)-Uph"d<t>°
(28)
Define A
Z' -a
(p+a)Ucc+UpZ"+UcpZ’ (p+a)Ucp+UppZ'
= Z ,{(p+a)Ucp+UppZf} + a{(p+a)Ucc+UpZM+UCpZ’} < 0. (29)
We can now solve (28) for the desired partial derivatives using 
Cramer's Rule. First consider variations in p.
and
3P
3p > 0 .
(30)
(31)
Both consumption and pollution move in the same direction as the 
discount rate. To see the reasoning here more clearly, consider
the effects of a higher discount rate upon the plan. With the initial
level of pollution given, the community will desire more consumption
at present. In the future, however, it must pay in terms of higher
pollution levels. This result may not be immediately obvious since
both consumption and pollution utilities are discounted equally.
However, the community has no control over the current level of
pollution. On the other hand, consumption can be increased
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immediately. The pollution caused by this decision occurs in the 
future, and with the higher discount rate on future utility, the 
community is prepared to pay this price.
Now we investigate the effects of different decay rates. We 
find that
3^  = - {P[ (P4«)Ucp+Z'Upp]-aUc} > 0 (32)
and
|I = i {-Z-Uc-P[(P+a)Ucc+UpZ"+UcpZ'n 7  o. (33)
The consumption level moves in the same direction as the decay rate 
but the level of pollution may move in the same direction or in the 
opposite direction.
Suppose the decay rate is lower. This means that any pollution 
level requires a lower level of consumption to maintain it. This lower 
level of consumption may not be sufficient to maintain the previous 
level of pollution and the pollution level will rise. This might 
occur if the psychic cost involved in additional pollution is less 
than the loss in utility which results from a further decrease in 
consumption required to maintain the previous level of pollution.
It is possible though, for the stock of pollution to fall. In 
this case the utility lost is offset by the utility gained from a 
lower level of pollution.
This ambiguity is in agreement with the results obtained in a 
similar model by Keeler, Spence, and Zeckhauser [1972, p 29], but 
in disagreement with Plourde [1972, p 124] who concludes
.. . the faster the natural biodecomposition takes 
place, the larger will be the acceptable steady-state 
waste stock.
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The source of the difference is a mathematical error in Plourde's 
analysis.^
The final parameter to consider is <J>°. Variations in 4>° can be 
thought of as arising from an increase in population or capital 
inputs, or technical knowledge. The following results then shed 
some light upon the possible effects of economic growth. Solving 
(28) we have
^  - j  {h1((p+a)Ucp+UppZ')-aUpph"} > 0
8(f)
and
^  i {-Uph"Z'-h'[(p+a)Ucc+UpZ"+UcpZ']> 7 o .
9cj)
Thus with an increase in the productive capacity of the system, 
in equilibrium the society has a higher level of consumption.
The pollution level on the other hand, could fall, rise or remain 
the same. The explanation for this result is similar to that given 
above for the decay rate. The important conclusion is that economic 
growth does not necessarily result in higher pollution levels.
6 In a personal communication C.G.Plourde agreed with my
calculations but expressed the opinion that he would expect 
9Pordinarily that > 0.
(34)
(35)
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4•4 A Boundary Solution
In order to sharpen the analysis of this section we assume 
U(C,P) has the additively separable form
U(C,P) = U 1 (C) + u 2(p)
where
U| > 0 , U ” < 0 , C > 0
and
< 0 , U ” < 0 , P > 0.
The following limit conditions are imposed
lim U ’ (C) = 00 
O o  1
and
lim Ul(P) = -a , a > 0.
P+o
In section 4*2 the analysis assumed that
lim U (C,P) = 0.
P+o F
This is equivalent to a = 0 for the present model.
For a > 0,
lim ip .
P+o ' ip=0
the ip
-a
p+a
0 curve of Figure 2 shifts downward with
while
lim ^ 
P->o P=0
-Ul(Co)
z«(co)
(la’)
(lb’)
(4’)
(5’)
(5)
(36)
(18’)
The solutions to the problem then depend upon whether
If a < then an equilibrium with a positive
p+a
Wz-(co)
level of pollution is possible as illustrated in Figure
0
V  (C )
Figure 4^3
The solution is formally the same as in section 2.
3.
P
The
equilibrium path is the optimal trajectory. In equilibrium, the 
level of pollution may be lower than in a model with a = 0 if 
the disutility is greater for any given level of pollution. In
98.
order to maintain this lower level of pollution, the consumption 
level must be lower.
For p+a
W .
Z ’(C ) ’ o
the equilibrium occurs in a clean
environment. In equilibrium the community will consume at C 
which is sufficient to sustain a clean environment.
The problem is particularly interesting if U1 <c Ja  ^ op+a Z’(C ) * o
since the P = 0 and ip = 0 curves do not intersect anywhere. Hence 
there is no equilibrium of the type discussed in the previous model 
The stationary point is given by the solution of^
(p+a)ijj + a + ra = 0
ip+r -ul<co>Z'(Co)
i.e.
at (P,i|0
W
Z'(Co) - a
U ’ (C )1 O 3.Since (c ') < p+a ^  assumption it follows that
7 Recall equations (12) and (13). r is the multiplier associated
with the constraint P >_ 0 when P = 0. In Smith [1972] and 
Forster [1972b] this constraint is not required since the 
structure of their differential equations is such that the 
constraint could not be violated. In fact it takes an infinite 
time for the pollution to disappear. This is not the case here 
or in Plourde [1972].
(37a)
(37b)
(37c)
Figure 4 depicts the movement of the system for any given
initial values of (P,i|i).
0 P
Figure 4*4
Trajectories which enter region I are non-optimal since 
eventually the costate ip turns positive violating (12’). Paths 
which originate in II may enter I (and hence are non-optimal), hit 
the tf/-axis between ^l^o^ and —7—  , or enter region III.z'(c;y p+°
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Trajectories in III are not asymptotic to any P _> 0 since
lim P = 0 
P+P
=> lim C = C where Z(C) = aP 
P+P
-U*(C)
=> lim \p = ---— —  which is finite.
M  Z ’(C)
Consider paths which hit the ip-axis above the stationary point
U1
a Z r  "  a
but below -ui(co)z'(Co)
The required conditions upon ip and \p for P = 0 are
-U{(C)
^+r = Z 1(C)
ip = (p+a)^ + a + ra 
r > 0.
r > 0 since if r = 0 then
C < C from (16)o
which means P = Z(C) < 0 which violates the constraint P >_ 0 when
P = 0. Now for paths which hit the i|i-axis above the stationary point
* * -U’(C )P = 0 and \p > 0. These paths move up the axis until ip = 1v o'
Z'(Co)
at which point r = 0 and the path enters region I. Therefore, these
(39)
paths are non-optimal.
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We have just shown that any path which lies above the stationary 
path (ip*,P*) is non-optimal. Now compare with any path (^,P) 
which lies below it,in order to rule these out.
Along ( ip * ,P*) , C* < Cq thus Z(C*) < 0, hence
lim {Z(C*)-aPÄ} = b < 0 say. (AO)
P+o+
Let T* be the time taken for the system to move from P(0) = Pq to 
P(T) = 0 along (^*,P*) where
lim
P(T)+o+
P(T) dP
Z(C*)-aP* (41)
is finite from (40). Any path lower than ( ip * ,P*) has a lower 
consumption level for positive P and is more efficient in cleaning 
up pollution. Hence these paths arrive at P = 0 in less than time T*.
Comparing integrals and using the concavity of U(C,P) we obtain
r °o
e“pt{U(C*,P*)-U(C,P)}dt 
 ^o
>
,oo
e"pt{U[(C*)(C*-C)+U’(P*)(P*-P)}dt 
> o
= A.
”pt{ [-ip*Z' (C*) ] (C*-C)+[\p*(p+ot)-^*] (P*-P) }dt
' o
+
fCO
e"pt{U'(C*)(C*-C)+U'(P*)(P*-P)}dt. 
X* 1 z
The second integral of A is zero since C* = C = and P* = p = 0 
for all t e [T*,°°).
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Therefore
A = [_^*e pt]{[Zf (C*)C*-Z(C*)]-[Z'(C*)C-Z(C)]}dt
Jo
- (P*-P)e pt>*
> 0
since Z ’(C*)C-Z(C) attains its maximum at C = C* and because 
P*(T*) = P(T) = 0 and P*(0) = P(0) = P Since C(0) =|= C*(0), A > 0 
and the stationary path is the optimal trajectory.
Paths lying above the stationary path were shown to violate 
the necessary conditions for optimality. Those trajectories lying 
below are inferior in that the consumption stream is lower and the 
cost associated with this outweighs the benefits of obtaining a 
clean environment more quickly.
Rewriting the condition
a
p+a
P i (Co)z'Ccy
as
W  <aZ'(C ) op+a -U£(0)Z'(Co)p+a (42)
we see the rationale for the system moving to a clean environment. 
This condition states that the marginal utility of consumption in a 
clean environment is less than the marginal psychic cost of 
consumption in a clean environment. This ensures that once the 
environment has been cleaned up there is no tendency to increase 
consumption above C , since the cost outweighs the benefit.
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4 • 5 Conclusions
The problem of pollution control has been discussed for a simple 
economy. By assuming a fixed supply of factors producing a fixed 
amount of output we were able to focus on the consumption-pollution 
trade-off. The consumption desires of the society are still very 
relevant and the cost of pollution control must always be considered 
in terms of foregone consumption.
It was shown that whether or not the pollution is totally 
eliminated depends upon the consumption-pollution trade-off in a 
pristine environment. These results are seen most clearly for the 
separable utility function of section 4*4. If the marginal utility 
of consumption in a clean environment is greater than the psychic 
cost of additional consumption in a clean environment, i.e.
u h c 0 >  »
-U£(0)Z'(Co)
p+a
then it is not optimal to eliminate the pollution. Rather, the 
optimal trajectory moves the system to the equilibrium which is 
characterized by a non-zero finite level of pollution and a 
consumption level above Cq.
If, on the other hand, in a clean environment, the marginal 
utility of consumption is less than or equal to the marginal 
psychic cost of consumption, that is,
W -u:(o)z'(c )l_________Op+a
then the optimal policy results in a pristine environment. Once 
the environment has been cleaned up, consumption is at Cq.
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From these conditions it is seen that a necessary condition for 
a non-zero pollution level is that Up(C,0) =f 0. This is not sufficient 
of course. For example, a very high discount rate (or decay rate) 
could offset the effects of Up(C,0) < 0. Or, if Z'(Cq) is "low" 
this could offset the disutility of pollution. We conclude that 
the net benefits of pollution control depend not only upon community 
preferences as embodied in U(C,P) and p, but also upon the technology 
and the natural characteristics of the environment as embodied in 
Z(C) and a.
The comparative statics analysis of section 4*3 showed that 
the higher the rate of discount on future utility (other things 
being equal), the higher the equilibrium levels of pollution and 
consumption. For variations in the decay rate of pollution and the 
level of output we were able to determine the direction of the 
change in consumption but not in the pollution level without further 
information about the utility function and the technology.
These results are for a stationary economy with a pollution 
problem. The fixed output could be considered as having been 
determined by the policy makers. It is reasonable to consider the 
case in which the level of long-run output is determined as part of 
the intertemporal optimization problem rather than being fixed at 
its initial level. This is done by choosing the optimal rate of 
capital investment. Such a consideration is the task of 
Chapters V and VI. In Chapter V, the amount of pollution is a flow 
which depends only upon current values of the relevant variables 
while in Chapter VI,pollution is a stock as in this chapter.
APPENDIX 4A
THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR OPTIMALITY
The purpose of this appendix is to state without proof the 
formulation of Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle used in this thesis.
In particular we want to outline the method developed in Arrow and 
Kurz'*' [1970, pp 41-42] for handling non-negativity requirements 
on the state variables.
The state of the system is described at any point in time by a 
vector of s state variables
x (t) = (x1(t),...,xg(t)).
These are piecewise smooth functions of time. The time paths of 
the state variables can be affected by the use of control variables. 
There are n such variables
v (t) = (vx(t),...>vn (t))
which are piecewise continuous functions of time.
It is assumed that the evolution of the system can be described 
by the following set of differential equations
x = T(x(t),v(t),t).
The control variables are restricted at each instant to be 
in a control region V defined by the constraints
Fj (x(t) ,v(t),t) >_ 0 j = 1,. . . ,m.
which need not depend on the state variables.
1 The material here first appeared in Arrow [1968],
We also wish to consider constraints on the state variables.
It is desired to constrain
x.(t) 1 0 i = 1,...,s.
The constraint (3) can be disregarded for all t such that x^ > 0. 
When x^ = 0 for some time interval, however, we want to constrain 
x. > 0  over that interval. Since x. = T. from (1),l —  l i
Ti(x(t) ,v(t) ,t) _> 0
is an effective constraint over the interval concerned. Constraint 
(4) is to be added to the set of constraints (2). Let us denote 
this new constraint set
R£(x(t) ,v(t) ,t) >_ 0 , i = 1, . . . ,m+s.
Before stating the Proposition we require the following 
constraint qualification.
Constraint Qualification (see Hadley and Kemp [1971, p 283].)
(a) If m+s, the number of constraints R , is greater than n, 
the number of control variables, then there does not exist 
any point (x,v,t) which satisfies (5) and for which more 
than n of the constraints is active, that is, hold as 
strict equalities.
(b) Let (x,v,t) be any solution to (5). If exactly k of 
the constraints (5) are active, then the k x n matrix
£the rows of which are the R from the active constraints,v
has rank k.
107.
This constraint qualification is satisfied in the problems 
considered here. We now state the theorem.
Proposition 4A1 (Arrow and Kurz [1970, pp 48—49 ] .)
Let v*(t) be a choice of instruments (t >_ 0) which maximizes
•00
a(t)U(x(t),v(t),t)dt (7)
■' o
subject to the conditions
x = T(x(t),v(t),t) (1)
a set of constraints
F_. (x(t) ,v(t) ,t) _> 0 j = 1,. . . ,m (2)
and the non-negativity conditions
x^(t) >_ 0 (t _> 0, i = 1,. .. ,s) (3)
on the state variables. If the constraint qualification holds, 
then there exist functions of time, p^(t), such that for each t,
v* maximizes H(x(t),v,p(t),t) subject to the constraints 
(2) and the additional constraints T^(x(t),v,t) •> 0 
for all i for which x^ = 0 where
s
H(x,v,p,t) = U(x,v,t) + Z p T (x,v,t)
i=l
pi = p(t)Pi - ^
evaluated at
x = x (t) , v = v*(t) ,
P(t) = - /
p = p(t) where
(8)
(9)
(10)
and
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L(x,v,p,q,r,t) = H + Z q F (x,v,t) + l r T (x,v,t)
i=l J J i=l
and the Lagrange multipliers q_. and r^ are such that
1L9v, 0 all k , for x = x(t), v = v*(t), p = p(t)
q^(t) _> 0 , q^(t)F^ (x(t) ,v(t) ,t) = 0 all j
ri(t) _> 0 , ri(t)xi(t) = 0 , ri(t)Ti(x,v*,t) = 0 all i,
For the optimal control problem of section 4*4 condition (14) is 
important.
(ID
(12)
(13)
(14)
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CHAPTER V
OPTIMAL CAPITAL ACCUMULATION IN A POLLUTED ENVIRONMENT*
In The Costs of Economic Growths Mishan criticizes the importance 
attached to economic growth by politicians, businessmen, and 
economists. He contends that these groups generally overlook the 
spillover effects of the growth process - such as environmental 
pollution. Others such as Parish [1972] think that economic growth 
is miscast as the villain suggesting that
... while economic growth may actually or 
potentially result in more pollution, it also 
contributes to the solution of the problem by 
creating, through rising incomes, an increased 
demand for an unpolluted environment and through 
research activities it allows to be undertaken, 
increasing awareness of the problem. [p 38].
Chapter IV examined the pollution problem in a stationary
economy. Comparative statics analysis suggested that it was not
possible to predict whether or not pollution was higher for higher
levels of output. The interesting question is how a society
planning rationally (taking pollution into account) would choose
to grow. When it is possible to select the endpoint capital stock
we are interested in knowing how this stock differs if cognizance
of pollution is taken.
This problem of optimal capital accumulation is the subject 
of this chapter and the next.'*' In the present chapter we consider 
the pollution level to be a flow variable rather than a stock 
variable. This assumption is mathematically convenient since it 
means that there is only one state variable in the model and we
* A version of this chapter is published under the same title in 
the Southern Economic Journal, April 1973.
1 For a discussion of optimal investment planning without pollution 
see Cass [1965] or Dorfman [1969],
no.
can obtain a phase analysis. Economically, this is also convenient 
since the phase analysis allows a more direct comparison of our 
results with those of the standard neoclassical model of optimal 
economic growth.
The mathematical model is formulated in section 5*1 while 
section 5*2 presents the optimal solution. Section 5*3 summarizes 
the discussion.
5 * 1 The Model
It is assumed that the labour force is a constant proportion 
of a constant population. Further there are no problems of natural 
resource exhaustion. Physical output <J> is assumed to be a concave 
function of the capital stock K(t),
4> = <KK) , <KK) e C(2). (1)
The marginal product of capital is positive but diminishing
4)’ > 0 , <f>" < 0 , K > 0. (2)
Also 4> satisfies the limit conditions
lim 4> ’ (K) = 00 , lim 4»T (K) = 0. (3)
K-*o K-*»
This output is devoted to consumption C, investment in the 
capital stock, I, or to investment in pollution control E,
4>(K) = C + I + E. (4)
The capital stock evolves over time according to the transition 
equation
K = I - 6K (5)
where 6 is the constant exponential rate of capital depreciation.
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We assume that pollution is the result of the production 
process. By devoting output to pollution control, the amount of 
pollution generated is lowered. In this chapter we assume that 
the amount of pollution present at time t is an additively 
separable function of the capital stock in existence at time t 
and the level of pollution control expenditure at time t. Hence,
P(t) = P(K(t),E(t)) , P(K,E) e C (2). (6)
This form is not meant to be representative of all pollution. It 
does, however, approximate the form of noise pollution, smoke 
pollution or congestion more than the stock concept.
We assume that pollution increases at an increasing rate with 
respect to capital use
3P
9K > 0 0 K > 0. (7)
Pollution control is assumed to be extremely efficient for low levels 
of expenditure, but becomes marginally less efficient as additional 
control is applied
3P
dE < 0 E > 0 (8)
and
(9)
(9) ensures E =j= 0 along optimal trajectories.
Social welfare is assumed to be a function of current consumption 
and pollution. We assume that this function has the separable form 
of Chapter IV section 4*4. Thus
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U = UX (C) + U 2 (P) (10)
U (C) e C (2) , U 1 (0) = 0
U| > 0 , U ^ < 0 ,  C > 0 -
Also
lim U ’ (C) = 00 , lim U' (C)
C+o 1 C-x» 1
U 2 (P) e C (2) , U 2 (0) = 0
U ^ < 0 ,  < 0 , P > 0
lim U ’(P) = 0. (14)
P+0 z
As in Chapter IV assumptions (12) and (14) are sufficient to eliminate 
the boundary cases C = 0 and P = 0.
5•2 The Optimal Solution
The objective of the planning authority is to maximize the 
discounted flow of utility. Again the time horizon is left infinite 
and future utility discounted at a positive exponential rate p. 
Formally, the problem is to seek solutions which will
f  00
max e ptU(C,P)dt , p > 0 (15)
C ,E •* o
subject to K = <p (K)-C-E-6K, K(0) = Kq
P = P(K,E).
For an optimal solution it is required that there exist a 
continuous function tp(t) such that
H = U (C,P(K,E) ) + \p (<j> (K)-C-E-<5K) (16)
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Ui(C)=U2 f f = * (17)
i - {p+ä - (||/||) - 4>'(K)}i|>. (18)
Condition (17) is a short-term equilibrium condition which
3Pstates that the marginal utility of pollution control must
everywhere equal the marginal cost of pollution control in terms of 
foregone consumption, U|(C). These in turn must equal the shadow 
price of capital ip (t). More simply, the marginal social values of 
output in its alternative uses must be equated. These results are 
intuitively appealing. If the marginal utility of pollution control 
exceeded the marginal utility of consumption, welfare could be 
increased by redistributing output in favour of pollution control.
(17) also gives the derived demand equation for pollution 
control as an implicit function of the levels of consumption and 
capital
E = E(C,K) (19)
with
3_E
ac
-ui
-[U2'(f > 2+U2 § ]
> 0
and
3E
3K
-[U2<I>2+U2
> 0.
(20a)
(20b)
Equation (18) is the time rate of change of the shadow price 
xp(t). Using (17) and (18) we express the equations of motion for
this economy as
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6 = üj{p+6 - <fHI> -
K = <J) (K)-C-E(C ,K)-6K , K(0) = Kq
with the planning authority free to select C(0) = C .
(21)
(22)
We now investigate the behaviour of the system in the (K,C) 
phase plane. Consider first the behaviour of the capital stock.
Define N(C,K) = <j) (K)-C-E(C,K)-6K = 0 
Nr = <{)’ - {|| + 6} ^ 0 as K ^ K*
Nc = -{1 + f } < 0
dC
dK K=0
- {f  +
u + •££}
>
< 0 as K - K*> (23)
N(C,K) is increasing to some value K* and decreasing thereafter.
For fixed levels of K, K = <f> (K)-C-E(C ,K)-6K is a decreasing function 
of C. Hence K > 0 below N(C,K) = 0 and K < 0 above it.
Let K in Figure 1 correspond to the stationary capital stock
2
locus of the standard optimal growth model. F°r any given K, the 
gross investment 4>—C—E required to maintain that capital stock is 
the same as in the neoclassical model <j>-C. However, since E > 0 
this means that the consumption level must be lower. Therefore, 
the K = 0 curve lies below the K = 0 locus.
2 See for example Dorfman [1969], or Intriligator [1971, 
Chapter 16].
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Turning now to the consumption level we define
M(C,K) 5 p+6 - (ff/ff) - *'(K) “ 0
23 P
“k
3P
3K
23 P
,2 ‘ 9K;
4>M > 0
3P
3K
32P 3E
3C > 0
(I?)2V3E;
dC
dK
‘m k < 0,c=o (24)
The locus M(C,K) = 0 is downward sloping to the right in the 
(K,C) phase space. For fixed levels of consumption C is a decreasing 
function of the level of the capital stock. Hence C < 0 to the right 
of C = 0 and C > 0 to the left.
Also since
= p - (f£/f§) > P (25)
the locus C = 0 lies entirely to the left of C = 0 - the locus 
associated with the non-polluted model. These results are shown
in Figure 1.
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Figure 5*1
00 00 \For completeness we demonstrate that the equilibrium (K ,C )
is a saddlepoint. It is sufficient to show that the Jacobian
00 00determinant of the system (21), (22) evaluated at (K ,C ) is negative.
det J ac9C
9C 9K 
9K * 9C (26)
00 00where these derivatives are evaluated at (K ,C ). Using this fact 
and the information obtained above, we can express (26) as
det J u i u iNKMC MKNC < (27)
as desired, and hence we have shown that (K ,C ) is a saddlepoint.
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As in the neoclassical optimal growth model, the path leading 
to the equilibrium is the optimal trajectory. That this choice is 
sufficient for a maximum is shown in the Appendix to this chapter. 
The Central Planning Authority selects an initial level of 
consumption C(0) = which places the economy on the stable 
branch of the saddlepoint. With K(0) = Kq given and E(0) fixed
by relation (17), the evolution of the economy is determined by the
00equations of motion (21) and (22) . Suppose Kq < K , then capital 
and consumption increase over time. This implies that E increases 
over time as well.
In equilibrium the condition on the capital stock is that it 
satisfy
it /ir \ r _ 9P /8P
 ^  ^  ^ 6 P 9K^8E
or equivalently, 
4>'(K)-6 . dE P + dK > PP=constant
(28)
(28’)
The marginal product of capital net of depreciation no longer equals 
the social discount rate, but rather the social discount rate plus 
the marginal rate of transformation of pollution control for capital 
in maintaining a constant level of pollution. Since
dE
dK 0P=constant
it follows that the net marginal product of capital is greater 
than the social discount rate, and consequently (given the strict 
concavity of 4>) the endpoint capital stock is lower than the 
modified golden rule capital stock of the standard model.
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Since K = 0 lies everywhere below K = 0, the consumption level 
in the polluted model is lower than in the neoclassical model. These 
results can be seen in Figure 1.
It is worth noting that the long-run equilibrium condition is 
independent of the utility function of pollution. The modification 
from the neoclassical version depends only upon the technical 
relationship between pollution control and polluting capital. The 
condition
U ’(C) = U ’(P) ||
must hold of course but this must be satisfied everywhere along the 
optimal path.
5•3 Summary
Before stating the conclusions of the above analysis let us 
consider the standard optimal economic growth model. This has 
been used as a yardstick against which we compare our results. 
Implicit in the standard model is the assumption that there are no 
wastes produced by the economic process, or alternatively, that if 
any wastes are generated they can be disposed of at no cost to 
society. The path which approached the equilibrium (Kg,Cg) was 
the optimal trajectory.
On the other hand, if wastes are generated and, as Mishan 
contends, are ignored by policy makers they will operate so as to
max
,co
e"ptU1 (C)dt
o
(29)
and the optimal solution is the path which leads to (K_,Cj,).
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In a competitive system the individual agents take the level of
pollution as given exogenously. Their independent maximizing behaviour
3may move the economy along the trajectory to (K^,Cg) in the same 
manner as in a centralized system where pollution was ignored.
For these reasons, the comparison of our results with those of 
the standard model seems very reasonable. The analysis of this 
chapter shows that in the long-run, if we take into account the 
pollution generated by production then we approach a smaller capital 
stock and have a lower consumption level than if pollution is 
ignored. Is Mishan [1967] right and Parish [1972] wrong? Not 
quite. If the capital stock is initially below the equilibrium 
level, then we still desire growth and as we grow not only does 
consumption rise but also the level of pollution control expenditure. 
This of course assumes that the optimal policy is being followed.
We turn in Chapter VI to an investigation of the growth 
problem when pollution is a state variable. The problem of 
implementing the optimal policy in a decentralized society will also 
be considered.
3 This problem is the subject of current debate. See Hahn [1966,1970], 
Kurz [1968], and Shell-Stiglitz [1967].
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APPENDIX 5A
In order to prove the sufficiency theorem for the problem in 
this chapter we need to show that the utility function is concave 
in C, E and K. That it is strictly concave in C follows from the 
original assumptions (10). From (12) we know that U2 is strictly 
concave in P, but P in turn depends upon E and K. Thus we want 
the second order partial derivatives of U2 with respect to E and K.
u2 = u 2(p (k ,e ))
1», a2p ap 2
— 2~ = U2 ^ 4  + U2 (H >  * 03E2 2 3E2 2 3E
th. = £l + „« (if)2 < o
3K2 2 3K2 2 3K
23 U2 |P . |P > o3E3K 2 3E ' 3K
th. th.. aV,
3E2 3K2  ^3E3K^
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
[U2 4  + U2 (f>2^ U2 4  + U2 # ) 2^tU2 I  * I]'3E 9K
(u.)2 4  4  +  D X , +
'2' 3E2 3K2 2 2 3E2 3K 3E' 3K2
> 0. (5)
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Conditions (2), (3) and (5) imply that is strictly concave in 
E and K.
Let U(C,P(K,E)) and <f> (K) be strictly concave functions. Let 
(C*,I*,E*,K*) be a feasible policy satisfying the necessary conditions 
(16) and (17), and also the transversality condition
lim e pti|;(t) = 0. 
t-x»
(6)
We shall show that if (C,I,E,K) is any other feasible policy then
e~pCU(C*,P(K*,E*))dt > e"ptU(C,P(K,E))dt (7)
with strict inequality unless K*(t) = K(t), C*(t) = C(t), E*(t) = E(t)
From the concavity of U,
e pt{U(C*,P*)-U(C,P)}dt
e pt{U^(C*)(C*-C)+l^(P*) ||^-(E*-E)+U£(P*) ||^(K*-K)}dt
e pt{^* (C*-C)+i|j* (E*-E)+[ (p+6-(j>1 (K*) ] (K*-K) }dt
(e P {C*+E*-C-E+(6-<j) ’ (K*)) (K*-K)}dt
(p\p*e pt-e pti*) (K*-K)dt
integrating by parts
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(e pti|)*) {C*+E*-C-E+(S-<j>1 (K*) ) (K*-K)+K*-K}dt- (K*-K)e pt>*
(e pt>*){C*+E*+I*-(C+E+I)-<t>’ (K*) (K*-K)}dt
(e pt>*){c}>(K*)-<f>(K)-V (K*) K*+<f>' (K*)K}dt
(e pt> * M  (<|> (K*)-4>T (K*)K*)- (cj) (K)-cJ) ’ (K*)K)}dt
>_ 0 from the concavity of <J) (K) .
Thus since U and $ are strictly concave then (7) is met with strict 
inequality unless K*(t) = K(t), C*(t) = C(t), E*(t) = E(t).
Since the path leading to the equilibrium (K ,C ) satisfies all
the necessary conditions and also lim e pP^(t) = 0 this path is
t-x»
the optimal path.
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CHAPTER VI
OPTIMAL CAPITAL ACCIMJIATION IN A POLLUTED ENVIRONMENT II1
This chapter continues the analysis of pollution and optimal 
growth. In Chapter V we considered optimal investment planning 
in an economy where the production process generated a flow of 
pollution which was immediately dissipated. Noise and smoke 
pollution are approximated by that model. We now reconsider the 
problem of investment and pollution control with pollution treated 
as a stock variable as in Chapters III and IV. We also include 
pollution as a negative feedback to production. This brings us 
to the optimal control of processes described in Chapter III 
without controls.
Keeler, Spence and Zeckhauser [1972] also discuss pollution 
control with capital growth. In their model they assume that 
a constant proportion of output ends up as pollution. The 
production process is also independent of the amount of 
pollution in existence. Their solution is not complete since 
there are two state variables necessitating the solution of 
four differential equations. The general model formulated in 
this chapter suffers from the same problem. However, for a less 
general problem we can obtain a complete analysis of the optimal 
trajectories in the P-K state space using techniques employed by 
Pitchford [1972] in discussing population and optimal growth.
1 I would like to thank,without implicating, W.A.Brock and 
R.C.d'Arge for reading and commenting on sections of this 
chapter which were presented to the 44th ANZAAS Congress, 
in Sydney Australia August 1972.
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The model is formulated in section 6*1. Section 6*2 
investigates the optimal solution for the general model. In 
section 6*3 we analyse a fixed endpoint problem. Section 6*4 
enquires into the effects of variations in the parameters. The 
concept of controllability for optimal policies in decentralized 
systems is introduced in section 6*5. Sections 6*6, 6*7, 6*8, 
and 6*9 then consider the question of controllability in the 
context of the present models of pollution control. Section 6*10 
concludes the discussion.
6 * 1 The Model
As in Chapter III section 3*2, it is assumed that physical 
output (J) is a strictly concave function of the capital stock K 
and the level of pollution P
<J> = <}>(K,P) , <f>(K,P) e C(2). (1)
The marginal product of capital is positive but diminishing
♦k > 0 > *KK < 0 ’ K * ° (2)
and
lim <j)_. = 00 , lim <}>„ = 0. (3)
K->o K K-x»
The marginal product of pollution is negative and diminishing
*p < o , 4PP < 0 , P > 0 (4)
and
lim <J) = 0. (5)
P+o ^
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We also assume that <}> is additively separable in K and P and 
that (K,P) e ft.^
Assuming a closed economy this output is available for 
consumption C, investment in capital I, or investment in 
pollution control E so that
<j> = C + I + E. (6)
The capital stock accumulates according to
K = I - 6K (7)
where 6 is the rate of depreciation.
The stock of pollution increases with the use of capital in 
production, but is assumed to decay away at a constant exponential 
rate a > 0. Thus
P = g(K) - aP (8)
where
g(0) = 0 , g' > 0 , g" > 0 , K > 0. (9)
By devoting some resources to pollution control, the community 
can offset the increase in pollution. The amount offset is a 
strictly concave function h of the expenditure.
h ’ > 0 , h" < 0 , E > 0 (10)
and
lim h T (E) = 00 , lim h ’ (E) = 0. (11)
E-^ o E-*°°
Now with pollution control the state equation (8) becomes
P = g(K) - h(E) - aP. (12)
2 Recall from Chapter III that ft = { (K,P) | (p (K,P) _> 0,
P > 0, K > 0}.
126.
The maximand is
r°o
U(C,P)e"ptdt , p > 0 (13)
o
where U is a strictly concave utility function. U satisfies the 
following conditions:
Uc > 0 5 ucc < 0 , C > 0 (14a)
OVPn * upp 0 ,
oAP-. (14b)
lim U„ =  00 > lim u = ° (14c)
O o  L C-x»
lim Up = 0 (14d)
P+o F
uccupp‘-UCP 1 V O UCP i  °- (14e)
6 * 2 The Optimal Program
We can state the planning problem formally as
oo
max e ptU(C,P)dt
C,E •’o
(15)
subject to
K = 4>(K,P) -C - E - 6K , K(0) = Ko
P = g(K) - h(E) - aP , P(0) = Po
This is a fixed (infinite) time, free right-hand endpoint 
optimal control problem with two state variables K and P and two 
control variables C and E. The conditions that a solution must 
satisfy are furnished by Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle (see 
Appendix 4A).
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These conditions are that there exist functions i|^(t) and 
^2 (t) such that
H = U (C ,P)+^1 (cj) (K,P)-C-E-6K)+^2 (g (K)-h(E)-aP)
UC (C,P) = ^  = -^2h ’(E) (16), (17)
\px = {p+6+g’/h,-(j)K }i|)1 (18)
\p2 = (p+a)ip2-Up-Uc(t)2 UP UC^P* (19)
The costates and \p2 are the shadow prices of capital and 
pollution respectively. Conditions (16), (17) are short term 
equilibrium conditions which constitute the rule for the optimal 
allocation of current output at any point in time. The marginal 
utility of consumption equals the social value of a unit of investment 
in productive capital which in turn equals the social value of 
additional pollution control expenditure.
Since at any point in time the prices \p2 and the pollution
level P are fixed, (16) and (17) are essentially derived demand 
equations for C and E in terms of these prices. We can visualize 
the system solved as
The first thing to note is that the level of consumption 
depends upon the pollution level and the price of capital but not 
the social price of pollution. To see why this is so suppose 
(16), (17) hold. Now consider a change in \p2 with P and constant.
C = COl^.P) and E - (20)
with
(21)
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Any change in C would result in disturbing the equilibrium
between the investment and consumption sectors by causing ^
Hence, it is clear that when \p^ changes, E changes to offset this
change and ensure that (16), (17) are satisfied. The additional
output comes from (or goes to as the case may be) the investment
sector not the consumption sector. The reason for this is that the
pollution is generated by the use of capital in production and the
relevant trade-off is between more polluting capital (investment)
3and more pollution control.
From (21) we conclude that as ip^ increases both consumption 
and pollution control fall and this output is devoted to investment.
As 1^2 rises, the level of pollution control falls. For fixed ip^ ,
the higher the level of pollution is, the lower the level of consumption.
The prices ip^  and ^  follow time paths given by (17) and (18).
These together with (6), (7), (12) and (Ko ,Pq) determine the 
evolution of the system once ip^ (O) and ^(O) have been assigned.
To this point we have been discussing the conditions necessary
for optimality. Since the Hamiltonian is concave in the state
4variables and the control variables, it is sufficient for optimality 
that the Central Planning Authority assign initial values ^(0) 
and ^(0) which will move the economy to an equilibrium solution
00 00 OO 00 00 00where K = K ,  P = P , C = C ,  E = E , = ^2 = ^2 —
In general, ij^ (O) and will depend upon Kq and Pq.
3 If pollution also results from the consumption process we 
would expect C to depend upon \p^ as well.
4 A general theorem for sufficiency is given in the appendix 
to this chapter.
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The following conditions characterize the equilibrium:
<KK,P) - C - E = 6K, (22)
g(K) - h(E) = aP (23)
*K - « = p + g'/h’ > p, (24)
-Uph' V p h' (25)p+a ■ p+a = U C ’
where variables are at equilibrium values.
(22), (23) are the conditions necessary to maintain the state 
variables in equilibrium. Gross investment should just equal 
depreciation and net pollution generation just equal natural decay.
(24) is a polluted version of the modified golden rule of 
capital accumulation. This condition is the analog of the condition 
derived in the previous chapter. The marginal product of capital net 
of depreciation equals the social rate of transformation of capital 
for pollution control in maintaining a constant stock of pollution. 
Since g'/h’ > 0, it follows that, as in Chapter V, the economy tends 
to a lower capital stock than in the pollution-free neoclassical 
model.
(25) is the allocation rule for output between sectors in 
long-run equilibrium. The left-hand side is the sum of two present 
values.^ The first term is the present value of the utility gained 
through additional pollution control. This is the direct marginal 
benefit of pollution control. The second term is the utility 
gained through additional output available for consumption as a 
result of pollution control. This we may interpret as the indirect
5 See Chapter IV.
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marginal benefit of pollution control. The right-hand side of (25) 
is the marginal utility of consumption which can be interpreted as 
the marginal cost of pollution control in terms of foregone 
consumption. Equation (25) then states that in equilibrium, the 
direct plus indirect marginal benefits of pollution control must 
equal the marginal cost of pollution control. Recall in 
Chapter V the equilibrium was independent of the utility function.
For the remainder of this section we shall consider the 
special case where <j> E 0. In other words, pollution does not 
affect the level of output. This brings our model somewhat closer 
to that of Keeler, Spence and Zeckhauser.
We first prove uniqueness of the equilibrium solution. The 
equilibrium conditions become
<p (K) - C - E = 6K
g(K) - h(E) = aP
<J>K - 6 = p + gf (K)/h* (E)
-Uph ’
—  = Uc •
Equation (24*) gives K as a decreasing function of E. (23f) 
then gives P as a decreasing function of E. Using these functions 
in (22’) gives C as a decreasing function of E. The number of 
equilibria now depends upon the number of solutions to (25’).
We have
d_
dE (“Uphf) TT V,' d P  _  UPPh dE TT h '  d C  _UCPh dE Uph" < 0
u —  + u —  >CC dE CP dE 0 .
( 2 2 ’ )
(23’)
(24’)
(25’)
and
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Since the left-hand side of (25*) is a decreasing function of E, 
while the right-hand side is increasing in E, there can be at most 
one solution to (22')-(25’) and hence there is at most one 
equilibrium.
In their study, Keeler, Spence, and Zeckhauser [1972] 
concluded that there were at most two steady-states, at one of 
which there is no pollution control. It is not clear whether the 
authors want to consider that there is the possibility of more 
than one equilibrium with a given model structure. In a footnote 
they state
Kurz pointed out the possible existence of multiple 
equilibria in another model in which both a stock 
(capital) and a flow (consumption) were arguments of 
the utility function. [p 24]
The authors also work out a numerical example (p 25-26) and give 
the results for both the "Golden Age Equilibrium" and the "Murky 
Age Equilibrium" - for the same set of parameters. The footnote 
and the numerical example suggest that the authors do wish to 
allow the possibility that with a given structure, more than one 
equilibrium exists. The footnote seems to aim at the stock in the 
utility function as the reason for multiple equilibria.
The confusion arises because their pollution state equation 
is linear in pollution control. Once the structure is given the 
equilibrium is unique. What is not known a priori is whether 
pollution control is positive or zero. Other things being equal, 
this will depend upon the coefficient of pollution control in the 
pollution state equation. If this coefficient is "low" then it may 
be optimal to have no pollution control in equilibrium. A similar 
problem occurs for the model in section 6*3.
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A complete phase analysis is not possible since there are 
four differential equations which need to be solved. However 
before we consider the problem of the next section let us divide 
the (K,P) state space into regions as shown in Figure 1.
= 4> (K)
P < 0
K < 0Zone I
P < 0 Zone III
K < 0
IV \
\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \
Figure 6*1
The boundaries of these zones are given by the curves 
<j> (K) = 6K and P = g(K)/a. In zones I and II the level of pollution 
is falling for any level of control. In zones II and III the 
capital stock is declining for any level of control. Thus if an 
equilibrium exists, it must exist in zone IV. No optimal policy 
will allow the capital stock to fall to zero. The pollution level 
cannot increase indefinitely because the trajectory must eventually 
cross into zone II. Hence all optimal policies move the system
toward zone IV.
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In order to further construct the trajectories in the (K,P) 
plane we require C(P,K) and E(P,K) - the control variables 
as functions of the state variables. This is the problem of 
synthesizing the controls. Unfortunately, as Pontryagin et al 
state
In the general case, the synthesis problem (i.e. the 
problem of the existence of the synthesizing function 
and of finding it) is unsolved. [1962, p 45]
For problems of a less general variety than the one discussed above 
it is sometimes possible to obtain a synthesis. This is the 
purpose of the next section.
6 * 3 A Two State Variable Problem Solved
The optimal control problem to be analysed in this section is 
a free time, fixed endpoint problem with two state variables capital 
and pollution. The problem presented will be completely solved 
using techniques established in Pitchford [1972]. The intertemporal 
objective is to minimize the deviations of current consumption from 
the maximum sustainable ("Bliss") consumption which we denote by C. 
That is we wish to
fTmin {C-C(t)}dt. (26)
C,E,T o
We assume that there is no capital depreciation, so that
K = <p (K,P) - C - E (27)
and we constrain
6 I would like to thank J.D .Pitchford for suggesting the approach 
used in this section. I am also indebted to N.Vousden for his 
comments.
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4> (K,P) - C - E _> 0. (28)
Further we assume that the pollution state equation is linear 
in E. Thus
P = g(K) - BE - aP. (29)
It will be recalled that in Chapter III (Model 5) we analysed 
the uncontrolled behaviour of this model where a constant 
proportion of output was devoted to investment and, of course, there 
was no pollution control. For that model there was no equilibrium 
(K,P) (0,0) and the system was unstable. We now examine how this
unstable system can be brought under control.
We need to specify the endpoint for the problem which is
denoted (K,P). (K,P) is the solution of
max <p (K,P) 
E,K,P
- E (30)
g(K) - BE - Q Tl II O
E _> 0.
The following conditions characterize the endpoint:
i 
-©- 
-e-
*"d
II 0Q a (31)
1 1  -X3 , equality if E > 0 (32)
>* ii
(N
 
1
- 
-©-
II a (33)
g(K) - BE - aP = 0. (34)
If E > 0, then (K,P) is uniquely determined by
♦k ■ g V B = 0 (35)
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and
3(f)p + a = 0. (36)
If E = 0, then (31) and (34) uniquely determine the endpoint. Given 
<j), g, and a, the crucial factor in determining which of these cases 
will hold is 3 - the marginal efficiency of pollution control 
expenditure. Consider Figure 2,
Figure 6*2
(K,P) in Figure 2 is the intersection of the curves defined by 
(35), (36). These intersect the locus (31) which is negatively 
sloped as shown and passes through the point where g/a is tangent 
to the isoquant <|> = <J>^. This assumes a given size of 3. For 3 
smaller in value, the intersection could occur to the northwest of 
the tangency of <|> = ({>, and g/ in which case it is optimal to set
-L
E = 0. In what follows we assume that 3 is sufficiently high that 
E > 0 is optimal at the endpoint.
We now turn to the intertemporal optimization problem. We
seek solutions C(t), E(t) and T which will
fT
min (C-C)dt
T,C,E o
subject to
K = 4>(K,P) - C - E , oiio
P = g(K) - 3E - aP , P(0) = Pn
<f>(K,P) - C - E _> 0 
E _> 0 , C >_ 0.
Construct
H = C-C-hpl (<|)(K,P)-C-E)+i|;2(g(K)-3E-aP),
and
L = H+qiE+q2(c})(K,P)-C-E)+q3C.
The necessary conditions are 
3L
3C = ^~b+^3-c*2 = 0
9L
3E = - = 0
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(26)
(37)
(38)
(39)
(40)
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^1 = “ (^ i +c1 2 ^ k""^28 T (41)
^2 = “ C^1-bq2 ) 4>p-,~0t^2 (42)
>. 0 , q1E = 0 (43)
q 2 1  0 , q2 (<KK,P)-C-E) = 0 (44)
q^ ü  o , q^C = o (45)
max H = M = 0 . 
C,E
(46)
T a b le  1 s e t s  o u t  t h e  v a r i o u s  p o l i c y  c o m b in a t io n s .  L e t  
I  = <f> -  C -  E.
T a b le  I
P o l i c y C E i
A > 0 > 0 > 0
B -©- V o V o 0 -©- 1 n V o
C 0 <f> > E > 0
0Aw1-e-
D 0 0
E 0 0
F 0 0
G <J> > C > 0 4> — c  > o 0
The v a r i o u s  p o l i c i e s  and t h e i r  a s s o c i a t e d  n e c e s s a r y  c o n d i t i o n s  
w i l l  now be s e t  o u t .
P o l i c y  A
1 = ip1 = -\p2$
h  = " h W
^2 = - ^ 1<Pp+a^2
C-C+^1 (0 -C -E )+ ^ 2 (g (K )-ß E -a P )  = 0 .
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Policy B
1 = 'l'l 1 “^2$
H = -h*YT*2S'
= -^1(f>p+^ 2a
C-C+ip1 (<j)-C)+^ 2 (g(K)-aP) = 0. 
Policy C
ipp = -4>2ß _> 1
*1 = ~h*YTh*'
^2 = _^1(t)p+a^2
C = 1pi(<j)-E)+^ 2(g(K)-ßE-aP). 
Policy D
i^ l >_ i , —t/>23 1  ^ p
= - (^ p-+-q2) 4>K-^2g ’
*2 = - C't,1+q2)
C = i|)2(g(K)-ß<|>-aP).
Policy E
l i f p  , ^p+q2 = ~^2e+qi
^1 = “ ^ i +q2 ^ K _^28'
^2 = -(^p+q2)^p+a^2 
4>“C = -^2 (g(K)-aP).
139.
Policy F
1 1 » ^  i
^2 = ~^i<^p+a^2 
C = iJ^ cH-^  (g(K)-aP).
Policy G
1 =  1
^1 =
^2 = “ (^ 1+q2)4>p+ot^ 2
C-C + (g(K)-ßE-aP) = 0,
The fact that the costates ^  and ^  must be continuous 
functions of time, along with the above information allows us to 
eliminate certain policies and to specify which policies may switch 
to other policies in various regions. We now turn to this facet 
of the problem.
For policy A, ip^  = -ij^ ß = ^* hence it is necessary that 
ip^ = 1 ^ 2 = 0* This means that policy A can only hold at (K,P).
Policy G requires that = 0. Since -^^ +q2  = 1 and -ij^ ß = 1 
we find
^ 2  = 0 only if 3<j)p+a = 0 
so that G can operate only at P = P.
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On policy B, = 1 = B+q-^  thus
♦l-qi
*1 = -*K + (~ 6 _ }  g'
= -{,»'K-g '/ß} - ’l « ' ^
= 0 only if 4>K-g' / ß £ 0.
Thus B can only operate for K >_ K. But if K >_ K, and I > 0 it is 
not possible to achieve the endpoint and we eliminate policy B.
Consider policy E. For policy E it is necessary that 
1 1
For the remaining feasible policies C, D, and F, it is required 
that \p^  _> 1. Thus for E to switch to any policy it is necessary 
that along E, > 0. But for E
= - (^1-+-q2 ) 4>K-^2gf
= *2ß{<t-K-g7ß}-qi*K
Ü  0 only if cj^ -g'/g £ 0.
This is only true for K >_ K. Thus for K < K, E cannot switch to 
any other policy. Since E cannot get to the endpoint (K,P) unless 
K = K, then no policy would switch to E in the region K < K. Hence 
we eliminate E from consideration in the region K < K.
Let us now consider policy C. For C we have ^  
which means that Hence, C follows a path defined
implicitly by
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$<f>p+a+<t>K-g73 = 0 
which has slope
(47)
dP = ^KK~g 
dK “ -64>pp (48)
Policy C operates on a line which is negatively sloped in the 
(K,P) state space and passes through the equilibrium (K,P).
We need to consider the policy switches which are possible in 
the various regions in order to determine the optimal policy for 
arbitrary initial conditions. The conditions for the switches 
(K < K) are derived in Appendix 6B and are summarized in 
Table II.
Table II
Switches into:
C D F
Switches 
out of:
• 34)p -Hot-N>K - g T / 3 ^ 0 ß ' t ’ p + a + ^ - g ’  / g i P
34)pH-otH-cf)R —  gT / 3 < 0 • 3 < f > p + a + < J > K - g 7  3 I P
g ^ p + a + c j ^ - g ’ / 3>_0 ^p+a+^-g'/glO •
Consider Figure 3 which illustrates the optimal policy 
combinations for any given initial endowments (Kq ,Po). Policy 
C operates on the locus for which
0<f>p+a+cf>K-g’ = 0.
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Above this locus is region I where 
3<J>p+a+4>K-g' /g < 0 
and below is region II where 
ß^p+a+^-g' /g > 0*
(49a)
(49b)
Figure 6*3
If the initial (K,P) is such that the economy is on the locus 
defined by
ß'f>p+a+<t’K-g'/ß = 0 (47)
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then the optimal policy calls for using policy C until the endpoint 
is reached. If the initial endowments place the economy in 
region I, then the optimal policy is D which is followed until a 
switch to C can be made. If (K ,P ) = (K,P ), P > P, then 
policy D is followed until the endpoint is reached.
To see that once C is reached a switch to another policy is 
not made notice that C can switch to F only if after the switch 
the path moves into region I. However, in region I F cannot
A A
switch to D and hence the point (K,P) cannot be attained if C 
switches to F. A similar argument holds for a switch from policy 
C to policy D.
For initial values of (K,P) in region II, K < K, the optimal 
strategy calls for policy F to be used - that is, all output is 
devoted to investment in capital. Policy F is followed until the 
trajectory reaches the switching surface for policy C where a 
switch to C is effected, or until the trajectory reaches a point 
on K = K, P < P and a switch to policy E is made. If K = K and 
Pq < P then policy E is used for the entire program.
Policy C is particularly interesting. Along C there is both 
pollution control and investment in capital. The policy C line 
divides the state space for K < K into two regions. In one region 
(I) there is all out pollution control while in the other (II) 
there is all out investment.
The C policy operates on the locus given by
' /3 = -{34>p+a}.
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The left-hand side is the marginal product of capital minus the 
marginal rate of transformation of capital for pollution in 
maintaining a given stock of pollution. This may be thought of as 
the marginal product of capital adjusted for pollution control.
Since for K < K, the left-hand side is positive, expanding the 
capital stock is warranted.
The right-hand side is written as
-8<j>p-a > 0.
As pollution falls some natural decay is lost. We gain -<j>p in 
output and hence potential cleaning up is increased by -8<J> . This 
marginal product exceeds the loss a. Put another way, the marginal 
product of pollution control net of decay is positive and hence 
there is a gain in cleaning up further pollution.
Along policy C, the net marginal product of investment is 
equal to the net marginal product of pollution control and both 
activities are operated at positive levels. In region I, it is seen 
that the marginal product of pollution control exceeds the net marginal 
product of investment. Thus total output is devoted to cleaning up 
pollution in this region. In region II on the other hand, the net 
marginal product of investment is dominant and hence a policy of 
all-out investment is called for.
6•4 Variations in the Parameters p and a
We now return to the more general model of 6*2 and consider 
the effects of changes in the discount rate and the decay rate
of pollution.
145.
The changes in p will be considered first. We solve:
V 4 -1 -1 0
3K
3p
g’ 0 -h' -a 3£3p
*KKh '-8" 0 (<j)K-6~p)h" 0
3E
3p
"uph’urr
0 <VucVh" h’UPP+UCh '*PP dr3p
_ ■ ■  m m
(50)
where partial derivatives are evaluated at equilibrium. Unfortunately 
the sign of the rate of change of any variable with respect to the 
discount rate is ambiguous.
3K > 
3p < 0 ,
3E _> 
3p < 0 ,
3P _> 
3p < 0 ,
3C >_ 
3p < 0 . (51)
By considering the behaviour of the system along the time 
path we gain insight to the cause of the ambiguity. An increase in 
the discount rate means that the community has a stronger preference 
for present consumption. In the standard theory of optimal growth 
this results in lower investment and hence the economy tends to a
CP7 The calculations here assume U 0 .
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lower capital stock with less consumption in long-run equilibrium. 
However, as our analysis in Chapter IV showed with a rise in the 
discount rate, the community is less interested in pollution control. 
From (21) we see that resources may flow from the pollution control 
sector to the investment sector in which case the endpoint capital 
stock may be higher than it would for a slightly lower discount 
rate. Since the changes in K and E are ambiguous, it is not 
surprising that the changes in C and P are as well.
Now consider the effects of various rates of pollution decay 
on equilibrium values. The system to be solved is:
V 5 -1 -1
g’ 0 -h'
*KKh '-s" 0
-U^ h’U^
52Q
.
1<o1-©-
0 P CCuc (Vuc V h'
9K
9a
_9C
9a
9E
9a
h' V UCh'*PP
3P
9a
(52)
yielding
9K
9a > 0 ,
3P _> 
9a < 0 . (53)
8 See Chapter V, Figure 5*1. A higher discount rate shifts the 
curve C = 0 to the left.
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If the decay rate is lower, then capital falls and pollution 
control rises. The level of consumption also falls since there 
is less output produced and the level of pollution control 
expenditure has risen. The sign of the change in pollution, 
however, is ambiguous. This result is in accord with the results 
obtained in Chapter IV.
6 • 5 Controllability
We have been discussing the optimal control of polluted 
growth processes. In a centralized society these optimal policies 
can be carried out in a simple manner: the central planning 
authority sets all control variables at their optimal values. 
However, in a decentralized society individual decision makers 
design their own plans. The government has instruments such as 
taxes available to it to influence the plans of the individuals 
in the society.
The important question is whether the government can through 
its instruments, guide the private agents to select the socially 
optimal policy. Phrased in this way the question is one of the 
controllability of the optimal policy. We have the following formal 
definition of controllability:
Definition 1. (Arrow and Kurz [1970, p 120]^)
A policy is said to be controllable by a given set 
of instruments, if there exists values of the instruments, 
varying over time in general, which cause the private and 
government sectors together to realize that policy.
9 The work of controllability originally appeared in Arrow 
and Kurz [1969].
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In essence, the optimal values of the control variables of 
the central plan are the targets for the decentralized plan. We 
want to devise a set of instruments which will allow us to realize 
the targets at every point in time. The target must be achieved 
instantaneously. This controllability concept differs from the 
concept as it is generally used in the theory of optimal control.
For example, Athans and Falb [1965, p 200] loosely define 
controllability as the possibility of driving any state of the 
system to the origin (or any other state of the system for that 
matter) in some finite time. From the above comments it is clear 
that to arrive at a given target value in some finite time is not 
good enough. If any finite time elapses before we attain a given 
value of the target then we have not been on the optimal policy by 
definition.
We will be interested in determining the minimum number of 
instruments which are required to control the optimal policy. As 
Arrow and Kurz [1970, p 120] point out
We do not have an explicit theory of the political 
and economic cost of any given instrument, but both 
the instruments and variations in them involve real 
cost and are politically difficult to accomplish.
In accordance with this unknown aspect of the cost of employing 
instruments, it is thought that the instruments should not behave 
in extreme fashion. Thus we have the following definition of stable
instruments:
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Definition 2. (Arrow and Kurz [1970, p 121])
A policy is said to be controllable with stable 
instruments, if the policy is controllable, the 
values of tax rates that achieve control converge 
to finite values and the value of the ratio of 
debt to national income (D/(f>) also converges to a 
finite value.
6 »6 Market Behaviour
We need to specify the behaviour of the consumers in the model. 
Since we began in Chapter III by assuming that consumers save a 
constant proportion s of their disposable income, this seems an 
appropriate assumption for the behaviour here. Chapter III showed 
how the laissez-faire economy would evolve; the first sections of 
this chapter examined how the economy would be optimally controlled 
if the government had the ability to assign controls freely; and 
now we examine the means of controlling the decentralized economy.
It is assumed that capital is offered inelastically and hence 
is fully employed at all times. We will write cj) for income.
The pollution control industry will be run by the government 
with the funds it derives from its instruments. We note that the 
targets are the optimal values of consumption, investment and 
pollution control denoted C*, I*, E* respectively. The sum of 
these components is
<]> = c* + I* + E*.
At any point in time cj) is given, hence, by determining any two 
of the targets the third is automatically determined. In this 
sense the problem involves only two targets.
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By determining C*, E* at any moment we uniquely determine 
K = 4> - C* - E* - 6K 
P = g(K) - h(E*) - aP
which is our desire, but as we shall see below the structure of 
the present problem is such that we need only concern ourselves 
with C, I, E and not with the differential equations.
6•7 Controllability with an Income Tax
We wish to control the economy with as few instruments as 
possible. Therefore it is natural to ask if it is possible to 
control the optimal policy with only one tax, say an income tax. 
The targets will be the consumption level C* and the pollution 
control level. E will be financed by the proceeds from the income 
tax. The tax rate will be denoted by x.
The following equations are to be solved to determine the 
value of x for any given (C*,E*)
C* = (1-s) (1-x)<f> (54)
E* = x<}>. (55)
Since s and <j> are given at any point in time, and C*, E* are 
given by the optimal plan, equations (54) and (55) are two linear 
equations in one unknown x and thus, in general, the system is not 
controllable with only an income tax. Economically, a single tax 
is not capable of syphoning the appropriate amount of pollution 
control and at the same time ensuring that the appropriate balance 
between consumption and investment is obtained.
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In their analysis of controllability with an income tax only 
and two targets, Arrow and Kurz [1970, p 131] refer to the 
differential equations of the model and then make use of the 
limiting (t °°) properties of the solutions to conclude that the 
optimal policy is not controllable by an income tax. The analysis 
here shows that it is not necessary to look at the problem in the 
limit; it is not possible to achieve the targets at any point in 
time (except by chance) including the initial time.
Given that the system is not controllable with an income tax 
alone, the government may pursue a second-best policy using only 
the income tax, or expand the number of instruments available. We 
do not stay to consider the first of these but rather move on to 
the alternative.
6*8 Controllability with Taxes on Consumption and Saving
We now assume that the government has two taxes available - 
one on consumption and one on planned savings. Again it is assumed 
that the government balances its budget in the sense that all tax 
revenue is put back into the economy.
Private saving (before tax) is a constant proportion of 
personal income s<J>. The tax is then applied to scj>. Thus realized 
savings is
S = (1-Xg) scj) (56)
where Xg is the savings tax rate. Consumption is
C = (l-xc) (1-s)4> (57)
where the consumption tax rate is x . Total tax receipts are
X = XgSHxc (l—s)({>. (58)
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To determine the values of x and x we solveu L
C* = (l-xc) (l-s)cf>
I* = (1—xg) s4> 
or in matrix form:
-d-s)<f> 0 x c C*-(l-s)<f>
0 -sip _ x s _ I*-s<J>
The matrix
- (l-s)4> 0
0 -sij)
will be termed the instrument matrix. 
The vector
will be called the vector of instruments. 
The vector
C*-(l-s)<t>
I*-s<f>
(59)
(60)
(61)
(62)
(63)
(64)
might loosely be called the target vector.
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Now in order to determine, at any given point in time, a 
vector of instruments satisfying (61) it is necessary and sufficient 
for existence and uniqueness that the matrix be square (which it is) 
and nonsingular. This means that the determinant of the instrument 
matrix is non-zero. Since
it follows that the optimal policy is controllable with a 
consumption tax and a savings tax. At any point in time the vector 
of instruments which will control the optimal policy is unique.
Having determined xc and x^ the appropriate amount of revenue 
for pollution control will be forthcoming. It may be possible that 
one of x^ or x^ is negative. For example
If planned savings are insufficient to cover the optimal investment 
requirement then saving will have to be subsidized.
As long as the optimal values of C and I converge to finite 
limits, it is clear that x^ and x^ will also. Thus the optimal
-(l-s)(f> 0
(65)
0 -Scj)
Sj)-I*
policy is controllable with stable instruments. This of course 
assumes that s e (0,1). Should s take on the boundary values 0,1 
then this approach breaks down - one of the tax rates will not exist!
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6•9 Controllability with Borrowing and Taxation
We now introduce the public debt and borrowing into the analysis. 
Personal income is defined as total output <f> plus interest on the 
debt. The rate of interest is equal to the marginal product of 
capital <j) . Thus personal income is
y = + 4>kd (66)
where D is the amount of debt.
Savings and consumption are given by
S = s(l-xs)(<f>-h|>KD) (67)
and
C = (1-s) (l-xc) ((J)+4>kD) (68)
with total taxes
X = [sxs+(l-s)xc] (<|>+(j>KD). (69)
The debt D accumulates according to
D = B (70)
where B is the rate of borrowing.
Before investigating the controllability of this system, we 
note that if an income tax is used only to pay interest on the debt 
while the borrowing finances pollution control, then the optimal 
policy is not controllable since there is in effect only one 
instrument. This is because the amount of the tax is determined 
by the state variables which are given at any moment and thus can 
play no role in achieving the target C*.
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We now proceed to the question of controllability with 
borrowing and taxes where tax revenues are not tied to the interest 
payments on the public debt. Instead the tax payments, plus 
borrowing net of interest payments equals the value of pollution 
control. That is
X+B-cf) D = E. (71)K
Since we are interested in controlling the economy with as few 
instruments as possible we examine the use of borrowing and only 
one tax.
The case to be considered first is borrowing accompanied by 
a tax on saving. The matrix system to be solved is
-sy -1 x s I*- Sy
Sy 1 B E*+4> D K
(72)
It is seen immediately that the instrument matrix has less than 
full row rank. Thus, in general, it is not possible to control 
the optimal policy by a tax on saving accompanied by borrowing.
Next we consider borrowing plus an income tax. We want to
solve
-y -l X I*- sy
-y 0 B C*-(l-s)y
(73)
The determinant of the instrument matrix is
-y = -(<J>+<I>kD) =)= 0, (74)
thus, the system (73) can be solved uniquely for the vector of
instruments
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B
and hence the optimal policy is controllable. However, for 
B > 0,
= > D -> 00 as t 00 
and if
00K -> K <°° as t 00
then
D/^ -* °° as t -*• 00 .
By definition the optimal policy is controllable but not, 
in general, with stable instruments if the optimal values C, K, 
and E converge to finite values. This result is in contrast to 
that obtained by Arrow and Kurz [1970, p 150] who found the optimal 
policy was controllable with stable instruments. The reason for 
the divergence of results is that Arrow and Kurz assumed an 
exogenous growth factor. Thus as t -* 00 both the debt and output 
grow at the exogenous rate of growth and the ratio of debt to 
output approaches a constant finite value.
The remaining case is where the instruments are borrowing 
and a consumption tax. The system to be solved is
x
0 -l xc I*-sy
-y 0 B C*- (l-s)y
(75)
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The rank of the instrument matrix is 2 and hence the optimal policy 
is controllable by borrowing and a consumption tax. However, as 
in the last case the policy is not controllable with stable 
instruments.
6 * 10 Conclusion
This chapter continued the analysis of optimal investment 
with pollution generated by production. For the model of section 6*2 
pollution is both a welfare cost in that it yields disutility to 
the community directly and a production cost in that for a given 
level of capital input, pollution decreases the amount of output 
produced.
For the model of section 6*2 we found, as in Chapter V, that 
in the long run the economy tends to a lower capital stock than 
that predicted by the neoclassical analysis. In equilibrium, 
output is allocated such that the direct plus indirect marginal 
benefits of pollution control is equal to the marginal cost of 
control in terms of foregone consumption.
In section 6*3 we considered that pollution was an input 
to production with a negative marginal product. The planning 
objective was to minimize the deviations of current consumption 
from the maximum sustainable consumption level. This formulation 
allowed an analysis of the optimal trajectories in the (K,P) 
state space from arbitrary initial endowments.
The comparative statics analysis of 6*4 showed that (for 
the general model) slowly decaying pollution results in a lower 
capital stock, lower consumption, and a higher level of pollution
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control in equilibrium than rapidly decaying forms, but the 
direction of the change in the pollution stock is not known.
It is not certain whether societies with high rates of discount 
on future utility will have higher pollution levels in the future 
than those societies with lower discount rates.
In this chapter we also considered the problem of policy 
implementation in a decentralized society. The study is formalized 
with the introduction of the concept of controllability given by 
Arrow and Kurz [1970]. The results in most cases parallel those of 
Arrow and Kurz. The differential equations in the Arrow and Kurz 
study were linear in the controls while those studied here could be 
non-linear. We saw however that this did not affect the solution 
since the differential equations were not used directly.
It was shown that there must be at least as many instruments 
as there are targets (two in this case). This is Tinbergen's 
Theorem [1952] and was to be expected. While this in general is a 
necessary condition it is by no means sufficient as shown by the 
fact that a savings tax with borrowing will not in general control 
the optimal policy. This demonstrates that a mere counting of 
instruments is not sufficient to determine the controllability of 
the optimal policy. Each case must be considered separately to ensure 
that the policy can be controlled.
Further it is dangerous to link the number of required 
instruments to the number of state variables in the original 
Pontryagin problem. The controllability analysis of this chapter 
applies equally to the optimal policies of Chapter IV and Chapter V 
where there is only one state variable.
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Given that we have no theory of cost in employing our 
instruments the concept of controllability with stable instruments 
was introduced. It was shown that while the optimal policy is 
controllable by borrowing accompanied by either an income tax or 
a consumption tax, the policy is not controllable with stable 
instruments. This leaves the case where the policy is controlled 
with two taxes - one on saving, the other on consumption.
This completes our study of optimal capital accumulation 
in a polluted environment. We turn our attention now to less 
aggregative models and concentrate on commodity substitution as 
it affects the pollution problem.
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APPENDIX 6A
A SUFFICIENCY THEOREM
In this appendix we prove a sufficiency theorem for an 
optimal control problem where the time horizon is unbounded, the 
endpoint is free and some costates may be non-positive.'*' The 
control problem is of the form
f 00
max e ptF(x,y,u)dt (1)
* o
subject to
x = g(x,y,u) , x(0) = xq (2)
y = f(x,y,u) , y(0) = yQ (3)
h(x,y,u) _> 0. (4)
x(t), y(t), u(t) have dimension n^, and n^ respectively, 
g, f, and h have dimension n^, n^ and n^ respectively. F, g, and h 
are concave while f is convex. e ^  is a discount factor with p > 0.
Theorem.
Let F(x,y,u), g(x,y,u), h(x,y,u) be concave functions and
let f(x,y,u) be convex. Let (x*,y*,u*) be a feasible policy which 
satisfies the necessary conditions
V F+4) V g+ijj V f+qV h = 0 (5)u x uö y u u
1 Other general sufficiency theorems are given by Mangasarian 
[1966] and Kamien and Schwartz [1971]. These papers assumed 
a finite time horizon and given terminal transversality 
conditions. The proof in this appendix is similar to that of 
Mangasarian.
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*x = p,,JX- (VxF+^ Vx ^ y Vx f+qVXh)
ip = pip -  (V F+ij; V g+ijj V f+qV h) 
y y y x y° y y ^ y
q Ü 0 , q h ( x , y , u )  = 0
and a l s o
ip > 0x —
< 0
y -
and t h e  t r a n s v e r s a l i t y  c o n d i t i o n s
( 6 )
( 7 )
( 8 )
(9 )
(10)
l im  e p t \p x = 0 , l im  e p t (p y = 0.  (11)
t “ H X 3 t - *"0 0  ^
Then i f  ( x , y , u )  i s  any o t h e r  f e a s i b l e  p o l i c y ,  w i t h  x , y  bounded,
,00
e _ P t F ( x * , y * , u * ) d t  _> 
J o
r00
J o
e p t F ( x , y , u ) d t ( 12)
P r o o f .
,00
e “ p t { F ( x * , y * , u * ) - F ( x , y , u ) } d t  
J o
>
• 00
e~p t V F * ( x * - x ) d t  + 
' o
r°°
e _ p t V F * (yÄ- y ) d t  + 
o
,oo
e ” p t V F* ( u * - u ) d t  u•* o
(from t h e  c o n c a v i t y  o f  F ) .
C o n s i d e r  t h e  f i r s t  i n t e g r a l .  Using  (6)
00
e " p t {V F * (x*-x )}d t  = 
J o
r ° °  #
e P t {pip*-ip*} ( x * - x ) d t
X X ^o
+
,oo
e _PÜ{ - ( i|j*V g*+ip*V f*+q*V h * ) } ( x * - x ) d t  x x  y x xJ o
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e ^^^5l'c{g*—g}dt 4- e Pt{-(4>*V g*4-ifj*V f,"c+q*V^h5!c) } (x*-x)dt 
o X ' o
-e pt>  (x*-x) (integrating by parts)
e pt>*{g*-g}dt + e pt{-(^>vV g*+i|j*V f*+q*V h*)}(x*-x)dt x x  y x x
using (11)
and assuming x*, x are bounded.
Similarly
e ptVyF*(y*-y)dt e~pt>*{f*-f}dt + e Pt{-0p*Vy
g*4-^*Vyf*4-q*Vyh*)}(y*-y)dt.
Also
i QtV F*{u*-u}dt e pt{_(^*Vug*+4;*Vuf*+q*Vuh*) } (u*-u)dt
from (5).
Combining these results and rearranging we obtain
e pt{F(x*,y*,u*)-F(x,y,u)}dt
e pt^*{g*-g-(V g* (x*-x)4-V g* (y*-y)+V^g* (u*-u) ) }dt
4- e ptijj*{f*-f-(Vxf*(x*-x)+Vyf*(y*-y)+Vuf*(u*-u))}dt
4-
fOO
e~p t q*{-(V h*(x*-x)+V h*(y*-y)+Vuh*(u*-u))}dt 
o
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<*00
e PS ^g*-g-(vxg* (x*-x)+V g*(y*-y)+Vug* (u*-u)) }dt 
o y
+ e pt (-^p{f-f*-(VxfMx-x*)+VyfMy-y*)+Vuf*(u-u*)) }dt
e pt{q*h-q*h*}dt from the concavity of h.
_> 0 since g is concave, f is convex, and 
q*h >_ 0 , q*h* = 0.
If any of F, g, h is strictly concave or f strictly convex, then
<*00
e ptF(x*,y*,u*)dt > 
•’ o
<30
e ptF(x,y,u)dt 
*o
unless x* = x, y* = y, u* = u. In other words the optimal 
solution is unique.
Corollary.
If we can find a path (x,y,u,^x ,ij> ) which satisfies the 
conditions of the above theorem and which converges to an 
equilibrium then this path is an optimal path. If any of 
F, g, h is strictly concave or f strictly convex, then the path
leading to the equilibrium is the unique optimal solution.
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APPENDIX 6B
In this section of the appendix we derive the conditions
necessary for policy switches between policies C, D and F in the region
K < K for the problem of section 6*3. We use the information in 6*3
on the policies and the fact that the costates and ^  must be
2continuous functions of time. Notice that any switch can only occur 
for at the switch. Thus by looking at the relative motions
of the imputed prices immediately before or immediately after a 
switch we can determine which switches may take place. The following 
equation gives the determination of the relative motion of the 
prices at the instant of a switch:
= 3^2^^p+a+^-g’/$} • (13)
Policy C may switch to:
(i) Policy D. Since on D, \J;^ <_ fchen immediately
after the switch
^1 -
=> 3<J)p+a+4>K-g’/ß _> 0 from (13).
(ii) Policy F. In this case >_ after the switch
to F. Thus
64>p+a+<t>K-g’ /$ 1 0.
2 See Pitchford [1972],
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Policy D may switch to:
(i) Policy C. Since on D, ^  <_ then prior
to a switch to C it must be true that
1^ —
and hence Stfip+a+cj^ -g’ <_ 0.
(ii) Policy F. The same conditions apply for a 
D-F switch as for a D-C switch.
Policy F may switch to:
(i) Policy C. _> for policy F. Hence immediately
before a switch it is essential that
i|^1 + ^2$ £  0
that is,
3<J>p+a+4>K-g' /g 2L °*
(ii) Policy D. A switch to D also requires
ßcjjp+a+^-g’ /g _> 0.
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CHAPTER VII
POLLUTION IN A TWO SECTOR ECONOMY
To this point we have been considering the pollution problem 
in highly aggregative models of economic activity. In the previous 
chapters we were concerned with a homogeneous output which when 
produced (or consumed) generated pollution. Pollution was controlled 
by devoting a portion of output to cleaning up pollution. The 
purpose of this chapter is to remove the assumption of a single 
homogeneous commodity.
It is clear that not all commodities pollute in the same 
manner. Indeed, Commoner [1971], in discussing the pollution problem, 
points to the proliferation in the post-war era of new commodities 
which deteriorate the environment. There are non-returnable 
bottles and cans, detergents, synthetic plastics, synthetic 
fertilizers, DDT and so on. In this chapter we examine the choice 
between different commodities in the light of the pollution problem.
We assume that there are two sectors in the economy (such as 
manufacturing and agriculture) each producing a single homogeneous 
commodity. To begin with it will be assumed that only one sector 
or commodity generates pollution. In this case fairly definite 
results can be obtained. We then turn to the case where both 
commodities cause pollution. The results here are less definite.
In the course of this work we shall rediscover several 
traditional results; however, the source of these results and their 
full implications are much clearer in the context of a general 
equilibrium model than in a model of a single isolated producer.
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The effects of pollution control on product prices and factor 
prices are seen more clearly if the industry rather than the 
individual firm is considered.
The competitive solution will be examined in section 7*1 and 
then compared with the optimal solution in section 7*2. The effect 
of factor immobility is examined in section 7*3. Pollution from both 
commodities is considered in section 7*4. Sections 7*5 and 7*6 
investigate dynamic versions of the models where pollution is a 
stock. A brief look at the conditions for establishing a pollution 
control industry is taken in section 7*7. Section 7*8 concludes the 
discussion.
7•1 The Competitive Solution
It is assumed that there are two industries producing two 
commodities X and Y with the use of two factors, capital, K, and 
labour, L. The production functions for the two goods are
Y = Y O C ^ L p (1)
x = x (k 2 ,l 2) (2)
K1 , K2 
L1 L2 ’
where X and Y are homogeneous of degree one in capital and labour. 
Production is assumed to be subject to the law of diminishing
returns.
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Capital is assumed to be owned by households who sell the 
services to firms. Capital and labour services are in perfectly 
inelastic supply and are perfectly mobile so that
K = K1+K2 (3)
L = L^+L^. (4)
The firms are assumed to act competitively and maximize 
profits. Producers of Y solve the following programming problem,
max t t, = pY(K, ,L, )-rK, -wL, (5)
K1’L1
where p is the price of Y in terms of X and r and w are the prices 
of capital and labour respectively (also in terms of X). These 
prices are taken as given by the producers.
Producers of X solve
max tt 2 = X(K_2 »L^-rK^-wI^ . (6)
K2 ’L2
Both firms will equate the price of a factor to the value of its 
marginal product
w = (7)
r ax3K2 • (8)
The above optimization can be summarized by relating X and 
Y via the production transformation curve
X = T(Y) (9)
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where
T T < 0 , T" < 0 (10)
with producers selecting a production point on T such that
p = -T\ (11)
Consumers are assumed to be identical and possess a utility 
function which depends upon the consumption of X and Y and the level 
of pollution W. The marginal utilities of X and Y are assumed to be 
positive but diminishing. The marginal utility of pollution is 
negative and decreasing. We will also assume that the utility 
function is separable in consumption and pollution.
U = U (X, Y , W)
U X  > 0 , < 0
(12)uY > 0 , uYY < 0
uxw uYW 0 .
Also we assume U^Y _> 0.
The budget constraint for the consumer is
rK4vL = pY+X. (13)
The consumers seek to maximize their utility subject to their 
budget constraint. In maximizing their utility they take the 
prices and the level of pollution as given. This is in keeping 
with the assumption of an atomistic market.^ In equilibrium, the
1 See Arrow and Hahn [1971, Chapter 6].
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consumer purchases a bundle (X,Y) such that
assuming an interior solution.
We come now to the pollution function. It is assumed that 
the level of pollution W depends upon the current level of the output 
of Y,
W = W(Y) (15)
where
W' > 0 , WM >_ 0. (16)
This formulation allows for the possibility that pollution is generated
either by consumption or production of Y. This is only one possible 
2formulation.
The competitive equilibrium is portrayed in Figure 1. The 
curves 1^ and 1^ will be termed "private" indifference curves although 
the term indifference is not totally appropriate. These indifference 
curves are drawn on the assumption of a constant level of pollution.
2 For example, the amount of pollution may also depend upon the
Kifactor intensity for a given output level: W = W(Y, -— ).
L1
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X = T (Y)
price line p*
Figure 7‘1
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In the presence of the pollution level W*, the competitive
3equilibrium is "conditionally Pareto efficient". That is at
prices (p*,w*,r*) and allocation (X*,Y*,K*,K2j,L*,L^) producers are 
maximizing profits and consumers are maximizing their utility subject 
to the existence of the amount of pollution W*. The competitive 
equilibrium, in general, will not be Pareto efficient when the choice 
set includes W as well as X and Y.
Before proceeding to the optimal solution, we shall examine
the competitive solution a little closer. In order to aid the
4examination we state without proof the following lemmas. Some 
of these relations will be of use in later sections.
Lemma 1
where
3X \ 
9L2 • X ’
Ki
i L i = 1,2.i
Lemma 2
P = (rY"rx)q
where
q =
w
r
3 See Arrow and Hahn [1971, Chapter 6].
4 These may be found in Takayama [1972, Chapter 2, pp 45-53].
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Lemma 3
X = A(K - ~  L) - Bq
Y = -A(K - —  L) + Bq
- T  L) + £wBq
X-Y = C(K-L) - Dq
where A, B, C, A, B, D, e^, and ck are defined as follows
1 K 1 K
k2 kl L2 k2 kl L1
k2‘kl {(rXk2+(1 rX)kl)a2+Klöl/L2}
k2“kl {(rYkl+(1 rY)k2)al+K2ö2/Ll}
1 LK
k2~kl LiL2
D = B + B
o , (_i) / (d£) i = 1 2. e - . Ii k k ; V  q ; » ’ W dY * W
Lemma 3 allows us to examine the effects of an increase in 
factor supplies. Suppose that Y is capital intensive (k^ > k2> 
and that there is an increase in the stock of capital. At constant 
prices, the output of Y increases while the output of X decreases. 
The level of pollution rises as Y rises. Further information about 
the preferences of the community is required in order to determine 
what happens to the equilibrium price as the supply of capital 
increases. These price effects could slightly offset the changes
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in X and Y. If the supply of labour increases with capital 
supplies and prices constant, the level of pollution will fall.
7 • 2 The Optimal Solution
As pointed out above the competitive equilibrium may not be 
Pareto efficient when the choice set includes W as well as X and Y. 
This fact is demonstrated in this section. We assume the existence 
of a Central Planning Board who seeks to maximize the consumers’ 
utility by taking pollution into account.
The planning board seeks solutions to
max U(X,Y,W(Y))
X,Y
subject to
T(Y)-X _> 0
(17)
Y >_ 0 , X > 0.
Necessary conditions for an optimal solution to this problem are 
UX~X 1  0 ’ X[U -A] = 0
uy +u w w ’+a t ’ £ 0  , y [u y +u w w '+a t ’] = 0 (18)
X >_ 0 , T(Y)-X >_ 0 , A[T(Y)-X] = 0.
As long as U > 0 for finite X, then X > 0, and hence X
T(Y)-X = 0. Assuming X > 0, Y > 0, the above conditions reduce to
(18’)
X = T(Y) .
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(18') states that at the optimal solution, the marginal rate 
of substitution adjusted for pollution effects should equal the 
marginal rate of transformation. Of course, the solution occurs on 
the production frontier.
The social marginal rate of substitution is given by
dX I
dY IU=constant
UY+UWW ' (19)
while the private marginal rate of substitution is given by
dX
dY (20)
For any given bundle (X,Y)
Y_
X
> W ' (21)
In words, at any given point the social indifference curve is flatter 
than a private indifference curve (except in cases where the social 
indifference curve is positively sloped). This is illustrated in 
Figure 2.
1 1  2 2 1^, I2 are private indifference curves while 1^, are social
indifference curves. Competitive equilibrium is at (X-^,Y^) while the
social equilibrium is at • That the social equilibrium occurs
at a lower level of Y follows from the concavity of the production
2frontier and the fact that the indifference map I is flatter at
any point than map I .
17b.
Figure 7*2
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2 1Curve 1  ^ is drawn to intersect I^ at the competitive
2equilibrium. At (X-^ ,Y-^ ) the utility level is the same for 1  ^as
for 1  ^ - U(X^,Y^,W(Y^)). Since 1  ^ is a higher level of utility than 
21 ,^ it follows that the consumers’ utility at ^ 2 ^ 2 )  is higher than 
at (X1 ,Y1).
In a centralized society, the planners could direct resources 
so that the bundle ^ 2 ^ 2 )  would be produced. However, in a 
decentralized system the government works through the market. It is 
clear that the market gives the wrong signals so that government 
intervention is warranted. Consumers in neglecting the pollution effects 
of Y, overvalue Y. Hence, Y is overproduced. The government seeks 
to manipulate prices so that producers produce at ^ 2 ^ 2 )  and 
consumers consume at ^ 2 ^ 2 )  .
We shall use the Pigovian approach - a per unit tax on Y.
This approach is motivated by observing the difference between the 
private and social marginal rates of substitution. The tax drives 
a wedge between the price of Y paid by households and the price 
received by firms.
In social equilibrium, the price ratio facing producers 
reflects the true social value of the two goods. Consumers must 
pay a distorted price to force them to consume at ^2^2). The 
appropriate tax rate (in terms of X) is
uww’t (x 2 ,y 2) * (22)
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The price paid by consumers is
C
P
(x 2>y 2)
while that received by producers is
P W '
(x 2>y 2)
cp -t.
(23)
(24)
The tax revenue tY^ which is collected must be returned as a 
lump-sum subsidy to the households in order that they be able to 
purchase the bundle (X2,Y2). From constant returns to scale and 
perfect competition we have
(pC-t)Y2+X2 = rK+wL (25)
or
pCY2+X2 = rK+wL+tY2.
Q
Consumer expenditure is p Y2+X2 which exceeds their factor earnings 
rK+wL by the amount tY2.
It should be mentioned that as a result of taxing Y, the 
relative price of Y to producers has fallen. From Lemma 1 and 
Lemma 2, the relative price of the factor used intensively in the 
production of Y falls. If it is assumed that all consumers own the 
same amounts of all services, then this need not cause any trouble. 
However, if there is a capitalist class and a worker class say, then 
compensation may be required to ensure that no one is made worse off.
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To this point we have been assuming that the optimal solution 
is an interior solution. It is interesting to ask whether it may be 
optimal to ban the production of Y altogether. Returning to the 
necessary conditions we have for X > 0, Y = 0:
W -T ’ (18")
X = T (0) .
A sufficient condition for Y = 0 is that
UY (X,0,0)+Uw (X,0,0)W’(0) £ 0  (26)
which states that an increase in Y (from 0) yields a negative gain 
in utility since the disutility from pollution offsets the utility 
from consuming Y. This condition is stronger than necessary. A 
weaker sufficient condition is that
UY (X,0,0)+Uw (X,0,0)W’(0) <_ -T'(0)Ux (X,0,0). (27)
In (27) it is possible for an increase in Y to yield a positive increase 
in utility; however, the loss in utility from giving up X is greater 
than the gain from increasing Y. Thus if (27) holds it is optimal 
to ban Y.
Both of the above sufficient conditions require that UY (X,0,0) 
be finite. Further, banning the production of Y will not be optimal if
T f(0) = 0
and Uw (X,0,0)W’(0) = 0.
(28)
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While it may not be optimal to ban the production of Y even if 
Uy (X,0,0) is finite, it is possible that banning will increase 
welfare above the level achieved by the competitive process. This 
is illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 7*3
The optimal solution occurs at ^ 2 ^ 2 ) while the competitive solution
2 2 is at (X^,Y^). The curve is a higher level of utility than 1^
2but lower than I^. So banning is superior to the competitive 
solution but inferior to the optimum. It can also be seen in 
Figure 3, that any tax-subsidy scheme which leaves the society on 
the transformation curve between the socially optimal solution and 
the competitive solution will increase welfare over the market solution.
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7•3 Factor Immobility
So far we have assumed that factors are perfectly mobile 
between sectors. In this section we consider the opposite extreme: 
factors are perfectly immobile between sectors.
The production set is the rectangular region described by the 
inequalities
0 <_ X <_ X*
0
0 <_ Y <_ Y*.
If all factors are offered in perfect inelastic supply, then 
production will take place at (X*,Y*). The competitive equilibrium 
price ratio is determined by the slope of the consumer indifference 
curve at that point. This is shown in Figure 4 by map l \
Figure 7*4
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The Central Planning Authority seeks to
max U(X,Y,W(Y))
X,Y
subject to
0 <_ X <_ X*
°  <_ Y  <_ Y * .
If Uy+U^W' > 0 at (X*,Y*) then the socially optimal solution is
(X*,Y*) - the same output mix as produced by the competitive
mechanism. The reason for this result is that there is no trade-off
in production between commodity Y and commodity X. As long as
consumers are not satiated in Y it pays to move to (X*,Y*). This
2case is shown in Figure A by map I .
On the other hand if U_r+UTTW' < 0 for some Y < Y*, then theY w
optimal solution differs from the competitive solution and in fact 
requires unemployment of factors employed in industry Y. Here it is 
doubtful that a tax system would achieve the optimal solution since 
factors are in inelastic supply. The tax would drive down the price 
of the factors employed in industry Y.
The assumption of perfectly immobile factors is as extreme as 
the assumption of perfectly mobile factors. It is more likely that 
factors of production are partially mobile. For example, capital 
may be immobile (at least in the short-run) while labour is mobile. 
As long as there are substitution possibilities and factors are in 
inelastic supply there is no need for unemployment of capital when 
product prices change as a result of pollution control. If the 
factors are partially mobile the production function has the general
shape shown in Figure 5.
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Figure 7*5
When factors are perfectly immobile between sectors, the 
competitive mechanism may not be inefficient. That is, the output 
mix selected is that which a centralized plan would select. However, 
the more mobile the factors are, the more inefficient we expect the 
competitive mechanism to be’. The*vwarning to be obtained from this 
section is that the existence of a polluting industry does not 
necessarily imply that the industry is overproducing (even if the 
industry is competitive).
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7•4 Pollution from Both Sectors
Suppose now that both commodities generate pollution. To begin 
with we assume that each produces a different type of pollution. 
Shortly, we shall assume a single homogeneous pollution.
The two types of pollution are
W1 = W2(X) , W ’ > 0 , Wj > 0 (30)
w2 = w2(Y) , W ’ > 0 , W2 i °* (31)
The utility function is now expressed as
U(X,Y,W1(X),W2(Y)). (32)
We assume that UV+UTJ W ' > 0 and Uv+Url W' > 0 for all (X ,Y) in
J. JL IN 2
the production set. This ensures that the social optimum is on the 
production frontier. The social marginal rate of substitution is
dX
dY
V UW2M2
ux+uWlwi (33)
and the private marginal rate of substitution is
dX
dY
The corrective tax on Y in terms of X is
(34)
t
UY+UW2W2
ux+uWlwi
or equivalently,
( V Wlwi-uxuw2w
iwyT
(35)
t (35')
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evaluated at the social equilibrium. It is seen from (35’) that 
we need more information in order to determine which commodity needs 
to have its production reduced. It is possible that no change is 
required.
To simplify the rest of the discussion we assume that both X 
and Y generate the same type of pollution W(X,Y) but perhaps in different 
amounts. The tax rate is
y uxVuYwxiw w (36)
The sign of t depends upon the sign of U W -UVWV .Ä  I I A
Y YIf —  = —  , then the tax rate is zero. The competitiveux wx
solution is the same as the optimal solution. In this case the 
private marginal rate of substitution is equal to the marginal rate 
of transformation of X for Y in maintaining a given level of pollution.
If —  > —  , then a per unit subsidy on Y is called for to expandux wx
its production and to reduce that of X. 
tax on Y is required.
For a positive
We have just shown that when both sectors pollute, the market 
may yield the socially optimal solution in the absence of 
government intervention. Without further information about the 
community preferences and the polluting effects of the commodities 
it is not possible to say which commodity will be taxed. The 
solution entails a movement along the boundary of the production set.
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If there exists a point (X*,Y*) in the interior of the
production set such that U + U W  = 0 and Uv+U W = 0, then it isX w X I W Y
optimal to operate at that point. That is, it is optimal to produce 
in the interior of the production possibilities set. This will 
require unemployment of factors. In this case, if the factors are 
supplied inelastically then a tax solution will not work.
7•5 A Dynamic Model with Factor Mobility
In the previous section we have considered pollution as a 
flow W = W(Y). If pollution is a stock and accumulates, then it 
cannot jump to the optimal endpoint. Instead, there is the problem 
of optimal adjustment of waste to the endpoint. We examine this 
problem now.
In order to simplify matters we introduce some additional 
assumptions and notation.
The pollution accumulation equation is taken to be
W = G(Y) - aW (37)
where a is the constant exponential rate of pollution decay. G is 
assumed to have the following properties:
G(0) = 0 , G' > 0 , G" > 0
(38)
G' (0) = 0.
The following limit conditions are imposed on the utility
function given by (12):
The production set is
T(Y)-X >_ 0
(40)
Y _> 0 , X >_ 0.
Rather than solving a free endpoint problem, we solve a fixed 
endpoint problem. The objective of the planning authority is to 
minimize the deviations of current utility from "Bliss" utility U.^
Bliss utility is the maximum sustainable level of utility and is found 
by solving the following programming problem:
max U(X,Y,G(Y)/a) (41)
X,Y
subject to
T (Y) -X >_ 0
Y >_ 0 , X _> 0.
Note the similarity between (41) and (17).
The vector solution (X,Y,W) to (41) is unique and 
characterized by
uv+u„ = -uYrY W a X
X = T (Y) .
(42)
5 This objective function was used in Ramsey [1928].
188.
The intertemporal objective may be expressed formally as
fiCO
min {U-U}dt (43)
X,Y o
subject to
W = G(Y) - aW , W(0) = Wq
W(°°) = W.
T(Y)-X >_ 0 
X > 0 , Y _> 0.
The Lagrangean is
L = U-U(X,Y,W)+ip(G(Y)-aW)+X1(T(Y)-X)+A2X+X3Y (44)
where ip is the costate associated with the state variable W and the 
A^ are multipliers associated with the inequality constraints.
The necessary conditions are: (see Hadley and Kemp [1971,
Theorem 5*41 and the ensuing discussion]).
-ux-*i+a2 = 0 (45)
-Uy+^G,+X1T'+X3 = 0 (46)
ip = atHUw (47)
X1 <_ ° , X1(T(Y)-X) = 0 (48)
x2 _< o , x2x = 0 (49)
x3 _< o , x3y = 0. (50)
We first show that it is never optimal to operate in the 
interior of the production set. Suppose T(Y) > X > 0. This implies 
from (45), (48), (49) that Ux = 0, but > 0 for finite X by
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assumption. Now suppose T(Y) > X = 0. In this case ®
which contradicts our assumptions. Thus an optimal trajectory 
must always keep the economy on the boundary of the production set. 
That is
T (Y)-X = 0. (51)
Now it will be demonstrated that no optimal policy will 
specialize production. Suppose X = T(Y) = 0. Then
Uy+^ G'
-T ’
or 0 - T ’(Y)
which is not possible. Thus X > 0 along optimal trajectories.
Consider Y = 0. From (46), we have
- U ^ X jO jW ^ i^ G’ (0)-Ux (X,0,W)T’ (0) = -Ar
Since -Uy (X,0,W) = -00 and -A^ >_ 0, it is clear that Y > 0 
along optimal trajectories.
We can now write the short-term equilibrium conditions as
-Uy+^G' = UXT ’ 
T(Y)-X = 0.
(52)
The Jacobian determinant of the system (52) is
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J
-u y y +^g ”-t ”u x -u x y t ’
T ’ -1
= Uy y -.(.G"+T"Ux+UxyT ' +UXYT ' + (T' ) 2UXX
< 0 if \p > 0. (53)
For \l> > 0, the short-term equilibrium is unique (Gale and Nikaido 
[1965, Theorem 7]). The possibility that <_ 0 cannot be ruled out 
on the basis of the conditions (52); however, it will be seen that 
ip > 0 along the optimal trajectory.
We can consider the system (52) solved for Y and X as functions 
of ip for ip > 0 with
The higher the costate ip, the higher the value of X and the lower 
the value of Y.
Now we construct the phase portrait of the system. Consider 
first the locus for which ^ = 0. This locus is defined only for 
ip > 0. Define
(54)
(55)
N(ip,W) = ctijj + Uw = 0
U,WW > 0 . (56)a
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The locus N(^,W) = 0 is upward sloping to the right in the positive 
quadrant with
lim
W+o \p=0
0 . (57)
ip for fixed levels of ip is a decreasing function of W. Thus to the 
right of ip = 0, we find ip < 0 and to the left ip > 0.
Now consider the locus for which W = 0. Define
M(^,W) = G(Y(iJ;)) - aW = 0 , ip > 0.
3 II o oA3-oV
II 1 p , \p > 0.
dib
dW
dA-=>-oVCDII (58)
W=0 dip
The locus M(i^ ,W) is downward sloping to the right in the first 
quadrant with
lim \p 
W-*o W=0
= lim 
Y+o
W ’
G'
(59)
W = 0 touches the W-axis at (W*,0). W* is the value of W for which 
W = G(Y*)/a where Y* is the solution of
UY+uxt? = 0
T(Y)-X = 0.
(60)
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The curve W = 0 extends into the fourth quadrant but the shape is 
undetermined since ip < 0. The curve does not pass W where W is 
associated with that Y such that T(Y) = 0.
For fixed levels of ip, W is a decreasing function of W.
Thus to the left of W = 0 W is increasing while to the right W is 
decreasing.
Figure 7«6
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It is clear from Figure 6 that the equilibrium is unique. 
Linearizing the system of differential equations (37), (47) about 
the equilibrium we have
P “ r “ I P  Pr » fiX. ! w ww
G dip | W  W
1
•___1 j^uww
P
1 --
- rr 1 ~€Er > l
where derivatives are evaluated at equilibrium. The characteristic 
roots of this system are
V 2  ' 1 I / 4(a2+UWWG’ (62)
which are real and opposite in sign. Thus the equilibrium is a 
saddle point. The stable branch is the optimal trajectory for this 
problem.
Suppose W(0) = W, then the planners select an ip (0) on the stable 
branch of the saddle. This i p ( 0 )  >  ip as seen from Figure 6. ip decreases
/\ A
until it reaches ip. This means that Y is set below Y and then increases
A
until it equals Y as indicated in Figure 7.
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0 Y(0)
Figure 7*7
If on the other hand W(0) < W, then \p is set below ip and increases 
over time. Y is set higher than Y, but never as high as Y* which is 
the competitive solution.
We pause at this point to comment upon the controllability 
of the optimal policy just derived. Suppose that individual agents 
solve the myopic maximization problems of section 7*1. The difference 
is that now pollution is a stock which will accumulate over time. We 
know that producers select a point on T(Y) such that
-T' = pP (63)
and consumers select a bundle (X,Y) such that
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Y_
X
C
P • (64)
In the absence of government intervention p = p ' and the competitive 
equilibrium occurs at (X*,Y*) in this model.
The optimal solution requires
(65)
Thus the tax rate on the output of Y can be calculated at every point 
in time from
T (66)
Having solved the central plan, the control authorities know the value 
of ip (and hence of (X,Y)) required to calculate the rate x in (66).
If the initial level of waste is higher than its desired level, 
optimality requires that the price received by producers of Y be 
forced down relative to the endpoint price and then rise over time 
until the endpoint has been reached. The price of the factor used 
intensively in the production of Y will also rise over time.
In the above proofs we made use of the assumptions Uy (X,0,W) = 00 
and/or G f(0) = 0. These were used in ruling out the possibility that 
Y = 0. If instead we assume that lIy(X,0,W) is finite and G* (0) is 
non-zero then
lim \p 
W+o W=0
= lim 
Y+o
w
G'
ip say. (67)
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This case is illustrated in Figure 8.
Figure 7»8
Now for sufficiently high levels of pollution, it is optimal 
to completely specialize in the production of commodity X over some 
time interval and then increase Y allowing it to approach its 
equilibrium value.
If in addition U^(X,Y,0) < 0, it may be optimal to specialize 
in X forever, leaving the waste to decay away. We will not pursue 
this matter here but refer the reader to Chapter IV above and 
Forster [1972b] for similar problems.
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7•6 A Dynamic Model with Factor Immobility
The analysis of section 7*5 assumed that the factors of 
production were mobile between sectors. In this section we assume 
that factors are perfectly immobile between the two sectors so that 
the production set is defined by the inequalities
0 <_ X £  X*
(29)
0 <_ Y <_ Y*
as in section 7*3 above. One might suspect at first glance that if 
G ’U +U —  > 0 at (X*,Y*) then the optimal policy calls for setting
X = X*, Y = Y* for all t analogously with the results of section 7*3. 
This is not correct however as we shall see below. Note first that 
in (29) there are 4 inequality constraints and only 2 controls; 
however, no more than 2 constraints can be effective at any time.
The Lagcangean for the problem, given the production set (29) 
is
L = U-U(X,Y,W)-H>(G(Y)-aW)+A;1 (Y*-Y)+X2 (X*-X)+A3Y+A4X. (68)
The necessary conditions are
Ux a 2+A4 0 (69)
-Uy+ ^ G ’—A^+A 3 = ° (70)
-9-ÖII
•
+  uw (71)
A1 1  0 5 AX (Y*-Y) = 0 (72)
A2 —  0 5 a 2 (x *-x ) = 0 (73)
A3 -  ° ) a 3y = 0
(74)
A. < 04 — > >- X II o (75)
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First we notice from (68), (73), (75) that X > 0 since if 
X = 0, A2 = 0 and
DX = > 4 - °
which is a contradiction. If X < X* then
ux =  0
which by assumption is not true for finite X. Hence X = X* for 
all time.
It is not optimal for Y = 0, since 
-U y + iPG' = -A3 .
As Y -*■ 0, —Uy -► and -A^ >_ 0. Hence
Y > 0.
The short-term equilibrium conditions then are
Ux ■ -A2
U y “ ^ G ’ =  - A  ^ .
We cannot rule out the possibility that Y < Y*. If Y < Y* then 
U -ipG' = 0
U A U (X*,Y*,W*)
Y - Y* for » = gT + g T l  g '(Y*)'----  =
When Y < Y*, (78) determines Y as a function of ip, with
dY
dip
G ’
Uyy-*G" 0 .
(76)
(77)
(78)
(78’)
(79)
(80)
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We now construct the (ip,W) phase plane. Consider first the 
ip =  0 curve. This curve is the same as in the previous section
di/
dW 0
and
lim ip I . = 0.
W->-o I ip=0
Now we turn to the W = 0 curve.
dip
dW W=0
pt dY < 0 
G dip
from
For ip <_ ip, we have 
(80),
lim ip ! . = a>
W-*o I W=0
and
lim ip = ip .
W+W* W=0
At ip, the curve W = 0 becomes vertical. These results are shown in 
Figure 9.
Figure 9 further assumes that the "Bliss" level of utility 
occurs for Y = Y* , X = X*, W = W*. For sufficiently high levels of 
initial waste, it is optimal to under produce commodity Y over a 
certain time interval. If the equilibrium occurs for ip >_ ip it is 
optimal (for "high" levels of waste) to under produce Y until
(81)
(82)
(83)
equilibrium is achieved.
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Y=Y*
Figure 7•9
If for the decentralized system, the factors of production 
are offered inelastically and if it is required to under produce Y, 
then the optimal policy in general is not controllable by a tax on 
output. This is because it is necessary to have some unemployment.
7•7 A Pollution Control Industry
In the aggregative models of Chapters IV-VI pollution was 
controlled by devoting a portion of total output to cleaning up 
pollution. In the previous sections of the present chapter, 
pollution was controlled only by altering the mix of commodities 
produced. There was no separate pollution control industry. For 
completeness we now consider the introduction of a third commodity - 
pollution control devices Z.
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Assume that the production surface is given by
Z = T(X,Y) (84)
where T is concave and T < 0, T < 0.X I
The amount of pollution W now depends upon the level of Z as 
well as Y.
W = W(Y,Z)
Wy > 0 , wyY >_ 0
wz . 0 , wzz > 0
WYZ = °-
The central planners solve
max U(X,Y,W(Y,Z))
X,Y,Z
subject to
Z = T(X,Y)
X > 0 , Y >_ 0 , Z > 0.
The necessary conditions, assuming X > 0, Y > 0, are
W y
(85)
(86)
(87)
Z = T(X,Y) (84)
"UWWZTX -  Ux » equality if Z > 0 (88)
-UwWzTy _< UY+UyWY , equality if Z > 0. (89)
If (88) or (89) are satisfied with strict inequality then the 
optimal value of Z is zero. Consider (88). The right-hand side
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is the utility gained by increasing the consumption of X. The 
left-hand side is the utility lost through decreasing Z in order 
to increase X. Thus if the gain from additional consumption of X 
exceeds the cost in terms of additional pollution, then the 
pollution control industry will not operate. A similar interpretation 
holds for (89) in terms of Y.
It is not easy to obtain a full picture of the solution since 
with three industries we require a three dimensional diagram.
However, if we fix Z at its optimal level and consider the projection 
of the production and utility surfaces onto the (X,Y) plane, we 
obtain a partial view. This is seen in Figure 10.
Figure 7*10
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The curve AB is the private production possibilities curve, i.e.,
the production frontier for X and Y given that Z is being produced. 
2Indifference map I is also drawn for Z = Z. The optimal solution 
is at (X,Y).
There remains the question of the decentralized solution. 
How is the pollution control industry to be financed?
We start the discussion by noting that from (87) a tax on the 
output of Y is required. The tax rate in terms of X is
t V y
(X,Y,Z)
(90)
This is similar to the problems discussed above. However, in 
section 7*3 it was shown that the tax revenue raised must be returned 
to the consumers. Now the tax revenue is to be used to finance the 
pollution control industry.
Suppose the government appoints a pollution control manager.
The manager is in charge of maximizing the output of pollution control 
subject to his budget constraint. Formally the manager seeks to
max Z(K~,L~)
K3 ’L3 
subject to
tY = rK^+wL^
where tY, r, w are taken as given.
(91)
The following conditions characterize the manager's solution:
1 _8Z 
X 3K3 (92)
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1 8Z
I 3 L 3 - " (93)
tY = rK3+wL3 (94)
where A is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget 
constraint.
Note that consumer expenditure is equal to consumer income since
(pC-t)Y+X = r(K1+K2)+w(L1+L2) (95)
or
pCY+X = r(K1+K2+K3)+w(L1+L2+L3). (96)
7•8 Conclusion
In this chapter we considered an economy which produced two 
commodities. The pollution characteristics of these commodities 
were different. Initially we assumed that only one good caused 
pollution. We also considered the effect of introducing factor 
immobility.
If there is only one polluting commodity and if factors of 
production are mobile, then the consumers overvalue the polluting 
commodity and it will be over produced in the absence of government 
intervention. In order to correct the situation a per unit tax on 
the output (or consumption) of Y is used. This reduces the relative 
price of Y received by producers while increasing the relative 
price of Y paid by consumers. The tax revenue is returned to the 
consumers as a lump sum payment. The price of the factor used 
intensively in the production of the polluting commodity falls
relative to that of the less intensive factor.
205.
With pollution from both commodities it is not possible, 
without further information about the community preferences and 
the relative polluting effects of both goods, to determine which 
good is to be taxed. As long as there is no point in the interior 
of the production set such that the consumer is satiated (after 
adjusting for pollution) in both commodities, the optimal solution 
requires a movement along the boundary of the production set. If 
there is a satiation point interior to the production set then it 
is optimal to operate inside the production frontier.
In the case of perfect factor immobility, if there is no 
satiation point in the closure of the production set then the 
competitive solution and the optimal solution coincide.
So far we have considered two commodities in a non-growing 
economy. Thus two generalizations for future work suggest 
themselves. First, the extension of the analysis to cover more 
than two goods is required. Here less definite results may be 
expected. The second extension is to a growth model where, say, 
capital accumulates. In this case the results will depend upon the 
polluting characteristics of the capital versus the consumption 
good.
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION
It has been the aim of this thesis to examine, at a theoretical 
level only, the basic relationships between pollution and economic 
activity. The time has come to draw together the various threads 
of the analysis. The study commenced with an examination of the 
evolution of an economy in which there was no control of pollution, 
and then proceeded to analyse optimal policies for pollution control. 
The problem of implementing these policies in a decentralized society 
was also considered.
Chapter III was a study in positive economics - the models 
analysed were descriptive not prescriptive. It was assumed that a 
constant proportion of output was invested in augmenting the capital 
stock. We then examined the growth of the economy under various 
assumptions about the production/pollution/pollution decay 
relationships. We saw that it was possible for the system to be 
unstable if pollution is a negative feedback to production.
Whether stability or instability prevails depends upon the 
feedback loop structure, the shapes of the functions and the data 
used. For example, consider the model in section 3*3, where 
pollution depresses the rate of natural decay. Here an equilibrium 
may be locally stable for one value of the savings ratio but locally 
unstable for a higher value. If there is a locally stable 
equilibrium, then the initial endowments of capital and pollution
determine the eventual outcome.
207.
If the pollution does not decay at all, or if capital does not 
depreciate and if pollution is a negative feedback to production, 
then the system is unstable. Output falls to zero along all 
trajectories.
In Chapter IV we examined pollution control in a stationary 
economy in which pollution is generated by consumption. Using 
Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle, we analysed the allocation of output 
between consumption and pollution control over time. We were 
interested in finding the conditions which would determine whether 
or not zero pollution is optimal for a given society. If the marginal 
utility of consumption in a clean environment is less than or equal 
to the marginal psychic cost of consumption in a clean environment, 
then the optimal strategy calls for a total elimination of pollution. 
Otherwise, the system moves to an equilibrium solution with a 
positive level of pollution. In order for zero pollution to be 
optimal it is necessary (but not sufficient) that the marginal 
disutility of zero pollution be non-zero.
The analysis of Chapter IV assumed zero growth in the productive 
capacity of the economy. Our attention in Chapters V and VI turned 
to optimal capital accumulation with pollution generated by the 
production process. In Chapter V we assumed that the pollution was 
a flow such as noise. This allowed us to work with only one state 
variable, capital, and hence obtain a phase analysis. It was assumed 
that pollution affected social utility but not production. It was 
shown in this case that the economy approaches an equilibrium 
characterized by a lower capital stock and a lower consumption level
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than if the disutility of pollution is ignored. In equilibrium, 
the marginal product of capital net of depreciation is equal to 
the social rate of discount plus the marginal rate of transformation 
of pollution control for capital in maintaining the equilibrium 
level of pollution. The equilibrium is independent of the utility 
function of pollution.
In Chapter VI we allowed pollution to be a state variable.
The results for the general model of section 6*2 were similar to 
those of Chapter V except that the equilibrium now depends upon the 
utility function as well as the technology. For the model of 
section 6*2 it was not possible to obtain a complete phase analysis, 
since the model was too general. In section 6*3 we considered a 
problem in which pollution affected production but not utility. The 
aim of the planners was to minimize the deviations of current 
consumption from Bliss consumption. Posing the problem in this 
fashion allowed us to obtain a synthesis of control in the P-K state 
space.
Of central interest is the locus defined by
ß<f>p+a-hf>K-g'/ß = 0 ,
since along this locus the community is investing in pollution control 
and productive capital. For (K,P) above this locus the optimal policy 
requires all output to be devoted to pollution control, while below 
this locus all output is to be invested in productive capital. Since 
the above locus is negatively sloped in the P-K state space, there 
is a region where it is optimal to devote all output to investment 
in capital even though pollution is above its long-run endpoint value.
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The optimal policies discussed in Chapters IV to VI can be 
easily implemented in centralized societies. The government can set 
the control variables at their optimal values. In decentralized 
societies the problem of policy implementation is not as easy. In 
Chapter VI we considered this problem of controllability of optimal 
policies in market economics. The work here closely followed that 
of Arrow and Kurz [1970] although the method of analysis was 
simplified. It was shown that if consumers save a constant positive 
fraction of their income (the behaviour assumed in Chapter III) then 
for the problems discussed in Chapters IV, V, and VI at least two 
instruments are required. If a tax on saving and a tax on 
consumption are used then the optimal policy is controllable with 
stable instruments. In the context of the present models if one tax 
and borrowing are the instruments then either the optimal policy is 
not controllable or is controllable but not with stable instruments.
The models analysed in Chapters III to VI were highly 
aggregative. This aggregation while useful in isolating certain 
features of the pollution problem, does serve to gloss over other 
interesting features. Chapter VII began an investigation of the 
pollution problem, where more than one commodity is produced in a 
stationary economy. We examined the choice of commodities in a 
competitive economy and in a centralized economy. If there is only 
one polluting commodity and if factors of production are perfectly 
mobile then the competitive solution is inefficient (assuming an 
interior competitive solution). The welfare level is increased if 
the polluting commodity is taxed. In some cases banning, while not 
optimal, may increase welfare above the level achieved by the market.
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If the factors of production are perfectly immobile between 
sectors then unless there is consumer satiation (after adjusting for 
pollution effects) for a value of output less than achieved by the 
market, then the two solutions are the same.
If both commodities pollute and if factors of production are 
mobile between sectors, further information is required in order to 
determine which commodity is being overproduced. It is possible 
that the market solution is the same as the centralized solution.
In the above studies I have not considered the problems of 
population growth or natural resource use. This approach was used 
to allow us to focus on the pollution problem. These other features 
are important. Indeed, the problems are very much interrelated.
This suggests an avenue for future research. The work may be 
difficult and solutions incomplete, however, since the more 
interesting problems will require augmenting the state space to at 
least three dimensions.
The theoretical analysis of this thesis lays bare the 
importance of information to the pollution problem. Zero pollution 
may be optimal in a pollution averse society but not optimal in a 
less pollution averse society for example. The few introductory 
comments in Chapter I about the 'Doomsday' debate show that the 
problem of information is a non-trivial one. The scientific 
questions are difficult to answer. Can we expect the social 
questions to be any less difficult? We cannot give up because we 
lack the information we desire for optimal decisions. Rather, this 
suggests that future research consider the problem of pollution and 
economic activity in a world of uncertainty and imperfect information.
211.
As Burmeister and Dobell [1970, p 416-417] state
Eventually our search must turn from a concern with 
exact optimality to a concern with the identification 
of policies that lead to satisfactory values of the 
criterion function and that are robust against shocks 
or possible misspecification.
These extensions may not be easy but they are challenging and 
their solution will be rewarding - both privately and socially.
212
BIBLIOGRAPHY
d'Arge, R.C., [1971], "Essay on Economic Growth and Environmental 
Quality", Swedish Journal of Economics, Vol. 73,
No. 1, pp 25-41.
d'Arge, R.C. and Kogiku, K.C., [1973], "Economic Growth and the 
Environment", Review of Economic Studies3 Vol. XL,
No. 1, pp 61-77.
Arrow, K.J., [1968]* "Application of Control Theory to Economic 
Growth", Mathematics of decision Science3 Fart 23 
American Mathematical Society, pp 85-119.
Arrow, K.J. and Hahn, F., [1971], General Competitive Analysis3 
Holden Day.
Arrow, K.J., Hurwicz, L. and Uzawa, H., [1961], "Constraint
Qualifications in Nonlinear Programming", Naval 
Research Logistics Quarterly3 Vol. 8, pp 175-191.
Arrow, K.J. and Kurz, M., [1969], "Optimal Public Investment
Policy and Controllability with fixed savings ratio",
Journal of Economic Theory3 Vol. 1, pp 141-177.
Arrow, K.J. and Kurz, M., [1970], Public Investment3 The Rate of
Return3 and Optimal Fiscal Policy3 Johns Hopkins Press.
Äthans, M. and Falb, P.L., [1966], Optimal Control : An
Introduction to the Theory and its Applications3 
McGraw-Hill.
Ayres, R.U. and Kneese, A.V., [1969], "Production, Consumption, 
and Externalities", American Economic Review3 
Vol. 59, pp 282-297.
Baumol, W.J. and Oates, W., [1971], "The Use of Standards and
Prices for Protection of the Environment", Swedish 
Journal of Economics3 Vol. 73, No. 1, pp 42-54.
Birkoff, G. and Rota, G.C., [1969], Ordinary Differential 
Equations3 Blaisdell.
Bohm, P., [1970], "Pollution, Purification, and the Theory of 
External Effects", Swedish Journal of Economics3 
Vol. 73, No. 1, pp 55-66.
Beckerman, W., [1972], "Economists, Scientists, and Environmental
Catastrophe", Oxford Economic Papers3 Vol. 24, No. 3, 
pp 327-344.
Brock, W.A., [1972], "A Polluted Golden Age", unpublished 
manuscript.
213.
Buchanan, J. and Stubblebine, W.C., [1962], "Externality",
Economioa3 Vol. 29, No. 116, pp 371-384.
Burmeister, E. and Dobell, A.R,, [1970], Mathematical Theories 
of Economic Growth3 Macmillan.
Boulding, K.E., [1966], "The Economics of the Coming Spaceship
Earth", in H.Jarrett (ed.), Environmental Quality in 
a Growing Environment3 Johns Hopkins Press.
Cass, D., [1965], "Optimum Growth in an Aggregative Model of
Capital Accumulation", Review of Economic Studies3 
Vol. 32, pp 233-240.
Chisholm, T. and Walsh, C., [1973], "Environmental Quality and 
Resource Allocation : A Proposed Framework for 
Analysis", paper presented at 17th Australian 
Agricultural Economics Society Annual Conference.
Coase, R., [1960], "The Problem of Social Cost", Journal of Law 
and Economics3 pp 1-44. Reprinted in Breit and 
Hockman, Readings in Microeconomics.
Coddington, E.A. and Levinson, N., [1965], Theory of Ordinary 
Differential Equations3 McGraw-Hill.
Converse, A.O., [1971], "On the Extension of Input-Output Analysis 
to Account for Environmental Externalities", American 
Economic Review3 Vol. 59, pp 197-198.
Commoner, B., [1971], The Closing Circle3 Jonathon Cape Ltd.
Dales, J.H., [1968], Pollution3 Property3 and Prices3 University 
of Toronto Press.
Davis, O.A. and Whinston, A.B., [1965], "Some Notes on Equating
Private and Social Cost", Southern Economic Journal3 
Vol. 32, No. 2, pp 113-126.
Dolbear, F.T., [1967], "On the Theory of Optimal Externality",
American Economic Review3 Vol. 57, pp 90-103.
Donaldson, D. and Victor, P., [1970], "On the Dynamics of Air
Pollution Control", Canadian Journal of Economics3 
Vol. 3, No. 3, pp 422-431.
Dorfman, R., [1969], "An Economic Interpretation of Optimal Control 
Theory", American Economic Review3 Vol. 59, pp 817-831.
Dorfman, R., Samuelson, P.A. and Solow, R.M., [1958], Linear
Programming and Economic Analysis3 McGraw-Hill.
Ehrlich, P.R. and Ehrlich, A.H., [1970], Population3 Resources3 
Environment3 W.H.Freeman and Co.
214.
Ecologist3 [1972], "A Blueprint for Survival", (revised edition 
Penguin Specials, [1972]).
Ecologist3 [1973], "Paul Ehrlich", interviewed by Nicholas Pole,
Vol. 3, No. 1, pp 18-25.
Forrester, J.W., [1971], World Dynamics3 Wright-Alien Press Inc.
Forster, B.A., [1971], "Optimal Consumption Planning in a Polluted 
Environment", Working Paper No. 5, Australian 
National University, (revised version forthcoming
in the Economic Record).
Forster, B.A., [1972a], "A Note on Economic Growth and Environmental 
Quality", Swedish Journal of Economics3 Vol. 74,
No. 2, pp 281-285.
Forster, B.A., [1972b], "A Note on the Optimal Control of Pollution",
Journal of Economic Theory3 Vol. 5, No. 3, pp 537-539.
Forster, B.A., [1972c], "Economic Growth and Pollution Control",
paper presented to the 44th Congress of the Australian 
and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of 
Science (ANZAAS), Sydney, Australia.
Forster, B.A., [1973a], "Optimal Capital Accumulation in a Polluted 
Environment", Southern Economic Journal.
Forster, B.A., [1973b], "Pollution and Economic Growth", paper
presented at the UNESCO, Man and the Biosphere Program, 
National Symposium, on "Energy and How We Live", 
(Adelaide 15th-18th May), forthcoming in the Proceedings 
of the Symposium.
Forster, B.A. and Logan, J., [1973], "The Welfare Economics of Water 
Resource Allocation over Time : Comment", Applied 
Economics.
Fox, K.A., Sengupta, J.K. and Thorbecke, E., [1966], The Theory of 
Quantitative Economic Policy with Applications to 
Economic Growth and Stabilisation3 North-Holland.
Gale, D. and Nikaido, H., [1965], "The Jacobian Matrix and Global 
Univalence of Mappings", Mathematische Annalen3 
Vol. 159, pp 81-93.
Haberler, G., [1950], "Some Problems in the Pure Theory of
International Trade", Economic Journal3 Vol. 60, 
pp 223-240.
Hadley, G. and Kemp, M.C., [1971], Variational Methods in Economics3 
North-Holland Publishing Co.
215.
Hahn, F.H., [1966], "Equilibrium Dynamics with Heterogeneous 
Capital Goods", Quarterly Journal of Economics3 
Vol. 80, No. 1, pp 633-646.
Hahn, F.H., [1970], "Some Adjustment Problems", Econometrica,
Vol. 38, No. 1, pp 1-17.
Hestenes, M.R., [1965], "On Variational Theory and Optimal Control
Theory", J. SIAM Control3 Ser. A, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp 23-48.
Intriligator, M.D., [1971], Mathematical Optimization and Economic 
Theory3 Prentice-Hall.
Kaplan, W., [1958], Ordinary differential Equations3 Addison-Wesley.
Keeler, E., Spence, M. and Zeckhauser, R., [1972], "The Optimal 
Control of Pollution", Journal of Economic Theory3 
Vol. 4, No. 1, pp 19-34.
Kneese, A.V., [1964], The Economics of Regional Water Quality 
Management3 Johns Hopkins Press.
Kneese, A.V., [1971], "Background for the Economic Analysis of
Environment Pollution", Swedish Journal of Economics3 
Vol. 73, No. 1, pp 1-24.
Kamien, M.I. and Schwartz, N.L., [1971], "Sufficient Conditions in 
Optimal Control Theory", Journal of Economic Theory3 
Vol. 3, pp 207-214.
Koopmans, T.C., [1965], "On the Concept of Optimal Growth", The
Econometric Approach to development Flanning, Rand 
McNally, pp 225-300.
Kuhn, H.W. and Tucker, A.W., [1951], "Non-linear Programming",
in Proceedings of the Second Berkeley Symposium on 
Mathematics Statistics and Probability3 ed. J.Neyman, 
pp 481-492, University of California Press.
Kurz, M. , [1968], "The General Instability of a Class of Competitive 
Growth Processes", Review of Economic Studies3 Vol. 35, 
No. 2, pp 155-174.
Klein, L., [1962], River Pollution3 II. Causes and Effects3 
Butterworths.
Lee, E.B. and Markus, L., [1967], Foundations of Optimal Control3 
John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
Leontief, W. , [1970], "Environmental Repercussions and the Economic 
Structure : An Input-Output Approach", Review of 
Economics and Statistics3 Vol. 52, No. 3, pp 262-271.
216.
Loehman, E. and Whinston, A., [1970], "The Welfare Economics of 
Water Resource Allocation over Time", Journal of 
Applied Economics3 Vol. 2, pp 75-99.
Mahbub U1 Haq, [1972], "The Limits to Growth : A Critique",
Finance and Development3 Vol. 9, No. 4, pp 2-8.
Maddox, J., [1972], The Doomsday Syndrome3 Macmillan London Ltd.
Mangasarian, O.L., [1966], "Sufficient Conditions for the Optimal 
Control of Nonlinear Systems", J. SIAM Control3 
No. 4, pp 139-152.
Meadows, D.H., Meadows, D.L., Ränders, J. and Behrens, W.W., [1972],
The Limits to Growth3 Earth Island Ltd.
Meyer, R.A., [1971], "Externalities as Commodities", American 
Economic Review3 Vol. 61, pp 736-740.
Mills, E.S., [1966], "Economic Incentives in Air Pollution Control", 
in H.Wolozin, ed., The Economics of Air Pollution3 
Norton.
Mishan, E.J., [1967], The Costs of Economic Growth3 Staples Press.
Mishan, E.J., [1971], "The Postwar Literature on Externalities :
An Interpretative Essay", Journal of Economic Literature3 
Vol. 9, No. 1, pp 1-28.
Musgrave, R.A., [1959], The Theory of Public Finance3 McGraw-Hill.
Myrdal, G., [1972], "Economics of an Improved Environment", Lecture 
delivered in the Distinguished Lecture Series, sponsored 
by the International Institute for Environmental Affairs 
with the support of the Population Institute, held in 
connection with the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment, Stockholm University.
Nath, S.K., [1969], A Reappraisal of Welfare Economics3 Routledge 
and Kegan Paul.
Neutze, M., [1971], "Welfare Economics and the Environment", Seminar 
paper presented in Department of Economics, SGS, 
Australian National University.
Noll, R.G. and Trijonis, J., [1971], "Mass Balance, General
Equilibrium and Environmental Externalities", American 
Economic Review3 Vol. 61, pp 730-735.
Parish, R.M., [1972], "Economic Aspects of Pollution Control",
Australian Economics Papers3 Vol. 11, pp 32-43.
217.
Pigou, A.C., [1932J, The Economics of Welfare3 4th ed., Macmillan.
Pauly, M.V., [1968], "On the Theory of Optimum Externality :
Comment", American Economic Review3 Vol. LVIII,
No. 3, pp 528-529.
Pitchford, J.D., [1972], "Population and Optimal Growth", Econometrica3 
Vol. 40, No. 1, pp 109-136.
Pitchford, J.D., [1973], Population in Economic Growth3 North-Holland 
Publishing Co. (forthcoming).
Plott, C.R., [1966], "Externalities and Corrective Taxes", Economica3 
Vol. 33, No. 129, pp 84-87.
Plourde, C.G., [1972], "A Model of Waste Accumulation and Disposal",
Canadian Journal of Economics3 Vol. 5, No. 1, pp 119-125.
Pontryagin, L.S., [1962], Ordinary Differential Equations3 
Addison-Wesley.
Pontryagin, L.S., Boltyanskii, V.G., Gamkrelidze, R.V. and Mishchenko, E.F., 
[1962], The Mathematical Theory of Optimal Processes3 
John Wiley and Sons.
Preston, A.J., [1972], "A Paradox in the Theory of Optimal
Stabilization", Review of Economic Studies3 Vol. 39, 
pp 423-432.
Quirk, J. and Ruppert, R., [1967], "Global Stability and Phase
Diagrams", Research Papers in Theoretical and Applied 
Economics3 Research Paper No. 11, University of Kansas.
Ramsey, F.P., [1928], "A Mathematical Theory of Saving", Economic 
Journal3 Vol. 38, pp 543-559.
Rothkopf, M., [1973], "World Models won't work", New Scientist3 
Vol. 57, p 654.
Ruff, L.E., [1972], "A Note on Pollution Prices in a General
Equilibrium", American Economic Review3 Vol. 62, 
pp 186-192.
Samuelson, P.A., [1947], Foundations of Economic Analysis3 Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press.
Samuelson, P.A., [1967], "Indeterminacy of Development in a
Heterogeneous Capital Model with Constant Saving 
Propensity", Essays on the Theory of Optimal Economic 
Growth3 edited by K.Shell, MIT Press, pp 219-231.
Samuelson, P.A., [1970], Economics3 8th edition, McGraw-Hill.
Shell, K., [1967a], Essays on the Theory of Optimal Economic Growth3 
MIT Press.
v
218.
Shell, K. , [1967b], "A Model of Inventive Activity and Capital
Accumulation", in K.Shell ed., Essays on the Theory 
of Optimal Economic Growth3 MIT Press, pp 67-85.
Shell, K. and Stiglitz, J., [1967], "The Allocation of Investment
in a Dynamic Economy", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 81, pp 592-609.
Smith, V.L., [1972], "Dynamics of Waste Accumulation : Disposal 
Versus Recycling", Quarterly Journal of Economics3 
Vol. 86, pp 600-616.
Starrett, D.A., [1972], "Fundamental Nonconvexities in the Theory
of Externalities", Journal of Economic Theory3 Vol. 4, 
No. 2, pp 180-199.
Stern, A.C., [1968], Air Pollution3 Vol. 1, 2nd ed., Academic Press.
Streatfield, G., [1973], "No Limit to the Growth Debate", New 
Scientist3 Vol. 57, pp 531-533.
Senate Report, [1969], Air Pollution3 Report of the (Australian) 
Senate Select Committee, Commonwealth Government 
Printing Office.
Takayama, A., [1972], International Trade3 Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston Inc.
Tinbergen, J., [1952], On the Theory of Economic Policy3 North- 
Holland Publishing Co., Second Edition.
Vousden, N., [1973], The Economics of Exhaustible Resources: A
Theoretical Contribution3 Ph.D. dissertation to be 
submitted at the Australian National University.
